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ABSTRACT 
Academic research lends significant empirical support to the expectation that 
there is a strong link between the economy and election outcomes. Voters hold 
incumbents responsible for developments in the national economy: public sup-
port for government parties drops when the economy preforms poorly and 
increases when the economy grows. However, not all elections are determined 
by the economy. The history has witnessed political leaders being voted out of 
office during periods of prosperity, and getting re-elected amidst deep reces-
sions. Academic work on the topic, too, suffers from the lack of consistency in 
research results. Empirical evidence of economic voting is found often, but not 
always and not everywhere, and it remains unclear why that is.  
The recent global crisis has further accentuated the concerns as to the insta-
bility of economic voting. The majority of Western countries experienced its 
deepest recession since 1930ies, leaving governments struggling to cope with 
dropping revenues, increased expenditure and record high borrowing, and forc-
ing many of them to pursue painful austerity measures. According to classic 
economic voting theories, such remarkable economic instability should lead to 
major political consequences. Indeed, in a number of countries, governing par-
ties witnessed landslide electoral defeat, but on several other occasions incum-
bents managed to maintain their position despite the unprecedented economic 
turmoil. This has highlighted the need to better understand the link between 
economic conditions and popular evaluations of political incumbents.  
The instability in economic voting was the main motivation for writing this 
dissertation. If the link between economic conditions and elections does not 
exist, then voters’ ability to assign responsibility for poor economic outcomes is 
limited, and this leaves leaders free to pursue whatever policies they please 
irrespective of their public consequences. The dissertation addressed the insta-
bility in economic voting from three different aspects, which were considered in 
three empirical chapters. Firstly, it tested the overall strength of the link 
between the economy and political support. Giving careful consideration to 
methodological issues, it explored the stability of economic voting in ten estab-
lished Western European democracies, using individual-level data for five 
survey years between 1989–2014 and a total sample of more than 55,000 
respondents. The analysis provided solid evidence that economic considerations 
have a strong effect on incumbent support. Citizens clearly withdraw support 
from governments during economic decline and rally behind incumbents when 
the economy flourishes. Outliers do exist, but overall, the economy matters to 
voters in developed democracies, in that citizens regularly observe national 
economic outcomes and shape their electoral decisions accordingly.  
Secondly, the work examined the performance of economic voting in Europe 
in the wake of the financial and economic crisis. The aim of this section was to 
compare economic voting in ordinary versus extraordinary times, and to scruti-
nise the political consequences of the severe economic turbulence of 2007–
2009. Theoretically, we should have witnessed strong sanctioning of political 
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leaders during the crisis as the impact of economic performance on government 
support is typically stronger during hard times. On the other hand, in the 
increasingly interwoven world economic voting could be becoming less pro-
nounced because economic responsibility is more difficult to apportion. The 
findings, however, demonstrate that there is very little abrupt change in eco-
nomic voting over time. The statistical relationship between the economy and 
voting remained remarkably constant, even after the most dramatic economic 
recession in our lifetime, suggesting that the economic voting mechanism is 
largely immune to external shocks.  
The third, and final, empirical chapter revealed a new dimension of eco-
nomic voting by shifting the focus onto national economic policies. I argued 
that when the clarity of economic responsibility is poor and when the economy 
is in recession everywhere, citizens may need additional sources of information 
than macroeconomic outcomes to help them form a reasoned opinion about the 
economic competence of incumbents. Using comparative survey data, which in 
this empirical chapter were extended to 24 European countries and more than 
77,000 respondents, and utilising macroeconomic indicators novel to political 
science research, I showed that in addition to traditional retrospective economic 
evaluations, the policy context helps explain electoral outcomes. Citizens pay 
more attention to national fiscal policies after the crisis than they did before, 
and hold incumbents responsible for painful austerity programs. In fact, eco-
nomic policies have emerged as one of the key predictors of individual vote 
choice next to more conventional determinants, revealing the new and multi-
dimensional face of economic voting.  
This dissertation contributes to the existing academic knowledge in that it 
provides methodologically and empirically solid evidence on the presence of a 
strong link between economic conditions and political support in general, and 
during the financial and economic crisis in particular. Theoretically, this work 
offers an innovative exploration of economic policy voting, which has emerged 
as a result of the crisis. The conclusions presented in the dissertation provide 
support for the judgement that there exists healthy democratic accountability in 
Europe. Of course, economic voting is only one of the many ways in which 
citizens give feedback to political leaders, but if voters maintain a capacity to 
monitor national policymaking and to react accordingly, then parties seeking 
electoral success are forced to take into account public interest and to act with 
the public benefit in mind when establishing and pursuing economic policies. 
For citizens, maintaining their right to demand accountability for how public 
policies are being executed – and being aware that such a possibility exists – 
empowers them to fulfil their role as democratic actors and to actively partici-
pate in the process of decision-making. This democratic mechanism, ultimately, 
helps determine national policy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“When you think economics, think elections; 
When you think elections, think economics.” 
(Tufte 1978: 65) 
 
1.1. Background and rationale 
The relationship between economics and elections has long been a major focus 
in the field of political science. Economic conditions are closely associated with 
electoral outcomes and are typically expected to have a strong influence on 
political support. This expectation rests on the assumption that incumbents have 
control over the state of the national economy and that handling the economy is 
one of the key responsibilities of those in power. Voters have been holding 
incumbents accountable for bad economic conditions since at least the Great 
Depression in the 1930s, but the link between the economy and the vote was 
cemented in the recent history by Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist James 
Carville whose famous words, ‘The economy, stupid!’, emphasised the focus of 
the 1992 U.S. presidential elections. Originally targeted at an internal audience 
of closer colleagues, the phrase quickly gained popularity as an unofficial slo-
gan for the entire Clinton campaign and has since found currency in political 
rhetoric everywhere. Most recently, the way in which economic conditions 
interact with support for political parties has received the attention of the public 
in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis of 2007–2009.   
The most general concept defines economic voting as ‘any change on voter’s 
support for parties that is caused by a change in economic perceptions’ (Duch & 
Stevenson 2008: 41). Academic research lends significant empirical support to 
the expectation that there is a strong link between the economy and election 
outcomes. A vast body of literature published over several decades confirms 
that voters tend to hold incumbents responsible for developments in the econ-
omy, and reward or sanction them accordingly. On average, economic variables 
have been found to explain about 20–30% of the variation in government popu-
larity (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). The overall relationship between eco-
nomic conditions and incumbent support is positive in direction: when the 
economy performs poorly, public support for government parties drops, 
whereas economic growth yields higher levels in support for the incumbent. 
These results generally hold on both the aggregate and individual levels. In 
aggregate-level research, the unit of analysis is the country or election. The 
outcome variable in these studies is typically the incumbent’s share of the vote 
in national elections (or in presidential elections in the case of presidential sys-
tems of government, such as the United States). Macroeconomic indicators such 
as GDP growth, unemployment and inflation rate are used as explanatory fac-
tors. Individual-level studies, on the other hand, rely on survey data. In these 
analyses, the dependent variable is most commonly defined as vote choice or 
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vote intention for the incumbent government party (or parties), and the econ-
omy is measured via subjective economic perceptions (van der Brug, van der 
Eijk, and Franklin 2007).  
Although the existence of the phenomenon of economic voting is firmly 
established, its stability can be problematic: economic changes do not always 
determine voter behaviour. Governments have been voted out of office during 
excellent economic times, and have survived or even consolidated their popu-
larity when times are tough. In empirical research, too, economic effects are 
found in some countries at certain moments in time, but not always and not 
everywhere. In other words, we do not know enough about when citizens decide 
to link their evaluations of incumbents to economic performance and when they 
do not. This poses a puzzle for students of economic voting, giving rise to dis-
putes over decisions on research design, datasets, variable operationalisation 
and statistical tools used in models of incumbent support. More importantly, 
however, the instability dilemma has broader implications, as it can be con-
strued as a threat to democratic accountability. If the link between economic 
conditions and elections does not exist, then voters’ ability to assign responsi-
bility for poor economic outcomes is limited, and this leaves leaders free to 
pursue whatever policies they please irrespective of their public consequences 
(Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). In essence, economic accountability 
is an indication of healthy democratic interactions between citizens and political 
leaders.     
The recent global crisis has further accentuated the concerns as to the insta-
bility of economic effects. Since the beginning of the crisis, the majority of 
Western countries have experienced its deepest recession since World War II 
(IMF 2009). Plummeting economic growth and rising levels of unemployment, 
accompanied by banking system crises and followed by the Eurozone debt cri-
sis, have left European governments struggling to cope with dropping revenues, 
increased expenditure and record high borrowing. To tackle the excessive levels 
of public debt and deficit, many governments pursued painful reductions in 
public jobs, services and benefits, while simultaneously implementing tax 
increase. According to classic economic voting theories, such remarkable eco-
nomic instability should be accompanied by major political consequences. 
Indeed, civil unrest and large-scale public protests have taken place in Greece, 
Ireland, Iceland, France, the United Kingdom, and in various Eastern European 
countries. In a number of countries, governing parties witnessed landslide elec-
toral defeat. However, on several other occasions incumbents managed to 
maintain their positions despite the unprecedented economic turmoil. This has 
highlighted the need to better understand the link between economic conditions 
and popular evaluations of political incumbents. Have the traditional accounta-
bility mechanisms changed with the coming of the recent crisis? 
Theoretically, the most severe economic shock of our time gives us reason to 
expect increased punishment of incumbents for weak economic outcomes. Pre-
vious findings indicate that the impact of economic performance on government 
support is stronger during hard times and less intense when the economy is 
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performing well (Mueller 1973). On the other hand, there is evidence that in the 
increasingly interwoven world economic voting is becoming less pronounced. 
The sanctioning appears stronger when responsibility is relatively easy to 
apportion (Powell and Whitten 1993), but as national economies become more 
interlinked and interdependent, the capacity of national governments to shape 
macroeconomic outcomes diminishes. Especially in the European Union (EU), 
the world’s largest single market, national economic policies are closely coordi-
nated to support stability and growth. Nineteen countries share a common cur-
rency, the euro, together forming the euro area. All EU member countries are 
part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), through which the European 
Central Bank (ECB) manages a common monetary policymaking in the Euro-
zone, aimed at maintaining price stability and the efficiency of the internal mar-
ket. Member states outside the euro area coordinate their monetary policy with 
the ECB. Similarly, EU trade policy is administered exclusively at the EU level. 
Member state governments have more control in other economic policy areas, 
such as fiscal policy, which nevertheless is also monitored centrally. The 
national policy response to the global crisis was partially regulated as well 
through increased European-level financial supervision, bailout agreements and 
stabilisation funds. In a system such as this, economic responsibility is divided 
between various levels of governance. However, when accountability is blurred 
the tendency of voters to hold governments responsible for economic outcomes 
decreases as it is harder to assign credit or blame (see Hellwig and Samuels 
2007; Duch and Stevenson 2010). Should we, then, expect to see less intense 
punishing in times of crisis than at other times? A number of studies have 
examined the aftermath of the crisis in specific European countries or regions, 
but have arrived at varying conclusions. Some researchers have found support 
for the thesis of retrospective economic voting, and some have not, while others 
conclude that the effect is mediated by other indicators. In the scarcity of indi-
vidual-level comparative studies with large geographical and temporal scope, 
our understanding of how recent drastic economic developments have shaped 
economic voting remains limited.  
The global crisis has raised awareness of another aspect of economic voting, 
which thus far has received little attention in the academic studies: namely, 
government economic policies. The complex accountability situation has forced 
voters, who have to date typically relied on economic outcomes to evaluate 
incumbent performance and form their vote preference, to search for other indi-
cators to help them judge government economic competence. One such indica-
tor is the feasibility and effectiveness of government countermeasures to the 
crisis. The economic hardship associated with the crisis triggered debates over 
government role in the economy. Despite attempts to coordinate the response to 
the crisis at the European level, there was no entirely unitary reaction to the 
plummeting economy. In some countries, governments opted for fiscal expan-
sion, while in others radical retrenchment policies were introduced. In cases one 
set of policies followed the other. Either way, government efforts to handle the 
crisis emerged at the centre of public discourse and were suddenly monitored 
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more closely than ever before. This allows to assume that economic policies 
adopted in reaction to the crisis are likely to have framed voter evaluations of 
government performance and influenced political support patterns. The scholar-
ship on economic voting has, in recent years, paid more attention to voter policy 
reactions (see Clarke et al. 2013; Magalhães 2014a; Karyotis and Rüdig 2015; 
Kavanagh 2015; Whiteley et al. 2015), but empirical evidence remains frag-
mented and inconclusive. Analyses typically focus on a single election or coun-
try, and arrive at conclusions that provide limited and not generalizable insight 
to patterns of public attitudes towards crisis policies.    
 
 
1.2. Objectives and structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation aims to fill gaps in the literature by advancing knowledge on 
the relationship between the fortunes of the economy and voting behaviour. The 
work has three main objectives, which are addressed in three separate empirical 
chapters. The first empirical chapter explores the overall relationship between 
the economy and incumbent support and tests its robustness. To do so, I esti-
mate a basic model of economic voting across all major Western European 
democracies over the preceding 25 years. The use of such an exhaustive and 
heterogeneous dataset – including the years during and after the global crisis – 
enables the present author to explore the stability of economic effects regardless 
of extremely diverse political and economic circumstances. Careful considera-
tion is given to issues of variable measurement, model specification and meth-
odological challenges in order to address previous debates in the academic liter-
ature over differences in statistical modelling. In the second empirical chapter, I 
examine more specifically the performance of economic voting in Europe in the 
wake of the financial and economic crisis. The aim of this section is to compare 
economic voting in ordinary versus extraordinary times, and scrutinise the 
political consequences of the severe economic turbulence. Empirically, I con-
sider two scenarios: increased economic accountability during the recession due 
to negative asymmetry, and decreased economic effects due to blurred eco-
nomic responsibility. In the third, and final, empirical chapter I aim to reveal 
new nuances of economic voting by shifting its focus onto national economic 
policies. It argues that when the usual path of economic voting is disrupted, 
economic policy voting can occur. Using novel economic measurement for 
national fiscal policies, I investigate voter reactions to government policy 
choices and observe the dynamics in voter policy response over time.    
In order to carry out a systematic analysis of economic effects, I employ a 
cross-sectional time-series comparative framework in all three empirical chap-
ters. The purpose of such a design stems from the desire to map universal pat-
terns of voting behaviour and avoid the results being affected by election-spe-
cific idiosyncrasies. While single-election studies undeniably provide valuable 
insights into how economic conditions influence vote choice, the aim of this 
dissertation is rather to draw broader conclusions. Although all countries are 
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unique, this study is not designed to pick up on these specific nuances. Instead, 
it attempts to analyse the subject matter by generalising, classifying and sum-
marising, with the explicit purpose of understanding the broader sweep of voter 
attitudes and opinions. A comparative approach essentially imposes strong 
requirements onto the data used. In order to be suitable for cross-sectional anal-
ysis, questionnaires, sampling procedures and survey methods should be con-
sistent across studies. The analysis here employs individual-level data from the 
European Election Studies (EES) Voter study, a high-quality dataset with 
nationally representative samples from the EU member states, which has been 
carried out every five years since 1979 as a post-election study to analyse politi-
cal behaviour in European parliamentary elections. Questions measuring vote 
intention and economic evaluations, both essential for testing economic effects, 
appear almost identical from one survey to the next, as do sampling and inter-
viewing techniques. The selection of countries and time points in the three 
empirical chapters of the dissertation differs depending on the specific focus, 
but all chapters rely on highly comparable large-scale data and cover a hetero-
geneous set of political and economic contexts. Throughout the analysis, special 
attention is paid to variable operationalisation, coding decisions, model speci-
fication and statistical tools, as well as to providing robustness checks to results 
where necessary and possible.   
The monograph is structured as follows. The next chapter (Chapter 2) pro-
vides a theoretical framework to the dissertation, by first giving an overview of 
theories of voting behaviour and then more particularly introducing the theory 
of economic voting. It highlights the main findings in both classic and con-
temporary studies on economic effects, before outlining their limitations and the 
theoretical expectations tested in this analysis in order to contribute to the 
existing body of knowledge. The subsequent chapter, Chapter 3, presents the 
research design utilised in this study. It first explains the decision to use the 
comparative approach and then provides an overview of analysis levels, data 
and case selection, key variables, and analysis methods. Turning to the empiri-
cal part of the dissertation, Chapter 4 explores the overall link between the 
economy and the vote. It tests the robustness of the economic vote in a 
demanding contextual setting as well as against various methodological and 
coding choices, thereby addressing the concerns that economic voting effects 
are often overestimated and dependent on model specification. Chapter 5 dis-
cusses the performance of economic voting under the complex circumstances of 
the global financial and economic crisis, and seeks to reveal whether patterns of 
economic effects have transformed with the severe economic hardship. Chapter 
6 shifts the focus to economic policies. It first explores voter overall reactions to 
alternative government policies and then considers the possibility that policy 
effects on political support vary depending on the economic cycle. Finally, 
Chapter 7 summarises the main conclusions of the dissertation, discusses their 
wider implications and proposes suggestions for future research.    
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1.3. Overview of results and main contributions  
The first task of the dissertation is to evaluate the overall magnitude of the eco-
nomic vote. Using a demanding data pool that covers highly diverse political 
and economic conditions across European countries over time, including the 
period during and after the worldwide crisis, I demonstrate in Chapter 4 that a 
strong relationship exists between economic perceptions and vote intention. 
Furthermore, economic effects appear remarkably robust against challenges 
provided by a number of statistical and methodological tests. The findings of 
cross-national time-series analysis provide statistically solid confirmation that 
voter political preferences in Western Europe are related to subjective judg-
ments of government economic performance. The dissertation, then, firstly 
contributes to the existing knowledge by providing vigorous empirical support 
to the traditional expectation that there is a positive link between economic 
conditions and political support, as economic optimism leads to rewarding 
incumbents in elections.   
Secondly, it compares economic voting in times of non-crisis to that in the 
worldwide economic turmoil of recent years. The current literature on crisis-
time voting relies primarily on single-country or regional studies, which have 
shed valuable light on the effect of the crisis on political outcomes. Heavily 
influenced by national idiosyncrasies, however, these studies fall short in 
providing us with a full picture. The results are election-specific, greatly 
dependent on particular political and economic circumstances, and thus often 
inconsistent in temporal or geographical comparison. Determined to reveal 
larger patterns of economic voting in times of crisis, I employ in this study a 
broader comparative framework. The benefit of such an approach is that the 
findings are not a product of distinct circumstances peculiar to a specific coun-
try or moment in time. Instead, it enables me to create general knowledge that 
adds to the broader understanding of the electoral decision-making of an eco-
nomic voter. By utilising the time-series-cross-section setup, this dissertation, 
attempts to fill a gap in comparative studies exploring economic voting in the 
wake of the global crisis. Using survey data covering over two decades and ten 
Western democracies, Chapter 5 presents a systematic test of the stability of 
economic effects over time. The results demonstrate that the statistical relation-
ship between the economy and the vote is not more or less pronounced during 
the crisis compared to ordinary times, but instead remains strikingly stable. The 
positive link between economic opinions and incumbent support remains robust 
despite the severe economic hardship. 
Thirdly, the dissertation moves beyond the traditional mechanism of eco-
nomic voting and explores how government economic policies influence 
incumbent support levels. Using data on 24 European countries from before, 
during and after the recession, and utilising novel measurement of national 
economic policies, I show that post-crisis incumbent support is not determined 
by economic perceptions alone; rather government policy choices also signifi-
cantly shape public support for political leaders. Up until now, this novel angle 
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of voter calculus has received little attention in the economic voting literature. 
The results indicate that citizens generally react negatively to a government’s 
decision to pursue contractionary policy measures. Moreover, the public’s 
response to austerity measures is especially unfavorable in the post-crisis 
period, suggesting that five years after the worst point of the crisis voters are 
tired of radical reductions.  
In recent decades, a significant amount of scholarly attention has been paid 
to economic effects on voting behaviour. As our knowledge on the basic mech-
anisms advances, the surrounding context in which parties and voters operate is 
growing more and more sophisticated. This calls for students of economic vot-
ing to scrutinise the traditional patterns of electoral behaviour to see how these 
respond to contextual changes. This monograph aims to uncover the mecha-
nisms of how economic crises influence popular support for governing parties. 
It contributes to the current literature in three major aspects: empirical, method-
ological and theoretical. In empirical terms, it uses extensive datasets and 
emphasizes the importance of a comparative framework when studying eco-
nomic effects, especially in the rapidly changing environment, where research 
findings can easily be affected by national singularities. With regard to the 
methodology, it uses a large variety of robust statistical and methodological 
tests to show that there is a solid statistical relationship between economic con-
ditions and government support, and that this relationship has remained stable 
over time. Finally, as for the theoretical dimension, it moves the analysis 
beyond the simple link between two variables, economic conditions and voting, 
and introduces the effect of national economic policies on voter attitudes. The 
latter becomes increasingly important in a globally integrated world, where 
governments have less control over national economic outcomes, and percep-
tions of economic conditions alone do not provide enough information for a 
voter to assess incumbent performance. This work carries no intention of con-
tradicting the existing beliefs in the field. Rather, it wishes to draw attention to 
new nuances of classic political support patterns, and thereby further our under-
standing of both economic voting in particular and political behaviour more 
generally.   
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
The first systematic studies of voting behaviour originate from nearly a century 
ago. Since then, political scientists across the world have sought to explain how 
voters form their electoral decisions. Early studies of voting behaviour focused 
primarily on sociological and socio-psychological explanations of voter prefer-
ences. In the 1970s, the attention shifted to rational choice, and economic con-
ditions surfaced as a significant predictor of electoral outcomes. Today, popular 
conventional wisdom has it that voters tend to hold incumbents responsible for 
a country’s poor economic performance and punish them at the polls. The topic 
has emerged anew amid the global economic and financial crisis when the 
economy surfaced as the most salient issue in most Western democracies and 
was expected to be a significant factor in voter considerations. The drastic 
changes in the socioeconomic environment have led students of economic vot-
ing to reassess conventional assumptions about responsibility attribution. Spe-
cifically, recent scholarship on the topic has been concerned with the question 
of whether the relationship between the economy and voting may have changed 
in the context of the economic crisis. 
This chapter first provides a general overview of existing knowledge on 
individual voting behaviour. The second section explains in detail the theory of 
economic voting and highlights the main findings in classic and modern works 
before discussing the main limitations of previous studies. The chapter then 
turns its attention to describing the most frequently used empirical approaches 
in the study of economic voting and provides an overview of new research 
dimensions in the field. Finally, the last section introduces the contributions that 
this dissertation aims to make to the ever-growing body of literature on the 
economic vote.     
 
 
2.1. Classic theories of voting behaviour  
Understanding voting behaviour is one of the focal concerns of the field of 
political science. Elections are a key link in democratic systems between voters 
and political leaders: they provide a mode for the electorate to hold govern-
ments accountable for their decisions and influence the policymaking process. 
Studies on elections and voting date back to the beginning of the 20th century 
with preliminary historical and journalistic analyses, which gradually developed 
into a more empirical and systematic approach (see Niemi and Weisberg 1992; 
Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008). Due to limited data availability, early 
electoral research relied on aggregate-level election results as the primary 
source of information. Inferences about individual behaviour based on macro-
level data can, however, easily lead to an ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). 
Assuming that citizens are characterised by the same parameters as the groups 
that they belong to may lead to mistaken conclusions. With the rise of survey 
research in the United States in the 1930s, attempts were therefore made to 
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understand vote choice at the individual level (see Niemi and Weisberg 1992; 
Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008).  
Pioneering developments in academic voting studies took place at Columbia 
University in the 1940s, where a team of researchers using new survey tech-
niques developed novel theoretical frameworks to study voter considerations. 
Investigating prospective voters during the 1940 U.S. presidential campaign, 
Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948, 1954) focused on 
sociological characteristics of the electorate to explain political preferences: 
education, ethnicity, social class and religion (for an overview, see Bartels 
2012b). The authors emphasised the role of social networks and interpersonal 
relations rather than the mass media in shaping individual vote choice. Accord-
ing to this sociological approach, decisions determined by social affiliation are 
attitudinal and emotional rather than calculated. Pointing out the main short-
comings of the Columbia model, later work has argued that it focused only on 
selected communities, and, more importantly, fails to explain why differences 
between social groups occur (see Niemi and Weisberg 1992; Lewis-Beck, 
Nadeau, and Elias 2008). 
The next major milestone in voting studies emerged at the University of 
Michigan in the 1950s. National election surveys conducted over a course of an 
entire decade at the Survey Research Centre of the university gave rise to what is 
now considered the landmark of electoral research, The American Voter (see Niemi 
and Weisberg 1992; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008; Bartels 2012b). The 
authors of this seminal book famously introduced a funnel of causality, a 
subsequent chain of events that leads to vote choice, with party identification being 
the key characteristic in the model (Campbell et al. 1960). The axis of the funnel 
represents the dimension of time. Located at the narrow end are the immediate 
determinants of vote such as campaign issues or voter perceptions of the candidate, 
and at the wider end are the broader underlying factors such as social divisions and 
party loyalty (see Figure 1). Events in the funnel follow one another, forming a 
causal chain that culminates in a political act. 
 
 
Figure 1. Funnel of causality. 
 
Source: Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 23. 
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In their later work, the Michigan researchers distinguished between long-term 
and short-term forces of vote choice. Long-term influences are typically ‘inher-
ited’ from one’s social background, while short-term factors more often result 
from the mass media, political campaigns, and conversations with family and 
friends. The authors reasoned that although social groups differ in their voting 
patterns, socio-demographic variables that were emphasised by the Columbia 
school are stable in nature and hence fail to explain change from one election to 
the next (Campbell 1964). Instead, the Michigan model highlights the 
psychological factors, where party identification is the basis for political divi-
sion. In an attempt to address both stable party loyalties as well as sharp elec-
toral fluctuations, the authors suggest that while party attachment itself is long-
lasting, it influences more immediate voter attitudes, primarily towards issues, 
candidates and parties, which can substantially change between elections and 
therefore explain short-term shifts in electoral outcomes (see Figure 2). The 
Michigan model traces strong ideological patterns, but concludes that voter 
knowledge on specific policy agendas appears remarkably limited (Campbell 
1964). 
 
 
Figure 2. Long-term and short-term predictors of vote choice. 
 
 
 
Amid the turbulent political developments of the 1960s and ’70s, the Michigan 
approach was challenged by revisionists suggesting that issue orientations play 
a much larger role in political preferences than the socio-psychological model 
had anticipated, whereas the significance of party identification had previously 
been overestimated (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). Public turmoil over civil 
rights and the war in Vietnam demonstrated distinctly that citizens are not only 
familiar with policy issues, but are also willing to involve themselves and act 
upon their concerns (Bartels 2012). The explanatory power of party loyalty, on 
the other hand, was called into question with critics arguing that the importance 
of partisanship cannot be applied to multi-party systems (Budge, Crewe, and 
Farlie 1976), and, moreover, the connection individuals have to political parties 
is weakening (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). Key (1966) disputed the 
Michigan model claiming that voters are more rational and responsible than 
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they are given credit for, and that they base their political decisions on available 
options rather than merely on psychological leaning.   
The idea of a voter as a calculating being began to gain currency in the 
1970s when the rational choice model gained popularity. Grounded in the con-
cept of utility maximisation proposed by economist Anthony Downs (1957), 
this approach places personal self-interest and cost-effectiveness at the centre of 
the voters’ decision-making process. It regards the act of voting as similar to 
consumer behaviour in the market economy. Using the available information 
and measuring costs against benefits helps people arrive at an outcome that 
maximises their personal advantage. For example, individuals decide whether to 
turn out to cast their vote based on a comparison of the potential costs and bene-
fits of this act. If the perceived costs are higher than the expected benefits, 
rational citizens are likely to abstain. Additionally, the decision is dependent on 
the perceived probability of an individual vote affecting the electoral outcomes 
(Downs 1957). The notion of a rational voter was later criticised for only been 
able to apply to a small group of well-informed citizens but failing to explain 
mass behaviour (see Green and Shapiro 1994). People all over the world do 
vote, despite the real costs of voting typically exceeding the expected benefits, 
and despite a single vote very rarely having a pivotal influence on overall elec-
toral outcomes. This constitutes the paradox of voting, which is argued to have 
‘eaten’ the rational choice theory (Fiorina 1990).    
One of Downs’ seminal contributions to political science was the introduc-
tion of spatial models of electoral choice. According to this idea, voters are 
arranged along a one-dimensional ideological continuum. The policy stances of 
all parties and candidates are placed on the same continuum, and individuals 
vote for those whose political positions are ideologically closest to their own 
(Downs 1957). A rival theoretical framework was proposed by Stokes (1963), 
who underlined the importance of ‘valence’. Whereas proximity-based voting 
focuses on distances between voters’ positions on key issues and those of politi-
cians, the valence theory emphasises the role of candidate image, partisan 
attachments, and evaluations of party performance (Clarke and Whitten 2013). 
In spatial models, key issues divide the electorate because people share different 
opinions. A classic example of a spatial issue is taxation – some voters prefer to 
pay lower taxes even if this causes cuts in public services, and others are willing 
to accept higher tax levels because these lead to better public services (Clarke et 
al. 2009). Valence issues, on the contrary, are characterised by strong consen-
sus: everyone shares a similar ideal. The economy is one such issue – the 
majority of citizens typically prefer low unemployment and viable economic 
growth (Clarke et al. 2009). Stokes (1963) argues that valence politics (i.e. per-
formance politics) is about who delivers these publicly preferred outcomes, and 
vote choice is driven by individual judgements of the competence and perfor-
mance of rival parties on valence issues.   
Downs (1957) also proposed that in order to make a rational electoral deci-
sion, voters consider incumbents’ past performance to predict their future 
behaviour. The final vote choice is reached based on a comparison of the 
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expected performance of competing parties. Key (1966) advanced these 
assumptions further suggesting that citizens use their vote to either reward or 
punish incumbents according to the impressions they have of incumbent poli-
cies and performance. Building on Key’s propositions, Fiorina (1978) was the 
first to formulate the idea of retrospective voting: citizens vote based on their 
assessments of the incumbent party’s performance during its time in office, with 
specific consideration given to economic performance. Through the sanction-
ing-rewarding mechanism, elections provide an important form of political 
accountability as they enable citizens to hold political leaders responsible for 
their actions. This framework of retrospective voting is nowadays considered 
the foundation of contemporary economic voting theory.   
     
 
2.2. The theory of economic voting 
Since the 1970s, economy as a determinant of electoral behaviour has grabbed 
the attention of students of political science. Grounded in the idea of a reason-
ing voter, economic voting resembles issue-based voting but focuses on one 
issue only – the economy (Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2013). The overarching 
theoretical argument of economic voting is that citizens hold governments 
responsible for economic outcomes, and depending on economic circumstances 
either reward or punish them accordingly. Incumbents gain popularity when the 
economy is improving and lose votes when the economic conditions worsen. 
Two decades ago, the literature in the field of economic voting numbered more 
than 200 papers and books; today that number has increased manifold (see 
Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). The interest in 
economic effects has been further accentuated by the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis of 2007–2009, and today the topic enjoys a spotlight at major 
political science conferences and in the special editions of leading academic 
journals.  
While being broadly grounded in the classical voting behaviour literature, 
the theory of economic voting is more specifically rooted in rational choice 
models. In the rational choice approach, individuals are believed to be strategic 
utility maximisers who make decisions as to their electoral action on the basis 
of what they expect to gain: they will choose the potential outcome that benefits 
them the most and costs them the least (Evans 2004). Downs (1957) emphasises 
that voters do not consider parties per se, but focus specifically on the incum-
bent government. They calculate what the government will provide should it 
stay in office and what the opposition is offering as an alternative. Whichever 
provides the higher benefit wins the vote. According to Downs (1957), voters 
attempt to predict the government’s future economic performance in order to 
make a calculated decision. Key (1966) builds on this concept, stating that, as 
the future is unknown, voters rather evaluate government performance retro-
spectively. These ideas provide a theoretical foundation for subsequent devel-
opments in studies on the economy and election results.  
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Systematic work on economic voting started with Kramer (1971), who, ana-
lysing aggregate-level congressional vote and macroeconomic indicators, 
demonstrated that incumbent support is related to national economic perfor-
mance. Other early studies using aggregate data, most notably by Tufte (1978), 
arrived at similar conclusions, indicating that economic developments have a 
significant impact on election results. Fiorina (1978) was among the first to shift 
the research focus to the individual level. He established the theory of retro-
spective economic voting, demonstrating that vote choice is primarily deter-
mined by an individual’s evaluations of the government’s past economic per-
formance. The dispute over the relevance of retrospective versus prospective 
voting is still ongoing in the academic literature (see Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 
2013), but the dominant belief is that voters primarily react to past economic 
events rather than pre-empt future ones. Kiewiet (1983) added another essential 
dimension to the literature by showing that individuals vote based on their per-
ceptions of the national economy rather than their personal financial grievances.  
Early work on the economy and elections primarily concerned the United 
States. Pioneering in taking this tradition to Europe was Lewis-Beck (1988), 
who first demonstrated that European voters, too, are consistently stimulated by 
their perceptions of the wellbeing of national economy. A significant amount of 
economic voting research in Europe has been carried out in the United King-
dom (see Goodhart and Bhansali 1970; Butler and Stokes 1974; Clarke et al. 
2004) and in France (see Lafay 1977; Lewis-Beck 1980; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, 
and Bélanger 2012), but a vast amount of work also exists on Denmark (see 
Nannestad and Paldam 1997), the Netherlands (see van der Eijk and Niemöller 
1987; Middendorp and Kolkhuis Tanke 1990) and other European nations. 
Country-specific studies have shown that economic effects vary extensively 
across time and space. This has highlighted the need  to empirically compare 
countries and elections instead of merely investigating single cases (Duch and 
Stevenson 2008). Amongst comparative studies, works by Lewis-Beck (1986, 
1988), Powell and Whitten (1993), Anderson (1995), van der Brug, van der Eijk 
and Franklin (2007), and Duch and Stevenson (2008) are, among others, notable 
contributions to the field.    
 
 
2.2.1. Main findings in macro-level studies 
The effect of the economy on incumbent support has been studied both at the 
aggregate level, where the unit of analysis is the country or an election, and at 
the individual level, where the entity is the individual. Due to limitations in data 
availability, early research on economic voting was conducted using macro-
level time-series data, such as national macroeconomic indicators, and with 
either aggregated government popularity or the electoral outcome as the 
dependent variable. These types of models are often jointly referred to as VP-
functions, where ‘V’ refers to vote and ‘P’ to popularity (Stegmaier and Lewis-
Beck 2013). Early studies on vote and popularity found that political support is 
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strongly influenced by macroeconomic conditions (see Goodhart and Bhansali 
1970; Mueller 1973). Voters are familiar with and react to changes in general 
economic indicators. When the economy performs well, incumbent support 
increases, and when the economy deteriorates, incumbent support suffers. In the 
literature, this has become known as the responsibility hypothesis: voters hold 
the government responsible for economic developments and sanction or reward 
them accordingly. Mueller (1973) added that economic effects are asymmetric – 
voters are more inclined to punish the incumbents for poor economic outcomes 
than reward them following prosperity.  
The pioneering macro-level analyses used two economic indicators to pre-
dict political support: unemployment and inflation rate (see Goodhart and 
Bhansali 1970). Later on, economic growth was added to the original ‘big two’ 
(for an overview see Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2013). Other aggregated fac-
tors such as national debt, interest rates or personal income have demonstrated 
much weaker links with the economy. Macro indicators typically consist of 
time-series data that is observed monthly or quarterly. In later studies, however, 
objective macroeconomic measures were sometimes replaced with aggregated 
subjective perceptions of how the economy is performing (see Norpoth 1996). 
Because VP-functions estimate incumbent support through both economic and 
political variables (see Equation 1), various political controls are also often 
included in such models (see for example foreign policy in Mueller 1973), alt-
hough the focus still remains on the impact of economic factors. The dependent 
variable is ordinarily defined as an aggregate measure of vote or popularity. In 
linear formulation, the VP-function is expressed as follows: 
        
 ܸܲ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ + ݁ (1) 
 
where ܸܲ is the vote for or popularity of the incumbent expressed as a percent-
age of all voters, ߚ଴ − ߚଶ are the coefficients to be estimated, ଵܺ refers to eco-
nomic variables, ܺଶ to political variables and ݁ is error.  
Later findings have proposed certain adjustments in macro-level models of 
economic voting. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) draw attention to voters’ 
myopia: voters tend to have a short time horizon when evaluating economic 
events; the memory of an economic voter typically no longer than one year. As 
the effects of specific events dissolve rather fast, the studies of aggregated time-
series data sometimes include a short lag structure (see Nannestad and Paldam 
1994; Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2013). Nannestad and Paldam (1994) have 
also argued that in addition to the decay of economic effects, governments face 
a slow general deterioration of support over time, also known as the cost of 
ruling. They suggested that a government loses an average of 1.7 percent of 
votes during one election period (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). This has 
required researchers of economic voting to add government time in office as an 
additional control variable in the model specification (Stegmaier and Lewis-
Beck 2013). Such adjusted and improved macro-models commonly confirm 
strong associations between the economy and political support.   
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2.2.2. Main findings in micro-level studies  
The fundamental shortcoming of national-level macro-studies is the danger of 
making an ecological fallacy. Drawing empirical inferences about individual-
level behaviour from aggregated data may lead to spurious results because 
mathematically ecological correlations (i.e. group correlations) are not equal to 
corresponding individual correlations (Robinson 1950). Robinson (1950) used 
an example of the illiteracy rate in the United States to illustrate this claim. He 
demonstrated that at the state level the correlation between illiteracy and the 
proportion of immigrants is positive (the more immigrants in the state, the lower 
the illiteracy level), but the correlation at the individual level is negative (immi-
grants tend to have higher illiteracy rate than native inhabitants). He explains 
this paradox by arguing that immigrants have a tendency to settle in states 
where the literacy rate is on average higher. In a similar manner, merely using 
aggregate-level data to conclude that citizens consult macroeconomic condi-
tions when casting their vote may be incorrect (Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 
2013). The need to avoid making this mistake – and the growing availability of 
survey data in the 1930s – led to the shift of academic focus to individual-level 
studies, where subjective economic evaluations are used to predict incumbent 
vote.   
Two central arguments constitute an underlying foundation for micro-level 
studies on the economic vote. Firstly, economic effects tend to be sociotropic 
rather than egotropic: voters are more inclined to vote based on their percep-
tions of national economic wellbeing rather than their pocketbook and self-
interest (see Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kiewiet 1983). Kinder and Kiewiet 
(1981) explain this seemingly irrational altruistic behaviour via the culture 
hypothesis. In the United States, the absence of pocketbook voting refers to the 
prevalence of individualistic values in the society, which determines that citi-
zens are not eager to blame the government for their personal economic mis-
fortune. Despite severe critique of these findings (see Kramer 1971) and the 
lack of an alternative, widely accepted explanation to why voters are sociotropic 
(see Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011), studies carried out over the past decades in 
various political systems confirm that personal experiences are generally politi-
cally unimportant, recording this as one of the most standard findings in eco-
nomic voting studies.1 The second fundamental argument was proposed by 
Fiorina (1978), who stated that economic voting is retrospective rather than 
prospective: voters usually react to past economic events more so than they pre-
empt future ones. While the effects of retrospective sociotropic evaluations on 
vote are undeniably strong, more recent studies lend some support also to the 
thesis of prospective economic voting (for an overview, see Stegmaier and 
                                                                          
1  Contradictory evidence of strong pocketbook voting has been found in Denmark 
(Nannestad and Paldam 1997), where the phenomenon is attributed to the collectivist 
welfare society. Later studies, however, find no confirmation for the tendency (see Borre 
1997; Lewis-Beck, Stubager, and Nadeau 2013), suggesting that the results of Nannestad 
and Paldam may be due to unusual survey design and measurement decisions.  
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Lewis-Beck 2013). However, the evidence on prospective economic effects is 
far more volatile across studies, and thus the retrospective approach remains 
dominant.   
The magnitude of economic effects varies depending on the political and 
institutional context. Previous studies indicate that the punishing-rewarding 
mechanism is more visible when responsibility for economic outcomes is clear 
(see Powell and Whitten 1993). On the contrary, when power is divided 
between several actors, voters struggle to assign praise or blame for economic 
realities and appointing of accountability is blurred. Lewis-Beck (1986) demon-
strates that the clarity of responsibility is less in countries with multiparty coali-
tions, leading to weaker economic effects in studies on these countries. Voters 
have also been found to hold governments less responsible for economic out-
comes in cases where there exist few party alternatives, unstable or minority 
governments, bicameral system of government, or where there is low internal 
party cohesion and strong political opposition (see Nannestad and Paldam 1994; 
Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000). The clarity of responsibility argu-
ment also extends beyond the domestic dimension. Globalisation and growing 
economic integration send signals to voters about national governments having 
less control over and less responsibility for economic results, and this weakens 
the link between the economy and the vote. Economic responsibility is muted 
for example in highly internationalised countries, in the system of multilevel 
governance, and in open and interdependent economies (see Fernández-Alber-
tos 2006; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Costa Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012). 
Studies imply that the electoral success of political parties can be affected by 
different economic circumstances depending on which area of the economy 
they are associated with. Left and right governments tend to have dissimilar 
views on economic policy, and voters support the party which seems to care the 
most about the most pressing issue of the day. According to one explanation, 
left-wing parties, whether in government or opposition, primarily gain from 
high unemployment as they are elected to resolve this issue. Following the same 
logic, parties that position themselves on the right on the ideological spectrum 
benefit from rapid economic growth (see Rattinger 1991). This is known in the 
economic voting literature as the clientele hypothesis. Building on a similar 
logic but in a reverse direction, Powell and Whitten (1993) proposed the sali-
ency hypothesis and argue that governments are instead punished for the most 
salient issue. For example, voters expect left-wing governments to be more 
competent in reducing the unemployment level and, judging their performance 
in the office, hold them responsible when unemployment increases. By the same 
token, right-wing governments suffer from negative economic growth, a field 
for which they are seen as being talented. Either way, this ownership of eco-
nomic issues may shape the way incumbents are held accountable for economic 
developments.     
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2.2.3. Limitations and challenges of the theory 
Numerous studies published over the past couple of decades indicate a solid 
link between the economy and voting. Yet, the research also faces some sub-
stantial challenges. One of the main concerns in the economic voting literature 
is instability: instead of being universal, economic effects tend to be conditional 
(for an overview, see Anson and Hellwig 2015). The results lack stability not 
only between nations but also in the same country over time (see Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam 2000; Dorussen and Taylor 2003). In the United States, empirical 
findings generally confirm consistent economic influences on political support, 
but in other countries the magnitude of the economic vote fluctuates more 
remarkably and this poses empirical and theoretical challenges to the entire 
field. Authors often attribute this ‘instability dilemma’, identified by Paldam 
(1991), to imprecise modelling. Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) argued that the 
instability is only apparent and can be taken account of by adequate specifica-
tion of institutional conditions, for example whether we are looking at a country 
with a two-party or a multi-party system. In both cases economic effects can be 
identified, but only with proper modelling of institutional conditions (Lewis-
Beck and Paldam 2000). Van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin (2007) 
believed the inconsistencies to be the result of the operationalisation of the 
dependent variable. They suggested that the volatility in findings is due to 
models only concentrating on electoral choice and, especially in multi-party 
systems, failing to take into account the competition between parties and differ-
ent alternatives that voters consider before making the final decision. Whatever 
the cause of the problem, it remains an open discussion whether improvements 
in model specification and variable measurement provide a remedy for the 
instability in the findings.   
Another major concern in economic voting studies is that of endogeneity. 
Kramer (1983) claimed that election surveys are not a suitable instrument for 
investigating economic voting because the results can be spurious. This is 
believed to be due to partisan bias. Voter economic evaluations can be affected 
by voter’s pre-existing political preferences: those in favour of the incumbent 
government tend to view economic circumstances more positively, whereas 
opposition supporters are inclined to be more negative in their evaluation of 
incumbent performance. The differences in responses, therefore, may not reflect 
different economic circumstances but rather a judgment of economic conditions 
that has little to do with the reality (van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 
2007). In other words, the causal arrow between two variables, the economy 
and political support, could be reversed. A number of authors claim that eco-
nomic effects in previous studies have therefore been overstated (see Wlezien, 
Franklin, and Twiggs 1997; Evans and Andersen 2006; Anderson 2007). While 
the debate over endogeneity issues continues, a number of studies have 
addressed this critique by employing a complex method of variable exogenisa-
tion and have succeeded in finding confirmation for solid retrospective eco-
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nomic effects (see Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008; Fraile and Lewis-Beck 
2012; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013).  
Related to the partisan bias is the question of economic awareness. The 
majority of individual-level studies rely on subjective economic perceptions 
rather than on factual economic conditions, but doubts have been raised over 
how much the lay public really knows and understands about the economy. If 
voter knowledge on economic conditions is framed by their ideological prefer-
ence, these perceptions are likely to constrain their understanding of the issues 
(see Nannestad and Paldam 1994; van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 
2007). Consequently, some authors have suggested that subjective economic 
indicators should not be employed in studies of the economic vote (see van der 
Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007). Several other studies, however, have 
provided evidence that subjective economic assessments are shaped by actual 
economic circumstances (see Conover and Feldman 1986; Page and Shapiro 
1992; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2009). It has been demonstrated, for instance, 
that voters actively respond to changes in unemployment and can estimate it 
rather accurately (Paldam and Nannestad 2000). Observing economic condi-
tions does not require deep understanding from voters of economic and political 
issues. Even though citizens often lack thourough knowledge, they typically 
“know what life has been like during incumbent’s administration” (Fiorina 
1981: 6). Haller and Norpoth (1997) looked at media effects on economic 
awareness and concluded in a similar manner that even without following eco-
nomic news stories, people are able to paint an overall picture that mirrors the 
economic reality. In their large-scale comparative study on voter economic 
competency, Duch and Stevenson (2010: 113) demonstrated that individuals are 
reasonably well-informed about and understand the volatility of the macro 
economy, and that voter beliefs “are grounded in economic reality”.  
The logic of economic voting relies on the assumption that economic effects 
are homogenous; that is, all voters react to economic events in a similar manner. 
This, however, is usually not the case. Studies have found that some groups of 
people are more affected by and more responsive to economic changes than 
others. Economic effects appear more pronounced for example among women 
(Welch and Hibbing 1992), more experienced and informed citizens (Duch, 
Palmer, and Anderson 2000), those with higher levels of political trust (Duch 
2001), more vulnerable citizens (Singer 2011; 2013; Palmer, Whitten, and 
Williams 2013) and more politically knowledgeable voters (Godbout and 
Bélanger 2007). These patterns could further undermine the cross-national 
stability of empirical findings because some countries may have more voters in 
categories that react more strongly to changes in economic conditions (van der 
Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007). Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck (2013), on 
the other hand, suggested that while there may be some heterogeneity in the 
economic vote, with proper controlling for relevant indicators we are still able 
to make meaningful generalisations about the main economic effect.  
Finally, the literature on how the economy affects electoral results is rich in 
established democracies, but much less is known about economic voting in new, 
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developing and transitional democracies. Earlier studies not only sidestepped 
systematic analysis on this part of the world, but also attempted to replicate the 
findings of studies on advanced democracies, primarily those on Western 
Europe and the United States, thus failing to take into account the unique con-
textual environment of newer democracies (Tucker 2006). Fortunately, recent 
years have seen scholars pay more attention to economic accountability in 
countries undergoing turbulent economic and political changes. Studies of the 
economic vote have emerged on Latin America (see Remmer 1991; Benton 
2005), Africa (see Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012), Southern Europe (see 
Freire and Costa Lobo 2005), Eastern Europe (see Pacek 1994; Fidrmuc 2000; 
Tucker 2006; Roberts 2008), and on particular countries in each of these geo-
graphical locations (for an overview, see Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2013). 
Findings often demonstrate a link between economic conditions and election 
results, although its strength shows considerable regional variation. Less well-
understood are economic effects in Asia and the Middle East as regions, the 
current literature being comprised of mostly studies with single countries as 
their focus (see Chowdhury 1993; Meyer and Malcolm 1993; Horowitz and 
Kim 2004; Akarca and Tansel 2007).  
 
 
2.2.4. Studying economic voting 
In order to estimate the association between economic variables and political 
support, quantitative econometric data analysis is typically used. Both macro 
and micro-level approaches most often employ either linear regression if the 
outcome variable is continuous, or logistic regression if the dependent variable 
is dichotomous. Regression analysis applies statistical functions to estimate the 
relationship between two variables. Data structure in such analyses is ordinarily 
cross-sectional, i.e. characterises different populations at a single time point, 
time-series, i.e. observes one population over time, or both. If data are clustered, 
e.g. the answers are correlated because the respondents come from the same 
country, multilevel modelling is often used. In spite of various similarities, there 
are, naturally, also vast differences across studies, most notably in how the vari-
ables are operationalised and how multivariate models are specified.  
The first research decision of many is whether to define incumbent support 
via vote or popularity. Vote choice is measured as an actual political decision 
executed by individuals. At the macro level this can be done by using aggre-
gated election results, and at the individual level by asking respondents in post-
election studies who they voted for in most recent elections. Popularity is meas-
ured in population surveys by asking individuals who they would vote for if the 
elections were held tomorrow or whether they approve of the work the govern-
ment has done. Macro-level popularity-functions utilise an aggregated estimate 
of these figures. Despite voting being considered the ultimate dependent vari-
able in political behaviour (Campbell et al. 1960), political popularity actually 
shows better fits with the economy. The final vote can be a mixture of various 
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elements from campaign influence to strategic voting (see van der Eijk et al. 
2006), and popularity is therefore considered a purer function of economic fac-
tors. On the other hand, polling results are more volatile. Popularity is a riskless 
non-binding way to signal one’s attitudes, whereas vote is the ‘real thing’ 
(Nannestad and Paldam 1994).  
The next step is to determine whose support one wishes to study. Most 
commonly in economic voting studies the dependent variable is defined as sup-
port for incumbents rather than for the political system, political institutions or 
another actor. But who are we actually talking about when we talk about 
incumbents? In the United States, studies often focus on presidential or gov-
ernmental support, whereas in Europe the government, the Prime Ministerial 
(PM) party or less often the party holding the portfolio of the Finance Minister 
is considered responsible for the economy. In two-party systems the situation is 
relatively clear: the government is tasked with economic management and is 
held responsible for poor economic circumstances, whereas the opposition may 
gain from economic hardship. Things get more complicated in the case of multi-
party systems and coalition governments. Do people in such cases attribute 
responsibility to the entire government or only to the leading party? It has 
become a common practice in economic voting models to reduce the outcome 
to a dichotomous choice between government and opposition in order to allow 
consistency in coding across surveys (Duch and Stevenson 2008), but govern-
ments can be very diverse both in size and composition. Van der Brug, van der 
Eijk and Franklin (2007) have argued that discrete choice models like these 
neglect the possibility that parties are not affected the same way by the econ-
omy. Different coalition partners have dissimilar responsibilities for the econ-
omy and may therefore not suffer or gain equally from economic changes. The 
authors also claimed that focusing on electoral choice overlooks the competition 
between parties, and proposed an alternative approach of electoral utilities, 
using a more sophisticated research design of stacked data matrix. The under-
lying logic of this concept is that in reality people do not vote for or against the 
government, but are rather engaged in a two-step decision-process, where they 
first assess their support for each party and only then choose the party they will 
actually vote for. Instead of the typical vote choice question, the authors pro-
posed that respondents be presented with a list of parties and be asked to indi-
cate their propensity to vote (PTV) for each of these parties. This interval-level 
measure of electoral utility overcomes many limitations related to the nominal 
nature of the dependent variable of electoral research in multi-party systems, 
allowing researchers to model vote choices with a higher degree of methodo-
logical accuracy (van der Eijk 2002). Like many other approaches, however, 
this one is not without limitations, the main one being the lack of independence 
between the vote propensity scores given by the same person for different par-
ties (van der Brug, Hobolt, and de Vreese 2009). When observations related to 
the same respondent are correlated, the independence assumption of regression 
analysis is violated, possibly leading to biased estimates and inaccurate results. 
Furthermore, when PTVs are measured in post-election surveys, such as the 
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EES Voter study, they are likely to be endogenously produced – or ‘colored’ – 
by actual voting behavior in the past election, thus undermining the validity of 
the PTV question which, ideally, should not be related to any specific election 
(De Angelis and Garzia 2012). Last but not least, vote intention or choice on the 
one hand, and PTVs on the other, measure conceptually different things. While 
the two former map respondent’s current political preference, the latter looks at 
the likelihood to ever vote for a party. From the economic voting perspective, 
current preference is of higher relevance as its exhibits a straightforward theo-
retical link to economic perceptions: short-term changes in economic opinions 
induce provisionary changes in electoral support patterns. Conversely, we can-
not assume a similar individual-level mechanism to explain change in PTVs, as 
willingness to ever vote for a party can be linked to much more longstanding 
and fundamental attitudes.  
Survey instruments used to study economic voting on the individual level 
also vary a great deal. Due to data limitations, researchers are often constrained 
by the survey questions that already exist instead of being able to choose ones 
they would actually need or prefer. In their literature overview, Bellucci and 
Lewis-Beck (2011) counted at least eight different ways to operationalise the 
dependent variable in economic voting studies. Analyses on the United States 
typically rely on presidential approval, which measures individuals’ support for 
the incumbent president as regards the latter’s success in their job. In Europe, a 
similar approach can be used to measure the approval of the PM party, the gov-
ernment, etc. Depending on the research design, another common option is to 
ask respondents to indicate which party they voted for in last elections (past 
vote recall) or which one they would vote for if the elections were held the fol-
lowing day or week (vote intention). Studies also differ in terms of which elec-
tions are considered when asking people to express their political support. Ordi-
narily, party preference in general elections is preferred, but some studies look at 
party support in other elections, for instance the European Parliament (EP) 
elections. However, previous work indicates that EP elections are second-order 
elections, where the accountability attribution is different from that in national 
elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). As for survey measurement of the explanatory 
variable, national economic perceptions on the subjective level are most commonly 
measured by asking respondents whether the country’s economy has in their 
opinion improved, worsened or remained unchanged over the preceding year.  
Voting behaviour is of course not determined by the economy alone. There-
fore, statistical models include a number of other predictors that typically influ-
ence political preferences. While these are not a substantive concern in eco-
nomic voting studies, the inclusion of control variables helps us to determine 
the relative effect of the economy on political support. In order to better under-
stand the effect of one particular variable, all other factors in the model are held 
constant. Failing to account for essential indicators that are related to vote can 
lead to the omitted variable bias, which may cause the economic effect to be 
overestimated. The underlying idea in economic voting studies is that vote 
choice is a function of three essential elements: social cleavages, political ideol-
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ogy and the economy (Lewis-Beck 1988). In other words, the basic model 
specification typically includes data on voter demographics and socio-economic 
status (e.g. age, social class, ethnicity, income, education, religiosity), self-
placement on a left-right scale (or in the United States party identification), and 
economic perceptions. Social background and political predispositions are con-
sidered long-term forces of vote choice, which stay relatively stable over time. 
Economic considerations, on the other hand, are treated as a short-term factor, 
which can vary from one election to the next and may thereby help explain 
electoral change. Furthermore, the decline of cleavage voting and of ideological 
leaning is thought to have increased the importance of economic assessments 
(see Bellucci 2012). In addition to individual-level controls, most economic 
voting models also include a variable measuring the electoral cycle to account 
for the broadly demonstrated cyclical pattern in political support (see Miller and 
Mackie 1973; Tufte 1975; Stimson 1976). Other aggregate-level controls may 
contain party characteristics (e.g. size, role, and ideology), information about 
institutional and political context (e.g. party system, system clarity), etc.   
 
 
2.3. New horizons in studies of the economic vote 
In recent years, two significant new directions have emerged in studies of eco-
nomic voting: firstly, investigating the consequences of the recent global eco-
nomic and financial crisis, and secondly, the developments in economic effects 
against the backdrop of increasing globalisation and economic interdependence. 
The interest in the consequences of the crisis stems, on the one hand, from the 
severity of the economic turmoil that shook the Western world. Extraordinarily 
drastic changes in the social and economic environment raise the need to revisit 
classic concepts of political behaviour. At the same time, scholars of economic 
voting are astounded by large variation in political results following the eco-
nomic collapse. It is rational to assume that sharp economic decline should lead 
to strong electoral punishment of ruling parties, but empirical evidence from 
Europe does not always bear this out. Against the background of economic 
developments, the literature is concerned with broader global changes, where 
nation states are more and more economically interdependent, obscuring the 
link between government actions and national economic outcomes. These cir-
cumstances open up new research avenues for economic voting studies. 
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the subsequent economic recession 
are considered the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The tradi-
tional economic voting theory states that in ordinary times, voters reward the 
incumbents when economic conditions are healthy and punish them when they 
worsen. Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo (2016) define ordinary times as most of 
the time, in most advanced industrial democracies. However, the unprecedented 
economic instability that has occurred over the recent years raises the question 
of how the conventional mechanisms operate under extraordinary times. In 
other words, the drastic contextual changes force us to focus attention onto the 
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political consequences of the economic shock – its impact on public opinion, 
voter decision-making and electoral results. Scrutinising these developments 
helps us to expand our understanding of the relationship between economic 
crises and political support, and, more broadly, of the overall link between the 
economy and politics.   
The most recent global economic crisis began with the bursting of the hous-
ing bubble in the United States in 2007, causing a credit crisis and the meltdown 
of the financial market. Having gradually built up over the course of several 
years, the immediate causes for the manifold and complex crisis are not easy to 
trace, but the first major and alarming downturn arrived with the crash of the 
real estate market, which hit the Wall Street financial institutions backing mil-
lions of risky loans and mortgages especially hard. The initial attempts to 
bailout these seemingly few institutions by the U.S. government remained 
short-lived as the relapse quickly escalated into the bankruptcy of leading global 
financial firms, prompting an international financial panic. In the age of globali-
sation, national economies are tightly interrelated and interdependent. It is then 
to be expected that the developments in the world’s largest market had a strong 
and immediate impact on other nations all over the world. The rapidly evolving 
financial crisis quickly spread across borders, resulting in the failure of a num-
ber of investment and commercial banks in Europe as well. These severe trou-
bles led national economies worldwide into a steep and long-lasting recession, 
the extent and duration of which varied greatly and which in several cases is 
still ongoing.  
In Europe, the banking crisis moved into a yet more painful phase when the 
banking system in Iceland collapsed and several EU member states, such as 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, were unable to repay their gov-
ernment debt or to bail out their indebted banks without external assistance, 
driving the Eurozone into debt crisis in 2009. In 1992, members of the then 
European Community signed the Maastricht treaty, in which they pledged to 
limit their deficit and debt levels, but in the early 2000s some member countries 
failed to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and decided to increase money supply by 
selling government bonds. Securitisation of future revenues enabled govern-
ments to mask their true debt and deficit levels, while neglecting best practice 
and international standards. This culminated in 2009 when Greece unveiled its 
massive underreporting of budget deficit and true indebtedness. While the 
Maastricht criteria set out a national budget deficit of no more than 3 percent of 
GDP and a public debt of no more than 60 percent of GDP, the OECD estimates 
for Greece in 2009 were 15.2% and 134.9% respectively. The severity of the 
situation in Greece and the similar problems in other member states quickly 
triggered fears of financial contagion and a collapse of the euro. Several coun-
tries had their sovereign debt downgraded by international credit rating agen-
cies, considerably raising investor concerns. These worries led to European 
states implementing a series of financial support measures such as the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) in order to address the European debt crisis and to provide financial 
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assistance to troubled countries. Altogether, eight Euro area countries were 
forced to request a bailout, receiving financial support from the EU, the IMF or 
the World Bank. Cyprus has been receiving financial assistance since 2013, 
Greece from 2010 until 2018, and Hungary was provided external support from 
2008 to 2009, Ireland from 2011 to 2014, Latvia from 2009 to 2010, Portugal 
from 2011 to 2014, Romania from 2009 to 2015, and Spain from 2012 to 2013. 
The disbursements were and are strongly conditional on policy achievements in 
fiscal consolidation forcing governments to implement stringent austerity 
measures and structural reforms to restore financial stability and return the 
economy to sustainable growth. Ultimately, the sovereign debt crisis revealed 
countries’ underlying economic weaknesses, even if the nature of these struc-
tural weaknesses differed across countries. Although the economies have since 
started showing signs of recovery, the reducing government revenue, increased 
expenditure and record-high borrowing have left European economies strug-
gling with distressing levels of public debt and deficits. 
The majority of European nations were affected by economic fluctuations, 
but – as seen above – the consequences were particularly harsh on Iceland, 
Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The crisis quickly escalated beyond 
the initial financial and banking system troubles to include a public debt crisis, 
dragging Ireland, Greece and Portugal to the verge of bankruptcy. Accompanied 
by particularly slow economic recovery and remarkably high levels of unem-
ployment (some 25% in Greece and Spain since 2012), most of these countries, 
sometimes referred to with an unflattering acronym PIIGS (standing for ‘Portu-
gal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain’), were forced to accept international 
financial bailout deals and impose unpopular austerity measures in an attempt to 
reduce public deficits and to fulfil the external requirements. The Southern 
economies have yet to recover to their pre-crisis levels. The economic turbu-
lence triggered considerable political changes as well. Drastic cuts in public 
spending on state salaries and pensions, education, health and social security 
caused political unrest and were often met with large-scale public protests. 
Despite blurred economic responsibility between national governments and 
supranational European institutions, support for ruling parties suffered a great 
deal, eventually resulting in the ousting of the incumbents in all six troubled 
countries. This outcome seemingly refers to a simple retrospective voting 
mechanism, but on many occasions the long-term political consequences were 
even more fundamental. The Portuguese 2011 national election was defined by 
sanctioning of the Socialist government for poor performance, although the 
perception of weak control by the government over domestic economic matters 
blurred their economic responsibility (Magalhães 2014b). The 2011 Spanish 
election lead to the replacement of the incumbent Socialist party by its main 
competitor, while simultaneously increasing the level of party fragmentation 
and leading to the rise of smaller parties (Torcal 2014). In Iceland, the crisis 
considerably shaped the 2009 election with voters holding the coalition gov-
ernment accountable for the economic turmoil and expressing their high levels 
of dissatisfaction with the political system. Although the politics has since 
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largely returned to ‘normal’, the subsequent Icelandic general election in 2013 
was still characterised by major shifts in party support and increased the number 
of political contestants (Indridason 2014).The 2011 Irish election resulted in a 
remarkable defeat for the dominant government party Fianna Fáil. Marsh and 
Mikhaylov (2012, 2014) describe this as a clear example of electoral punish-
ment, adding that the sanctioning appeared strikingly severe both in cross-
national and time-series comparisons. In Italy and Greece the political landscape 
transformed in an even more dramatic way. The 2012 Greek election saw not only 
massive losses for the ruling Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), but the 
collapse of the entire two-party system, accompanied by a sharp decline in voter 
party identification, in political trust and in satisfaction with democracy 
(Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014). Italy witnessed significant electoral change in the 
2013 election with record-high electoral volatility and disruption of the long-
standing alternation of power between two established political parties, the centre-
left Democratic Party (PD) and the Berlusconi-led centre-right People of Freedom 
(PdL). In the background, deepening popular distrust of political parties and general 
political disengagement could be detected (Bellucci 2014). In both Italy and 
Greece, the former incumbents were replaced by non-partisan technocratic 
governments, potentially muddying the responsibility attribution for the eco-
nomic troubles (Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo 2016). 
Despite the severity of the Great Recession, its political outcomes are not 
nearly straightforward. In contrast to above examples, economic hardship did 
not translate into a decline in political support everywhere in Europe. Incum-
bent governments were re-elected for instance in Luxembourg in 2009, in 
Germany in 2009 and in 2013, in Sweden in 2010, in Latvia in 2010 and in 
2014, in the Netherlands in 2012, in Poland in 2011, and in Estonia in 2011. 
These tendencies have left scholars of economic voting wondering whether the 
standard reward-punishment mechanism has become more complex than previ-
ously thought. Several explanations have been provided for this instability 
puzzle, often emphasising the importance of the international context. For 
instance, it has been suggested that voters benchmark national economic growth 
against that abroad, and even where growth is weak or even negative, incum-
bent parties can still do well when they outperform their peers (Kayser and 
Peress 2012). A more extensive line of work focuses on constraints on govern-
ment economic capability. We know from previous work that responsibility 
attribution is blurred when the clarity of which actors bear responsibility is low 
(Powell and Whitten 1993). Although numerous studies have focused on 
domestic and institutional aspects of this argument, a growing strand of litera-
ture explores external constraints on government responsibility for economic 
outcomes. In an increasingly interdependent world, national economies are 
becoming more and more influenced by international processes and actors. 
Globalisation, internationalisation and regional integration lower government 
responsibility for economic outcomes. This sends signals to voters that incum-
bents have less economic control, and consequently the propensity to hold gov-
ernments responsible for poor performance diminishes (see Hellwig 2001; 
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Kayser 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2010). The international and complex nature 
of the recent crisis has muddied the waters even more, leaving voters confused 
in their judgments of performance in economic management. When the ability 
of the government to manage the economy is limited, its policy response to 
external shocks gains significance. Governments reacted to economic decline 
with harsh austerity measures in some countries and with expansionary stimulus 
packages in others. It is highly likely that the severity and timing of these 
measures divided voters, influenced voter perception of the competence of 
incumbents and further shapes the blame attribution mechanism. Ultimately, the 
way in which economic conditions interact with factors such as contextual con-
straints and economic policies can fundamentally influence the basic patterns of 
electoral behaviour (Magalhães 2014a).  
To summarise, the crisis of 2007–2009 was in many ways exceptional for its 
economic as well as political repercussions, and was by far more severe than 
any other economic development since the early 20th century. Circumstances 
like this call for researchers to revisit conventional political behaviour theories 
in order to assess potential changes in the democratic link between voters and 
elections. While our knowledge on voting behaviour in ‘normal’ times is by 
now relatively advanced, we know far less about how these mechanisms per-
form under exceptional conditions. Extraordinary times such as those charac-
terized by the recent crisis therefore offer a fascinating setting for testing the 
classic concepts, especially when the fluctuations are not merely short-term, but 
instead give rise to fundamental political changes as shown for some countries 
mentioned above. From the perspective of the voting studies, the crisis was 
worse than any experienced during the era of modern survey methods 
(Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2013), revealing unique research opportunities for 
students of political behaviour. Even though European nations are still strug-
gling with the aftermath of the recession, enough time has passed from the 
worst of the economic shock for us to be able to measure its impact. In doing 
so, applying a comparative approach is essential. Until recently, most economic 
voting studies on the crisis consequences of the crisis relied on single-election 
surveys, but this poses limits to our full understanding of the impact of the eco-
nomic changes. The crisis decisively transformed the political scenes in some 
countries in Europe but not everywhere. Focusing on single elections limits the 
variability, and thus fails to provide the full picture. Alternatively, a pooled 
cross-section time-series design, which covers repeated observations of coun-
tries, enables us to statistically study economic voting in times of crisis com-
pared to non-crisis times. A number of comparative studies examining the con-
sequences of the crisis have been published, but are oftentimes based on the 
analyses of aggregated economic and political data (see LeDuc and Pammett 
2013; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2014). These studies provide confirmation 
that in times of crises macroeconomic conditions strongly move national elec-
tion outcomes, but do not enable to make claims regarding the individual-level 
behavior of voters. This dissertation is, as will be explained in more details 
later, essentially interested in the latter.    
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2.4. Theoretical expectations of the dissertation  
Three aspects of economic voting theory form the backbone of the analysis 
presented in this dissertation: firstly, the overall link between economic condi-
tions and political choice in Europe, secondly, the dynamics in this relationship 
in times of worldwide crisis, and, finally, the role of economic policies in 
incumbent support levels. Each topic will be addressed in a separate empirical 
chapter, accompanied by theoretical framework corresponding to a particular 
research question. Here, a brief overview of key research hypotheses addressed 
in each of these chapters is provided.     
An extensive body of literature exists on the relationship between economic 
conditions and electoral results. This allows us to expect a strong positive rela-
tionship between the economy and incumbent support in Europe. As described 
in section 2.2.3, however, the research field is characterised by a number of 
limitations and challenges. One of the most widespread concerns in economic 
voting studies is the lack of stability in findings: economic effects appear in 
many elections but not always and everywhere, and it remains unclear what 
conditions its existence. The instability is often attributed to differences 
between studies in data, variables and statistical modelling. Various works sug-
gest that by proper variable operationalisation and model specification we 
should be able to achieve solid and consistent results (see Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam 2000; Bellucci and Lewis-Beck 2011; Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014). 
The first task of this dissertation is to address exactly this much-debated issue. I 
start out by estimating the basic link between the economy and political support 
in order to determine the overall magnitude and robustness of economic effects 
(see Figure 3). The main hypothesis is that better economic evaluations increase 
the likelihood of an incumbent vote.  
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between the economy and political support. 
 
 
 
Recently, the focus in the economic voting literature has shifted to the conse-
quences of the global financial and economic crisis. The crisis of 2007–2009 
severely shook the Western world and was followed by subsequent waves of 
economic decline, with which many countries are still struggling. A long-lasting 
recession, European debt crisis, and immense public debt and deficit levels have 
taken its toll on national economies. During the worst economic collapse of our 
time, there is good reason to expect the economy to play a leading role in 
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voter’s decisions at the polls. At the same time, the rapidly changing socio-
economic environment has provided an intriguing setting for testing the validity 
of well-known voting behaviour mechanisms, and so a whole new strand of 
studies has emerged that explores economic accountability under today’s unique 
circumstances (for an overview, see Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo 2016). This 
dissertation makes use of the fact that our knowledge of how the recent crisis 
has shaped voter attitudes is still relatively limited and undertakes an investiga-
tion of temporal changes in economic effects. The second task of the mono-
graph is to determine how the global crisis influences the relationship between 
the economy and voting (see Figure 4). Building on the theoretical framework 
outlined in detail in Chapter 5, I test two competing hypotheses: firstly, eco-
nomic effects in times of crisis are stronger than in ordinary times due to nega-
tive asymmetry, and, secondly, economic effects are weaker due to a lack of 
clarity in the attribution of economic responsibility. 
 
 
Figure 4. Crisis impact on the relationship between the economy and political support. 
 
 
 
Following the logic of economic voting, the severe economic hit that occurred 
in 2007-2009 should have led to public protest in the form of electoral punish-
ment, but empirical evidence from Europe is not always in line with this 
expectation. High levels of dissatisfaction with economic conditions should 
have resulted in the collapse of support for governments Europe-wide, but why 
instead did incumbents in many countries maintain their popularity despite the 
economic collapse? Such an outcome raises the possibility that other factors are 
likely in play. In other words, the punishing mechanism may be more complex 
than classic theories suggest. The most recent academic literature is therefore 
calling attention to government economic policies. In today’s world, where 
national economies are increasingly constrained by international processes and 
actors, a national government’s ability to shape economic outcomes is limited. 
In a multiplex context like this, government policy reactions to external shocks 
gain importance. Governments in Europe responded to the macroeconomic 
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developments either with generous stimulus packages or strict austerity 
measures, or both, one following the other. These decisions are likely to have 
framed voter attitudes of incumbent economic competence and consequently 
also shaped the patterns of political support. In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, I 
address this relatively unexplored area in the realm of economic voting – public 
reaction to economic policies – and argue that past research may have missed 
some important aspects of the individual-level vote choice mechanism (see 
Figure 5). More specifically, I hypothesise that overall, austerity yields lower 
incumbent support levels, but voters in times of crisis accept painful reductions 
as the measures are deemed temporary and necessary.    
 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between economic policies and political support. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Decades of research have witnessed multiple ways of studying economic vot-
ing. Early studies on economic effects utilised aggregate-level data on national 
electoral outcomes and macroeconomic indicators. These analyses demon-
strated a strong link between the economy and election results (see Goodhart 
and Bhansali 1970; Kramer 1971; Mueller 1973), but were not helpful in 
assessing the characteristics of voter decision-making process on the micro 
level where the political action is actually undertaken. The growing availability 
of survey data by the middle of the last century enabled researchers to turn their 
attention to the individual, with the micro-level approach becoming the most 
preferred way to investigate economic voting in contemporary studies.  
Constrained by the limited availability of comparable data, many works on 
economic voting focus on single countries, regions or points in time. Fortu-
nately, recent decades have seen academics and international research groups 
develop high-quality standardised cross-national and repeated social and politi-
cal surveys, providing students of voting behaviour with valuable opportunities 
to conduct electoral research with a comparative dimension. The search for the 
ultimate study design does not stop here, however. Academic debates continue 
over the adequacy of survey instruments, the validity and reliability of meas-
urement, and the suitability of methods and model specification used to estimate 
economic effects. Each of these decisions can potentially influence the results 
of the analysis and have implications on the overall judgements that we make.  
This present chapter introduces the design of this study. It firstly explains the 
importance of using the comparative research strategy in studying economic 
voting in general as well as over time. It then provides an overview of levels of 
analysis, empirical data and case selection employed to answer the research 
questions. Next, a detailed overview is given of the motivations that lay behind 
the selection of variables and the operationalisation of the key concepts in the 
study. In the final section, the data analysis methods used in the empirical 
chapters are described.    
 
 
3.1. Comparative research design  
Despite the literature on economic voting being vast and spanning many dec-
ades, the changing political and socioeconomic context is forcing political sci-
entists to re-evaluate the well-established relationship between economics and 
electoral outcomes. The main concerns in the modern academic literature are 
whether economic vote is consistent across elections and what conditions the 
economic effect on government support. This dissertation addresses these 
dilemmas from three different angles. It first tests the robustness of the basic 
link between the economy and vote intention against a number of statistical and 
methodological challenges so as to evaluate the robustness of economic effects. 
Secondly, the dissertation seeks to more specifically explore how the global 
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financial and economic crisis affected economic voting in Europe. Thirdly, it 
touches upon the novel topic of the impact of government economic policies on 
political support. In order to accomplish these tasks, I employ a geographically 
and temporally comparative research design, which maximises the contextual 
variability in which voters are embedded and thereby enables me to make 
stronger and more generalised inferences about citizens’ voting behaviour.  
Overall, comparative politics carries four immediate objectives: describing 
the political phenomena in a particular country or group of countries, concep-
tual categorising of countries based on shared characteristics, hypothesis-testing 
in order to identify important variables and links between them and conse-
quently build comprehensive theories of politics, and, finally, making predic-
tions about outcomes in other countries based on initial generalisations 
(Landman 2003: 4). The scientific purpose of comparison is to use these steps 
for making inferences. In other words, the comparative approach seeks to create 
knowledge through comparing cases (countries, political systems, regimes, time 
periods, etc.). It aims, similarly to natural science, to systematically collect 
evidence, find patterns, and based on the explanations of these patterns build 
more general theories. Insofar as political science is generally non-experi-
mental, comparison provides a control mechanism as it affords researchers an 
opportunity to replicate the results, holding certain things constant while 
accounting for observed differences between the cases. In this way it can be 
considered a substitute for experimentation (Landman 2003: 14). Therefore, all 
three empirical chapters of this dissertation employ an empirical approach based 
on the comparative method. The analysis focuses on mapping similarities and 
differences in individual-level economic effects across different time periods 
and between countries characterized by specific macro-level attributes. With the 
individual as the unit of analysis, I utilise a sample size of more than 55,000 
respondents to empirically assess various aspects of economic effects. I use 
nationally representative samples from survey data to make inferences about the 
respective population. Using an extensive dataset with wide geographical and 
temporal coverage enables me to reveal universal patterns of voting behaviour 
and make statistically solid inferences about the findings that contribute to theo-
ries of economic voting.  
A global comparative research design requires that particular attention is 
paid to establishing the equivalence of theoretical concepts and the indicators 
used to measure these concepts across various contexts. Landman (2003: 44) 
distinguished between three intellectual positions that address this issue: the 
universalist, the relativist and the middle position. The universalist position 
argues that in order for theoretical arguments and their empirical measurement 
to have explanatory power, they must be able to travel across contexts. The 
relativist position sees the meaning as locally determined and argues, because of 
this, that the scientific quality of comparative politics is not possible. The 
middle position states that concepts and indicators must not be abandoned, but 
should instead be modified in order to take into account context specifics. Using 
the comparative framework in an attempt to make larger inferences about eco-
46 
nomic voting, this monograph leans towards the logic of the universalist and the 
middle position. Building on these ideas, it is based on the assumption that con-
cepts such as ‘government support’ and ‘economy’ are abstract enough to be 
observed across different contextual conditions, and that making generalisations 
about citizens’ political behaviour is possible when particular attention is given 
to issues of data standardisation as well as the validity of measurement. The 
analysis relies on an international survey dataset from the EES Voter study, 
where samples and questionnaires have been designed in a similar manner 
cross-nationally since 1979. In essence, the same survey has been repeated in 
different European countries over the years. The measurement of the dependent 
and key independent variables is identical in nearly all surveys, as are the ques-
tions used to measure individual-level control variables. The macro-level data 
have been obtained from international datasets, which provide high-quality 
standardised statistical information gathered on a large number of countries on a 
regular basis. All of this provides an adequate basis for a well-constructed com-
parison.   
 
 
3.2. Levels of analysis 
In comparative politics, levels of analysis are largely divided between the 
micro, or individual level, and the macro, or system level. Micro-level analyses 
examine the political behaviour of individual actors, whereas macro-level anal-
ysis focuses on groups of individuals, social classes, nation states, etc. 
(Landman 2003: 18). As described in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, students of eco-
nomic voting have used both individual and aggregate-level studies to analyse 
the relationship between the economy and political support. For the lack of 
other alternatives, early studies typically focused on national-level aggregates, 
whereas contemporary works oftentimes aim to focus on mechanisms that drive 
individual decisions and therefore explain voter behaviour on the micro level. 
The most straightforward way of gathering such info is by asking people. The 
availability of survey data, especially of internationally standardised and com-
parable data, has made a significant contribution to the growth of popularity of 
the individual-level approach. In individual-level studies on economic voting, 
objective measures of national economy are replaced with voter perceptions of 
economic conditions, and instead of aggregate electoral outcomes the dependent 
variable is subjective political preferences. While a macro-analysis enables a 
researcher to reveal underlying relationships, for instance the correlation 
between the national level of unemployment and election results, it does not tell 
us anything about individual voter’s action. To be able to look at individual 
voter’s motivations and understand the mechanisms that actually determine 
political behavior, we must use a micro-analysis (Evans 2004, p. 11). Moreover, 
the micro-level approach enables us not only to explain individual vote-deci-
sions but also to link citizen’s demographic traits to their political attitudes and 
choices. Economic voting more specifically is also an individual-level phenom-
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enon. It is only when individuals condition their votes on their evaluations of 
the economy, that economic voting can occur (Duch and Stevenson 2008, p. 
42). For these reasons, this dissertation relies primarily on the analysis of indi-
vidual-level data in studying the economic vote. However, where necessary and 
possible, the micro-level tendencies will be controlled using aggregate-level 
data in order to assure the robustness of the results.   
While both micro and macro-level approach can help us better understand 
the democratic relationship between voters and political leaders, neither is with-
out problems. Aggregate-level studies can be problematic for mathematical 
reasons: drawing conclusions on citizens’ behaviour from group-level correla-
tions is unwise and carries the risk of ecological fallacy. The need to avoid the 
latter was the main justification for moving from aggregate-level time-series 
studies to individual-level survey research (Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2013). 
Micro-level studies, on the other hand, lead to concerns over endogeneity, 
doubts over citizens’ ability to accurately evaluate economic conditions, and are 
potentially biased as a result of the researcher’s decisions regarding survey 
timing, sampling error, response rate, interview method, question phrasing and 
order, data weighing, dishonest answers, memory failure, the desire to give 
socially desirable answers, etc. A frequent methodological concern in survey-
based research is whether vote intention indicated in interviews reflects sincere 
political preferences. In addition to survey methodology and self-reporting, 
discrepancies between pre-election polls and electoral outcomes can appear due 
to changes in voters’ minds by the time they reach the polling stations. The 
power of polls to accurately predict election outcomes may diminish as a result 
of a ‘late swing’ (voters changing their preference shortly before voting), the 
unknown vote intention of don’t knows and won’t says, unforeseen turnout 
levels, the bandwagon effect (voters rally behind a candidate or a party who is 
likely to win), the underdog effect (voter sympathises with a competitor who is 
expected to lose), and many other reasons (see Asher 1992; Jowell et al. 1993; 
Donsbach 2001). An individual’s final vote choice may also be a result of cam-
paign and media influence, tactical voting, or protest voting, which may not be 
reflected in attitudes indicated in survey interviews. The more time between the 
poll and the election, the less accurate the poll estimates are likely to be (Asher 
1992).  
The best way to assess the accuracy of survey data is to compare its esti-
mates to actual electoral outcomes. The EES Voter study data look trustworthy 
in this respect. An example from year 2014 is shown in Figure 6, which por-
trays gaps between vote share of incumbents in the EP election and self-
reported vote choice in the post-election survey a few weeks later. We observe 
some overreporting and underreporting of incumbent vote across countries, with 
the largest disparity of 11.4 percentage points in France, but the average differ-
ence in all ten nations combined between incumbent support in the survey and 
in the actual election is only 1.7 percentage points, with Pearson’s correlation as 
high as 0.82. Although these results do not allow us to assess individual-level 
differences between real electoral decisions and reported vote choice, the num-
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bers point to relative congruence between survey data and the ‘real’ world. In 
the literature, the accuracy of polls as an adequate mirror of public attitudes 
remains a controversy, with researchers arguing for and against the relative 
importance of survey bias. As so often in social sciences, no perfect data exist. 
That said, polling agencies are making an effort to adjust their methodologies to 
minimise the error and to achieve even more precise results, providing 
researchers with confidence that surveys are nevertheless in many aspects the 
most effective way to map the public political mood.  
 
 
Figure 6. Differences in self-reported and actual support for PM parties. 
 
Source: EES Voter study 2014; Parliaments and governments database at http:// 
www.parlgov.org/.  
Notes: PM party in country during the survey fieldwork indicated in parentheses.   
 
 
While many academic works attempt to explain politics on either the micro or 
the macro level, it is essential for the purpose of the current research to cover 
both. On the one hand, we can best explain citizens’ political behaviour by 
observing their values, attitudes and choices on the micro level. At the same 
time, individuals do not exist in vacuum. They are social beings operating 
within a context – political, institutional, cultural, economic and other – which 
may heavily impact their personal decisions. The context in which political 
action occurs cannot be neglected. Moreover, this study is specifically inter-
ested in understanding how national-level variables condition individual-level 
political behaviour: it explores the dynamics of economic voting as dependent 
on changes in the political and economic context in an effort to fully understand 
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how the crisis affects the link between economics and political choice. Firstly, 
to account for the contextual dimension when estimating individual-level effects 
and, secondly, to determine the influence of macro-level characteristics on indi-
vidual-level outcomes, this work combines survey data with aggregate variables 
and, where necessary, employs multilevel modelling techniques.  
 
 
3.3. Data and case selection 
In order to conduct the empirical analysis, I used a variety of data sources. The 
individual-level data were obtained from the European Election Studies (EES) 
Voter study.2 Launched in 1979 by an international group of electoral research-
ers, the EES is designed to examine electoral participation and voting behaviour 
in EP elections but also measures citizens’ political perceptions and preferences 
on a broader scale. The central component of the EES is a post-election survey 
among representative samples of voters from all EU member-countries. The 
EES Voter study has been carried out every five years since 1979, conducted 
immediately after the EP elections (see Appendix 1).3 The fieldwork period 
ordinarily remains within four weeks after the elections, although in early 
waves data collection often lasted longer. Earlier studies were carried out as a 
part of the regular Eurobarometer, but since 1999 the EES Voter study is its 
own standalone survey. Typically, face-to-face or telephone interviews are con-
ducted with a nationally representative sample of citizens aged 18 and more 
from every EU member-country. Despite wide contextual coverage, each of the 
studies has been designed in a similar manner and the questionnaires contain a 
large number of identical questions. These features guarantee a large temporal 
and geographical variation in the data pool, fulfilling a necessary precondition 
for the comparative research design.  
Although other individual-level datasets are available for European countries 
that contain good measures of political support, they either exclude consistent 
questions about key individual-level predictors for the study of economic vot-
ing, or lack homogeneity in questionnaires, data collection and sampling proce-
dures across studies. One valuable data source for researchers of voting behav-
iour is the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), an international 
collaboration among election study teams from around the world, where a con-
sistent set of questions are included in national post-election studies. Unfortu-
nately, economic perception measures were only covered in the first and the last 
survey wave so far. Similarly, economic assessments are not regularly measured 
in such large and long-established cross-national studies as the Eurobarometer, 
the European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Study (EVS) and the 
World Values Survey (WVS). Many European countries carry out their own 
                                                                          
2  See more at http://eeshomepage.net/home/.  
3  The fieldwork of the 1989 survey wave was carried out before the EP elections (from 
October to November 1988). Pre-electoral survey was selected for the current analysis 
due to availability of the variables needed for the cross-survey comparison. 
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national election studies (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden), but utilise country-
specific questionnaires and different methodological techniques, making the 
comparison of data complicated. Furthermore, the fact that the EES Voter study 
is conducted simultaneously in all European countries implies that the inter-
national political and economic context is constant, which is important for stud-
ying the Europe-wide effects of the financial and economic crisis. Using na-
tional election studies for comparative analyses of voting behavior can be more 
complex due to different timing in relation to such events (Oppenhuis 1995). 
For these reasons, and given the importance of the cross-sectional time-series 
research design for testing the stability of economic effects, the EES Voter 
study with good coverage of comparable empirical data across time and space is 
preferred here.  
Aggregate-level dynamics are modelled using macroeconomic indicators 
from the Eurostat databases. When the Eurostat data are not available, infor-
mation from the OECD and the IMF databank is used instead. All of these 
sources provide consistent high-quality data on European countries, publicly 
accessible on their websites and widely used by academic researchers. Because 
the individual-level analysis covers two dimensions, temporal and geographical, 
the macro-level data, too, are selected for each country per each year. The time 
points chosen correspond to the fieldwork year of the EES Voter study waves. 
Both survey data and national macroeconomic indicators for all countries and 
years were pooled into a combined, hierarchically structured dataset. 
The dissertation contains three empirical chapters, each of which utilises a 
slightly different case selection depending on the particular research focus (see 
Table 4). First of all, three survey years, 1979, 1984 and 1999, were dropped 
from the analysis throughout. Although data collection for the EES Voter study 
had already started in 1979, the first survey wave was excluded because it lacks 
data on the key explanatory variable in the current analysis, retrospective eco-
nomic evaluations. The data from 1984 were dropped for the same reason. The 
EES Voter study from 1999 was excluded due to a conceptually different meas-
ure of economic evaluations compared with other years. This leaves us with five 
comparable survey waves – 1989 (van der Eijk, Oppenhuis, and Schmitt 1993), 
1994 (del Castillo et al. 1997), 2004 (Schmitt et al. 2009), 2009 (van Egmond et 
al. 2011), and the newly published 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2015).4  
The first empirical chapter, which aims to test the overall robustness of eco-
nomic effects on incumbent support, uses data from all of these five waves. The 
country selection is based on the availability of data throughout the survey 
years: only countries whose data is to be found in all five waves are included in 
                                                                          
4  In 1989 and 1994, the EES Voter study was carried out as a part of the regular Euro-
barometer. Depending on the availability of the variables needed for the comparative 
analysis, data from the 1st wave of the 1989 survey (EB30) and the fourth wave of the 
1994 survey (EB42) are used here. 
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the analysis. These countries are Denmark, France, Germany5, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom6. Luxemburg 
was dropped due to a small number of respondents, and Belgium was excluded 
because data on vote intention were not collected in 2004. This determines that 
the focus in this chapter is on Western European countries, whereas Central and 
Eastern Europe remain excluded. Covering only ‘old Europe’ could be argued 
as being problematic, but the purpose of this analysis is, ultimately, not to draw 
conclusions on the entire continent. Rather, the aim is to explore voting behav-
iour dynamics over time, while still assuring large variability in political and 
economic contexts. By including data from 10 countries over the course of 25 
years, this requirement is easily satisfied.      
The second empirical chapter, testing the stability of economic effects over 
time, utilises the same set of surveys as the first one. The third empirical chap-
ter, however, differs from the others in terms of data coverage. The focus in this 
chapter is on public reactions to government economic policies, which makes it 
heavily reliant on aggregate-level indicators measuring government policy 
stances. Because for most countries this macro data are only available starting 
from 1995, earlier surveys were dropped. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to 
three survey waves: 2004, 2009 and 2014. On the positive side, focusing on the 
most recent waves enables us to considerably extend the geographical cover-
age – with time, an increasing number of countries has participated in the EES 
Voter study. The data used in the third empirical chapter span 24 countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. To give equal weight to every study, a random sample of 
approximately 1000 respondents was drawn from each country-year (see Table 1). 
This yields a total sample of 55,731 (50 country-years) in Chapters 4 and 5 and 
77,531 respondents (72 country-years) in Chapter 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                          
5  In 1989, only West Germany was included in the EES Voter study. In 1994, the field-
work was conducted separately in West and East Germany, but because by 1994 
Germany was officially reunified and elections were held federally, the two datasets have 
been combined.   
6  In 1989, 1994 and 2004, the fieldwork was carried out separately in Great Britain and in 
Northern Ireland. For the purpose of comparability with later survey waves, the data for 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland have been combined, and the United Kingdom has 
been treated as a unitary item throughout the analysis. 
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Table 1. Number of respondents in the EES Voter study. 
 1989 1994 2004 2009 2014 
Austria - - 1,010 1,000 1,096 
Belgium - - 889 1,002 1,084 
Cyprus - - 500 1,000 530 
Czech Republic - - 889 1,020 1,177 
Denmark 1,006 975 1,317 1,000 1,085 
Estonia  - - 1,606 1,007 1,087 
Finland - - 899 1,000 1,096 
France 964 972 1,406 1,000 1,074 
Germany 1,001 1,981 596 1,004 1,648 
Greece 961 964 500 1,000 1,085 
Hungary - - 1,200 1,005 1,104 
Ireland 927 581 1,151 1,001 1,081 
Italy 1,005 982 1,553 1,000 1,091 
Latvia - - 1,000 1,001 1,055 
Lithuania - - 1,005 1,000 1,096 
Luxembourg - - 1,335 1,001 538 
Netherlands 984 1,005 1,586 1,005 1,101 
Poland - - 960 1,002 1,233 
Portugal 930 955 1,000 1,000 1,033 
Slovakia - - 1,063 1,016 1,095 
Slovenia  - - 1,001 1,000 1,143 
Spain 951 948 1,208 1,000 1,106 
Sweden - - 2,100 1,002 1,144 
United Kingdom 1,268 1,277 1,498 1,000 1,421 
Total 9,955 10,644 27,272 24,066 26,193 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014. 
Notes: Only respondents age 18 and over. - = not included in the analysis.  
 
 
3.4. Operationalisation of the dependent variable 
While case selection varies slightly across the empirical chapters of this disser-
tation depending on the question at hand, the key variables are similar through-
out the study. The outcome variable in the analysis is incumbent support. 
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Quantification and simplification of vote choice are essential for the sake of 
cross-survey comparability, but the way incumbent support is operationalised in 
economic voting studies is fairly diverse. In their overview from 1981 to 2007, 
Bellucci and Lewis-Beck (2011) demonstrate at least eight different ways of 
defining the outcome variable in the economic voting literature. This indicates 
that there is no common and widely approved way to measure incumbent sup-
port. In many individual-level studies, the outcome variable is a dichotomous 
choice between government and opposition. However, the size and the type of 
governments differ remarkably between countries and moments in time, pos-
sibly making the drawing of conclusion complex. Van der Brug, van der Eijk 
and Franklin (2007: 9) emphasised that such a set-up fails to take into account 
the possibility that parties are differently affected by the economy. In diverse 
coalition governments, parties have dissimilar responsibilities and may suffer or 
gain from economic changes to a different extent. Instead, van der Brug, van 
der Eijk and Franklin put propensity to vote for national parties as the outcome 
variable in their work (2007: 67), but as described in section 2.2.4 above, this 
approach, too, involves various limitations. Most importantly, propensity scores 
given to different parties can be correlated (van der Brug, Hobolt, and de Vreese 
2009; see also section 2.2.4). In this analysis, the potential usage of the propen-
sity measure is restricted also due to data missing from 1989 and 1994.   
In an attempt to avoid the issues discussed above, here incumbent support is 
operationalised as vote intention for the governing PM party in subsequent 
national elections. The analysis, then, utilises widely-used discrete choice mod-
els, but focuses on support for the PM party as opposed to the whole govern-
ment. Although the role of the PM party can vary in political systems depending 
on, for example, its dominance, size, strength and whether government com-
prises multiple party participants, previous work shows that in multiparty sys-
tems the head of the government is still typically held more accountable by 
voters for economic performance than any other party (see Duch and Stevenson 
2008; Fisher and Hobolt 2010; Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun 2014). Voters are 
able to identify the party that holds the key position in the cabinet – usually also 
the largest, the strongest and the most visible party in the coalition – and recog-
nise its role as the main decision maker. Moreover, as demonstrated by Debus, 
Stegmaier, and Tosun (2014), looking at the impact of economic evaluations on 
the coalition as a whole can even lead to null findings, masking important dif-
ferences in assigning economic responsibility. The authors argued that their 
findings for Germany from 1987 to 2009 showing that economic voting is 
clearly targeted at the head of the government – even compared to key eco-
nomics-related ministries – “demonstrate the importance of assessing the impact 
of the economy on support for specific parties rather than for the governing 
coalition as a whole” (p. 63). For these reasons, in this study I too expect the 
PM party to be the primary target of economic voting. The way dependent vari-
able is operationalised in the present analysis also helps to address cross-survey 
validity concerns, in that it enables comparability across contexts as specifying 
the government leader is usually fairly straightforward. That said, even though 
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there are good reasons for focusing solely on PM party support, I conduct addi-
tional robustness checks with the dependent variable defined as vote intention 
for any other party in the case of a coalition government. This helps to account 
for higher ambiguity in some political systems, where identifying who is in 
charge may not be as simple as, for instance, it is in Germany.  
To measure vote intention, respondents in the EES Voter study were shown 
a list of parties and asked who they would vote for if there were a general elec-
tion the following day. The answers were recoded as 1 for the PM party in 
office at the time of the fieldwork and 0 for any other party. The latter category 
covers all parties, including small parties and non-parliamentary parties, thereby 
maintaining the number of choice options in the analysis (see restrictions of 
discrete-choice models in van der Eijk et al. 2006). Table 2 below provides a 
detailed overview of parties holding the PM party’s portfolio by country and 
survey year. Don’t knows, respondents who refused to answer the question, 
respondents who said they would not vote, would spoil their vote or vote blank, 
and missing answers were excluded.  
Although voters are able to express their attitudes towards political leaders in 
various elections and through many forms of political participation, the voting 
behaviour literature is predominantly concerned with general elections as these 
are the channel for electing the nation’s primary legislative body. In this disser-
tation, too, the focus is on vote intention in national parliamentary elections, 
even though the EES Voter study contains several measures of citizens’ politi-
cal preferences, including respondents’ vote choice in the previous EP election. 
Critics might argue that looking at vote intention instead of vote choice is a 
miscalculation as the latter should be the ultimate phenomenon of interest in 
political science studies. In addition, vote intention in a hypothetical election 
may not reflect how respondents will actually vote in next elections, and, fur-
thermore, may not even precisely mirror current political mood because little is 
at stake and the response is not binding. The more fundamental choice here, 
however, is that between types of elections, and thus the focus is on national 
elections even if this means a trade-off between vote intention and vote choice. 
In most European democracies national elections – parliamentary elections in 
parliamentary systems and presidential elections in presidential systems – are 
first-order elections, the most important elections. Other elections, such as by-
elections, municipal elections and various sorts of regional elections, are less 
salient and are thus second-order (Reif and Schmitt 1980). The main distinction 
between the two types is that there is less at stake in second-order elections. 
European elections, which the EES Voter study primarily focuses on, fall into 
the latter category. European elections are simultaneous national elections held 
every five years to elect members of the European Parliament. Reif and Schmitt 
(1980) emphasise that EP elections differ from national elections, in that they 
have no institutionally binding consequences on government or opposition poli-
cies at the national level but rather elect a representative body with little real 
power. Additionally, European elections are characterised by a complicated 
system of coalitions and party alliances, different electoral procedures, cam-
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paign efforts, etc. Because European elections do not lead to the formation of a 
government, these elections are far less important for voters and the turnout 
remains low. The focus remains on domestic political concerns rather than on 
European issues or the performance of the politicians and parties at the Euro-
pean level. National governments generally gain a lower vote share at EP elec-
tions because the latter behave as mid-term referendums for government per-
formance and enable voters to express their discontent with national incum-
bents. Finally, the extent to which governments are punished, depends largely 
on the timing of EP elections within the national electoral cycle as government 
support tends to be the lowest around mid-term (see Reif and Schmitt 1980; 
Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 2007, 2011; Hobolt, Spoon, and Tilley 2009).  
From the perspective of economic voting research, these arguments are 
important, in that they indicate that the mechanism of rewarding and sanction-
ing of incumbents operates differently in second-order elections. Voter attitudes 
are formed by a mix of a number of motives, and this may hinder us from 
detecting the pure effect of the economy on political preferences. The main 
concern is large differences in party support levels in first- and second-order 
elections. To bring an example, Figure 7 below illustrates aggregate vote share 
for PM parties in the 2014 EP election in ten Western European countries in 
comparison with vote share for the same parties in preceding national elections. 
We witness a very clear tendency for ruling parties across Europe to gain less 
votes in the European election in 2014 than they did in the preceding respective 
national election.7 In some cases, the difference is as large as 15 percentage 
points (see e.g. Spain, France and the Netherlands). The only exception is Italy, 
where the incumbent Democratic Party (PD) performed considerably better in 
the 2014 EP election than it had in the parliamentary election in 2013. This 
wave of support was likely due to the new Prime Minister Matteo Renzi taking 
office in early 2014 after Italy’s long-lasting economic struggle, painful auster-
ity measures and three previous governments ending in resignation of their 
leaders. The public welcomed fresh outlooks and reacted optimistically to 
Renzi’s radical reform plans for a country that had suffered years of severe 
economic and political distress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
7  The correlation between the two variables is r=0.21. 
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Table 2. Prime Ministerial parties at the time of the fieldwork. 
 1989 1994 2004 2009 2014 
Austria - - OVP SPO SPO 
Belgium - - VLD CD&V PS 
Cyprus - - DIKO AKEL DISY 
Czech Republic - - CSSD Indep.* CSSD 
Denmark KF Sd V V Sd 
Estonia  - - ERP ERe ERe 
Finland - - KESK KESK KOK 
France PS RPR UMP UMP PS 
Germany CDU/CSU CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU CDU/CSU 
Greece PASOK PASOK ND ND ND 
Hungary - - MSZP MSZP Fidesz 
Ireland FF FF8 FF FF FG 
Italy DC FI FI IPdL PD 
Latvia - - ZZS JL V 
Lithuania - - LSDP TS-LKD LSDP 
Luxembourg - - CSV CSV DP 
Netherlands CDA PvdA CDA CDA VVD 
Poland - - SLD PO PO 
Portugal PSD PSD PSD PS PSD 
Slovakia - - SDKU Smer Smer 
Slovenia  - - LDS SD PS 
Spain PSOE PSOE PSOE PSOE PP 
Sweden - - SAP MSP MSP 
United 
Kingdom 
Con Con Lab Lab Con 
Source: Parliaments and governments database at http://www.parlgov.org/. 
Notes: - not included in the analysis.  
*Czech data for 2009 was dropped because the incumbent party cannot be identified.  
 
 
                                                                          
8  In Ireland, incumbent change took place half way through the EES Voter study fieldwork 
period in 1994. Fianna Fáil held the PM portfolio until the 14th of Dec 1994 and Fine 
Gael, the previous opposition party, took the position on the 15th of Dec 1994. The EES 
Voter study fieldwork in Ireland in 1994 lasted from the 30th of Nov until the 23rd of Dec. 
In the analysis, Fianna Fáil is defined as an incumbent PM party. All respondents 
interviewed later than on the 14th Dec 1994 were dropped from the dataset. Decision 
reviewed by Prof. Michael Marsh (Trinity College Dublin) in personal communication 
on 11th Nov 2013.       
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Figure 7. Differences in support for the PM party in national and EP elections. 
 
Source: Parliaments and governments database at http://www.parlgov.org/.  
Notes: PM party in country during the EP elections indicated in parentheses.   
 
 
Italy aside, the overall picture shows, however, that party support patterns vary 
considerably between different types of elections. If the political mood during 
EP election is heavily anti-government, and, moreover, many dissatisfied citi-
zens choose to abstain from voting altogether, then this is likely to influence the 
economic voting mechanism as well, and may limit our ability to accurately 
estimate economic effects. For these reasons, this study opts to focusing on 
national elections instead. Another more practical reason that dictates how the 
dependent variable is operationalised is the fact that one of the five EES Voter 
study waves under observation – the one conducted in 1989 – was carried out as 
a pre-electoral survey, and therefore only includes information on vote intention 
in national elections, but not vote choice in past EP elections. Hence, focusing 
on the former also allows me to involve more survey waves in the analysis and 
to expand the scope of the study.  
 
 
3.5. Operationalisation of other key variables 
Even more emphasis has been put on what is on the right side of the vote pre-
diction equation, i.e. how to measure economic performance. Most individual-
level economic voting studies rely on subjective measures of economic percep-
tions rather than on actual economic conditions, but the question of how much 
people really know about the ‘real’ economy has been raised (see Conover and 
Feldman 1986; Blendon et al. 1997; Aidt 2000; Paldam and Nannestad 2000). 
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Voters who lack knowledge about the state of the economy cannot be expected 
to make rational and informed political decisions. With regard to these consid-
erations, I conducted a test by comparing aggregated individual-level economic 
assessments in the EES Voter study with objective economic performance. The 
results combining the data from 50 surveys show a strong correlation between 
aggregated economic evaluations and one of the key measures of the actual state 
of the economy, GDP growth rate (Pearson’s r=0.72). Moreover, regressing 
aggregated economic perceptions on key macroeconomic indicators (for a sim-
ilar approach, see Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2012), demonstrates that all three – 
GDP growth rate, change in unemployment and in inflation – have a statistically 
significant effect on subjective assessments on a 99% confidence level with 
signs in the expected direction (see Table 3). Therefore, individual-level survey 
data do a good job in reflecting economic realities. Several studies confirm these 
results (see Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Bélanger and Lewis-Beck 2004; Fraile 
and Lewis-Beck 2012), suggesting that voter beliefs about national economies “are 
grounded in economic reality” (Duch and Stevenson 2010: 113). 
 
 
Table 3. Effects of macroeconomic indicators on subjective economic evaluations. 
GDP growth  0.05*** 
 (0.00) 
Inflation growth  -0.02*** 
 (0.00) 
Unemployment change 0.00*** 
 (0.00) 
Constant 0.37*** 
(0.00) 
  
McFadden’s R2  0.55 
N 55,731 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; Eurostat and 
OECD; author’s own calculations. 
Notes: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is aggre-
gated from individual-level economic perceptions (mean value per country per year). 
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
 
 
The main independent variable in the analysis is citizens’ retrospective socio-
tropic economic assessments. Retrospective evaluations are based on past as 
opposed to future economic performance, and sociotropic refers to evaluations 
of national rather than personal financial situation. Previous results indicate that 
voters are more influenced by retrospective evaluations than by prospective 
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ones (Key 1966), and that they form their economic opinions based on the 
country’s overall economic situation rather than their own pocketbook (Kinder 
and Kiewiet 1981). Respondents in the EES Voter study were asked to assess 
on a 5-point scale whether they thought that compared to 12 months previous 
the general economic situation in the country had gotten a lot better, a little 
better, stayed the same, got a little worse or a lot worse. This survey item, first 
proposed by Lewis-Beck in 1988, is the most standard way to measure indi-
vidual-level economic perceptions. Because the substantive interest in economic 
voting studies lies in the distinction between negative, positive and neutral 
evaluations, the original 5-category variable was recoded into a 3-point scale 
where 1=worse, 2=stayed the same and 3=better (for a similar approach, see 
Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). Being able to select one of five 
responses is useful for the respondent, but in the analysis we are substantively 
interested in distinguishing only between three categories: how much more 
likely are citizens to vote for the incumbent if they move from category “worse” 
to “same” or to “better”. Even though broader than the original one, the recoded 
variable reflects a meaningful division of response categories, while still main-
taining the ordinal nature of the data.  
In addition to the retrospective dimension, prospective economic evaluations 
are often used in economic voting studies but show considerably weaker effects. 
Here, prospective evaluations were not included due to respective data missing 
on 1989.  
To test the relative impact of economic perceptions, a number of control 
variables are included in the models. These predictors are held constant 
throughout the analysis. The basic set of control variables predominantly con-
sists of standard determinants known to influence voter political preferences. In 
the American political system, the key socio-psychological factor influencing 
electoral choice is party identification (Campbell et al. 1960), with the majority 
of people having a sense of attachment with one of the two main parties – Dem-
ocrats or Republicans. In Europe, where the party landscape is more frag-
mented, stronger emphasis is placed on voter ideological identification 
(Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). The EES Voter study measures voter ideo-
logical leaning via respondents’ self-placement on the left-right scale (from 1 to 
10, where 1=left and 10=right). A wide range of empirical studies have shown 
that the left-right continuum is a major ideological dimension along which 
political life is organised (see Castles and Mair 1984; Warwick 1992). Left-
right thinking is a stable feature of political processes, and most citizens in 
democratic countries are willing and able to place themselves on this scale 
(Geser 2008). Left-right judgments are a major predictor of voting decisions 
(see Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993), and there-
fore in this analysis, too, I expect respondent left-right placement to have a 
strong influence on incumbent support. Additionally, standard socio-
demographic indicators that may determine vote preference such as age (in full 
years), gender (1=male, 2=female), education (age upon leaving full-time edu-
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cation,9 0=still studying, 1=up to 15 years, 2=16-19 years, 3=20 years or more), 
religious attendance (1=several times a week, 2=once a week, 3=few times a 
year, 4=once a year or less, 5=never) and subjective placement into social class 
(1=working class, 2=middle class, 3=higher class) are included. All of these 
items are regularly measured in the EES Voter study surveys. Country and year 
dummies are used in all single-level models as a control for unobserved hetero-
geneity across countries and time.  
To ensure correct model specification, respondents’ left-right ideology, 
social class and attendance of religious services were adjusted to match the 
ideology of the PM party in office at the time of the fieldwork (for a similar 
approach, see Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). For example, the ide-
ology scores remained unaltered (1=left, 10=right) if the incumbent PM party 
was right-wing, but were reversed (1=right, 10=left) if the incumbent PM party 
was left-wing.10 In a similar manner, the scores of religious attendance and self-
assigned social class were reversed if the governing PM party was left-wing. 
This enabled an ambiguous situation to be avoided in combined models where 
in some elections a positive regression coefficient would indicate higher support 
for a left-wing PM party and in others for a right-wing one.  
In order to account for possible effects of the electoral cycle – the cost of 
ruling – cabinet time in office is controlled for. It is a robust finding in political 
science research that government popularity follows a cyclical pattern. Incum-
bents begin their terms with high approval rates. The post-election honeymoon 
period is followed by a decline in popularity by mid-term, which then increases 
again towards the end of the electoral cycle (see Miller and Mackie 1973; Tufte 
1975; Stimson 1976). The average government in an established democracy is 
thought to lose about 2.25% of votes during a normal election period 
(Nannestad and Paldam 2002: 17). To capture these effects, I include in the 
models a measure of the time the government held office. The variable was 
measured as a number of months from the preceding last national election to the 
starting date of survey fieldwork. The calculations were based on information 
available in the EES Voter study methodological reports and in the European 
Election Database. Because I expect the relationship between the electoral cycle 
and incumbent support to be nonlinear, logarithmic transformation for the cycle 
variable was used.   
Additional independent variables specific to particular research questions are 
separately described in each empirical chapter.  
 
                                                                          
9  Data on the highest level of education completed are only available for 2009 and 2014, 
and coding of the variable is highly diverse across countries. Therefore, age when 
stopped full education is used instead.  
10  PM parties in different countries at different points in time were divided into left and 
right depending on which side of the midpoint of a typical left-right scale they fell on. In 
categorising, internet resources (e.g. the Parliaments and governments database at 
http://parlgov.org/ and the Parties and elections in Europe database at http:// 
www.parties-and-elections.eu/) and country experts were consulted. 
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3.6. Method of analysis 
Most economic voting studies rely on quantitative analysis, which uses numeri-
cally measureable data and employs statistical analytical techniques. These 
studies offer an understanding of the relationships between political phenomena 
based on large-scale empirical evidence, where generalisations are made from 
sample to population. The generalizability of quantitative results comes with a 
trade-off: being less in-depth than qualitative research, such studies may miss 
contextual details that help to describe underlying meanings and patterns of 
these relationships. Nevertheless, the focus here is on identifying the overall 
associations between economic opinions and political preferences across 
Europe, as well as variation in these relationship and trends over time. For this 
reason, quantitative data and statistical analysis methods are a logical choice. 
The purpose of the analysis is to estimate how explanatory variables, specifi-
cally economic perceptions, affect incumbent support. I utilise a variety of sta-
tistical methods, which best fit the data and the research question at hand. In 
social sciences, the relationship between variables is commonly estimated using 
regression analysis. Regression analysis helps us to estimate the statistical rela-
tionship between two or more variables. In this work, it helps us to understand 
how the typical value of incumbent support changes when economic percep-
tions vary, while the values of control variables are held constant.  
When the dependent variable is scalar, its statistical relationship with one or 
more explanatory variables is estimated with linear regression. Here, however, 
the dependent variable is dichotomous – the observed outcome can only take on 
two possible values, 1 if the respondent would vote for the incumbent PM party 
in subsequent national elections and 0 if the vote would go to any other party. 
The binary response means that the relationship between the variables is non-
linear, and this requires the use of logistic regression (Pampel 2000). The 
coefficients in logistic regression models will indicate the increase or decrease 
in probability of voting for the incumbent due to a one-unit change in a given 
independent variable. The baseline multivariate model includes economic 
assessments as its main explanatory variable, a number of control variables to 
test the relative impact of the economy on incumbent popularity, and, addition-
ally, dummies for country and year fixed effects in order to account for 
unmeasured time-constant country-specific factors that may influence incum-
bent vote probability for individuals and that may correlate with other covari-
ates. Interaction effects between micro- and macro-level variables are intro-
duced where necessary to determine how individual-level economic effects vary 
depending on higher-level factors. 
The results are presented as average marginal effects, which express the 
population average effect of ܺ on ܻ (Mood 2010). Marginal effects can be inter-
preted as discrete change in predicted probabilities when independent variables 
change from their minimum to their maximum value. Logistic regression coef-
ficients can be estimated in various ways, e.g. probability, odds or odds ratio 
(Pampel 2000; Menard 2002). In order to linearise the nonlinearity in regression 
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models with binary outcome, further logit transformation is used. Most statisti-
cal packages by default produce logistic regression results as logged odds. 
Unfortunately, while this transformation improves linearity, it carries with it the 
loss in interpretability since logged odds can be less intuitive to understand 
(Pampel 2000). Moreover, interpreting logged odds or odds ratios as substantive 
effects and comparing these effects across models, samples or groups can be 
problematic because of unobserved heterogeneity: differences in coefficients 
may not be due to differences in actual effects but variation in the dependent 
variable caused by omitted variables (see Allison 1999; Mood 2010). The 
recommended solution is to transform coefficients into changes in probability, 
for example marginal effects, based on derivatives of the prediction function 
(Mood 2010). This is the approach used in this study.  
When conducting data analysis, special considerations are taken with the 
specifics of the data used. In particular, in some empirical chapters the data 
have a hierarchical structure. Voters in Europe are not independent individuals, 
existing in vacuum, but are nested in countries and in different points in time. 
For example, survey respondents in France in 2009 are more likely to be similar 
to each other than to those from France in 2014, or to voters from Italy at any 
time point. If the answers are correlated because units of observations are simi-
lar, one of the main assumptions of classical single-level regression models is 
violated – namely, that scores of individual observations in the data pool must 
be independent from each other. In order to address this problem, I use multi-
level analysis, which accounts for the variability in each level of nesting. A 
multilevel approach enables relaxation of assumption of statistical independ-
ence and allows for correlation among responses for units that belong to the 
same group (Luke 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). At the same time, 
using multilevel modelling ensures that the researcher does not ignore the con-
text and wrongly assume that political processes operate in a similar matter in 
different environments (Luke 2004). This is an important concern in social 
sciences, not only in general, where researchers are dealing with open systems 
affected by outside influences (Luke 2004), but also in economic voting studies 
in particular, where we know from previous works that individual-level eco-
nomic effects can vary quite notably depending on the political and institutional 
context (see section 2.2.2). In this dissertation, I use 3-level models where indi-
viduals are nested in country-years at level 2 and country-years are nested in 
countries at level 3. The slope of the economic coefficient is allowed to vary 
randomly across all three levels in order to account for the variation in eco-
nomic effects.  
Specific statistical models employed in different chapters are discussed sepa-
rately in that chapter. The models were fitted with maximum likelihood estima-
tion in Stata version 12.0 (StataCorp. 2011) using logit and xtmelogit com-
mands.   
 Ta
bl
e 
4.
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
qu
es
tio
n,
 th
eo
re
tic
al
 fo
cu
s a
nd
 m
et
ho
d 
of
 th
e 
em
pi
ric
al
 c
ha
pt
er
s. 
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
qu
es
tio
n 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 fo
cu
s 
In
di
vi
du
al
-le
ve
l d
at
a 
 
A
gg
re
ga
te
-le
ve
l d
at
a 
M
et
ho
d 
C
ha
pt
er
 4
 
H
ow
 ro
bu
st
 a
re
 
ec
on
om
ic
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
on
 in
cu
m
be
nt
 
su
pp
or
t?
 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
 st
ro
ng
 li
nk
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
ec
on
om
y 
an
d 
el
ec
tio
ns
, b
ut
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
r 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
at
tri
bu
tio
n 
la
ck
s s
ta
bi
lit
y.
 
Th
is
 c
ha
pt
er
 te
st
s t
he
 ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 o
f t
he
 
ov
er
al
l m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 o
f e
co
no
m
ic
 v
ot
in
g 
in
 
W
es
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e.
  
Th
e 
EE
S 
V
ot
er
 st
ud
y 
fr
om
 
19
89
, 1
99
4,
 2
00
4,
 2
00
9 
an
d 
20
14
 fo
r D
en
m
ar
k,
 F
ra
nc
e,
 
G
er
m
an
y,
 G
re
ec
e,
 Ir
el
an
d,
 
Ita
ly
, t
he
 N
et
he
rla
nd
s, 
Po
rtu
ga
l, 
Sp
ai
n,
 a
nd
 th
e 
U
K
 
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 d
at
a 
fo
r c
ou
nt
rie
s i
n 
su
rv
ey
 
ye
ar
s f
ro
m
 E
ur
os
ta
t 
an
d 
th
e 
O
EC
D
 
 
Lo
gi
st
ic
 re
gr
es
-
si
on
, m
ul
til
ev
el
 
lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
  
C
ha
pt
er
 5
 
D
id
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 
cr
is
is
 in
flu
en
ce
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ec
on
om
ic
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 a
nd
 
vo
tin
g?
 If
 so
, 
ho
w
? 
 
Th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 c
ris
is
 le
d 
to
 
m
aj
or
 p
ol
iti
ca
l a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 in
st
ab
ili
ty
. 
Th
is
 c
ha
pt
er
 e
xp
lo
re
s t
he
 q
ue
st
io
n 
of
 
w
he
th
er
 e
co
no
m
ic
 v
ot
in
g 
al
so
 c
ha
ng
ed
. I
t 
te
st
s t
w
o 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
ar
gu
m
en
ts
: i
nc
re
as
ed
 
pu
ni
sh
m
en
t o
f i
nc
um
be
nt
s a
s s
ug
ge
st
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 h
yp
ot
he
si
s, 
or
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 
pu
ni
sh
m
en
t a
s p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 th
e 
cl
ar
ity
 o
f 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
hy
po
th
es
is
.  
 
Th
e 
EE
S 
V
ot
er
 st
ud
y 
fr
om
 
19
89
, 1
99
4,
 2
00
4,
 2
00
9 
an
d 
20
14
 fo
r D
en
m
ar
k,
 F
ra
nc
e,
 
G
er
m
an
y,
 G
re
ec
e,
 Ir
el
an
d,
 
Ita
ly
, t
he
 N
et
he
rla
nd
s, 
Po
rtu
ga
l, 
Sp
ai
n,
 a
nd
 th
e 
U
K
 
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 d
at
a 
fo
r c
ou
nt
rie
s i
n 
su
rv
ey
 
ye
ar
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
O
EC
D
 
 
Lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
C
ha
pt
er
 6
 
H
ow
 d
o 
vo
te
rs
 
re
sp
on
d 
to
 e
co
-
no
m
ic
 p
ol
ic
ie
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l a
nd
 d
ur
in
g 
an
 e
co
no
m
ic
 c
ris
is
 
in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
? 
Th
e 
cr
is
is
 w
as
 m
et
 b
y 
na
tio
na
l 
co
un
te
rm
ea
su
re
s, 
ra
ng
in
g 
fr
om
 ra
di
ca
l 
au
st
er
ity
 p
ro
gr
am
s t
o 
fis
ca
l e
xp
an
si
on
. T
he
 
fo
cu
s o
f p
ub
lic
 d
is
co
ur
se
 tu
rn
ed
 to
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 th
e 
cr
is
is
, a
nd
 it
 is
 
fe
as
ib
le
 to
 e
xp
ec
t t
he
se
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
de
ci
si
on
s t
o 
ha
ve
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
po
lit
ic
al
 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 in
cu
m
be
nt
s. 
Th
is
 c
ha
pt
er
 
ex
te
nd
s t
he
 fo
cu
s b
ey
on
d 
th
e 
cl
as
si
c 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 o
f e
co
no
m
ic
 v
ot
in
g 
an
d 
ex
am
in
es
 th
e 
ne
w
 d
im
en
si
on
 o
f e
co
no
m
ic
 
vo
tin
g,
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f a
tti
tu
de
s t
o 
ec
on
om
ic
 
po
lic
ie
s i
n 
vo
te
r b
eh
av
io
ur
. 
Th
e 
EE
S 
V
ot
er
 st
ud
y 
fr
om
 
20
04
, 2
00
9 
an
d 
20
14
 fo
r 
A
us
tri
a,
 B
el
gi
um
, C
yp
ru
s, 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
, D
en
m
ar
k,
 
Es
to
ni
a,
 F
in
la
nd
, F
ra
nc
e,
 
G
er
m
an
y,
 G
re
ec
e,
 H
un
ga
ry
, 
Ir
el
an
d,
 It
al
y,
 L
at
vi
a,
 L
ith
ua
ni
a,
 
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g,
 th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s, 
Po
la
nd
, P
or
tu
ga
l, 
Sl
ov
ak
ia
, 
Sl
ov
en
ia
, S
pa
in
, S
w
ed
en
, a
nd
 
th
e 
U
K
 
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 d
at
a 
fo
r c
ou
nt
rie
s i
n 
su
rv
ey
 
ye
ar
s f
ro
m
 E
ur
os
ta
t 
an
d 
th
e 
IM
F 
 
M
ul
til
ev
el
 
lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
64 
4. HOW ROBUST ARE ECONOMIC EFFECTS?   
It is commonly acknowledged that there is a robust relationship between eco-
nomic conditions and political support. A rich literature spanning more than 40 
years provides ample evidence that voters hold political leaders responsible for 
national economic conditions. They punish incumbents when the economy 
performs poorly and reward them when it is healthy. The tendency of citizens to 
observe and react to government performance incorporates the mechanism of 
electoral accountability. It remains unknown, however, how universal economic 
voting really is. It plays a role in some elections, but not always and every-
where, and it is not clear why this is o. This instability dilemma in economic 
effects constitutes a serious challenge to the research field, raising empirical and 
methodological debates and even claims of ‘the end of economic voting’ (see 
Anderson 2007).     
The empirical part of this dissertation aims to address the concerns outlined 
above by testing the overall robustness of the economic voting theory. It begins 
by estimating a basic model of economic voting for Western democracies. By 
pooling individual-level data from various points in time and geographical 
locations in Europe, I first compile a large dataset of 50 cross-sections with 
highly diverse political and economic conditions. Maximising the contextual 
variation provides a demanding setting for testing the link between the economy 
and political support, and helps to more accurately estimate the effects. Using 
various statistical tools, I examine the overall magnitude of the effect of subjec-
tive economic perceptions on incumbent support. Then, in order to evaluate the 
stability and robustness of economic effects, I challenge these results by 
employing a number of statistical and methodological tests.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. It first briefly reviews essential findings 
from previous studies on economic voting and explains the instability dilemma 
that perplexes the research field. The second section provides an overview of 
data, variables and methods used in the analysis in this chapter. The third sec-
tion introduces the empirical results, and the final section summarises the main 
conclusions. 
 
 
4.1. The instability dilemma in previous findings  
The central notion of economic voting theory is that under weak economic con-
ditions voters tend to punish incumbents by not voting for them in elections (see 
Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck 
1988). Although the literature on economic voting is expansive and spans many 
decades, there is a lack of consistency in the results as previous studies indicate 
that it is not known how universal economic voting actually is (see Nannestad 
and Paldam 1994; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2006). 
Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) have argued that while there are good theoreti-
cal reasons to expect a robust relationship between the economy and the vote 
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via responsibility attribution, data do not always empirically support the reward-
punishment mechanism. Empirical studies have found strong evidence of eco-
nomic influences on political support in the United States, the relationship how-
ever appears to be much more unstable in other countries (Duch and Stevenson 
2006). In their extensive analysis of 19 countries over two decades, in which 
they drew data from 163 national surveys, Duch and Stevenson (2006) esti-
mated the median impact of economic evaluations on vote probability for the 
incumbent PM party to be about 5%. Nevertheless, they too arrived at the con-
clusion that the magnitude of economic effects varies significantly across 
nations and over time, and this poses empirical and theoretical challenges to the 
entire research field (Duch and Stevenson 2006). 
Even studies that do not focus on differences between national and electoral 
contexts but use analogous data pools to investigate the overall significance of 
the economic vote have provided contradictory results. Van der Brug, van der 
Eijk and Franklin (2007) analysed pooled data on 15 countries from the EES 
Voter study from 1989, 1994 and 1999. They found only modest individual-
level effects and argued that due to a number of methodological limitations, 
such as improper operationalisation of vote choice or focusing on subjective 
economic perceptions, many scientific until then had overestimated the associa-
tion between the economy and voting. In their response article, Nadeau, Lewis-
Beck and Bélanger (2013) demonstrated using a similar data pool of 10 coun-
tries from the EES Voter study (1988, 1994, 1999 and 2004) that when exer-
cising special caution with methodological issues, economic perceptions do 
have a strong and important influence on vote choice. This demonstrates again 
that the academic community lacks consensus on the importance of the econ-
omy in predicting election results. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the significance of the economic vote by 
observing whether the effects remain stable in the face of challenges presented 
by a highly diverse dataset, different coding and operationalisation decisions, 
model specifications, theoretically driven subsamples and statistical techniques. 
Similarly to van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin (2007) and Nadeau, Lewis-
Beck and Bélanger (2013), this analysis employs data from the EES Voter 
study. I however importantly add data from more recent survey waves. The 
availability of the EES Voter study data from 2009 and 2014 – during and after 
the worst of the Great Recession – adds a new, thought-provoking dimension to 
the study of economic accountability. In the course of the global economic and 
financial crisis of 2007–2009, many European countries experienced a severe 
recession and rising levels of unemployment, which would lead one to expect 
major electoral losses for incumbent parties. The actual incumbent support pat-
terns, however, tell a more complex story: in several countries in Europe gov-
ernments were voted out of office, whereas in others incumbents retained or 
even increased their support.  
Figure 8 graphically illustrates the substantial changes in voter economic 
assessments in the EES survey data over time. In 10 European countries, the 
average proportion of respondents with negative economic evaluations varies 
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between 32% and 38% in 1989, 1994, 2004 and 2014, but drastically jumps to 
76.8% in 2009, indicating extreme dissatisfaction with national economic per-
formance in the midst of the economic crisis. In comparison, there were almost 
no changes in political support. The willingness to vote for the PM party in 
2009 remains similar to that of previous years and only drops by 3 percentage 
points by 2014. At the same time, we witness a slight increase in the proportion 
of respondents with no clear political preference11 (on average 33.8% in 2014, 
compared to 28.4% in 2004, not shown on the graph). Yet, these changes, too, 
are minor compared to the dramatic worsening of economic opinions. By 
expanding the data pool with survey data from 2009 and 2014, we are, then, 
able to considerably increase contextual variation – most notably in economic 
assessments – and thereby provide a more demanding setting for detecting the 
economic vote. 
 
 
Figure 8. Incumbent support and economic evaluations between 1989 and 2014. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Percentage of all respondents. Missing answers not shown.   
 
 
4.2. Data, methods and model specification  
To empirically test the robustness of economic effects, I use individual-level 
data from the EES Voter study (for study description, see section 3.3). The 
study is a post-election survey conducted shortly after EP elections every five 
                                                                          
11  Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who said they would not vote if the elections were 
held the following day, would spoil their vote or vote blank, and missing answers are all 
included in this category. 
28,6 20,8 19,7 20,7 17,7
0
20
40
60
80
100
1989 1994 2004 2009 2014
%
Incumbent support Worse Same Better
67 
years since 1979. In every country that was included in a given survey wave, a 
representative sample of voters aged 18 and over was interviewed. The analysis 
presented in this chapter includes respondents from 10 Western European 
countries in 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014, with a total of 50 cross-sections 
(n≈1000 interviews per survey per country; for more information on case selec-
tion, see section 3.3). The countries covered are Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United King-
dom. In order to maximise the variation in economic and political conditions 
and consequently more accurately estimate economic effects, data for five sur-
vey waves and 10 countries were pooled into one dataset. Such an approach is 
made possible by extensive similarities in study design, sample set-ups, inter-
viewing procedures and questionnaires across all 50 surveys. The final data 
pool has a total of N=55,371 respondents, providing ample statistical power to 
explore the individual-level relationship between variables. Weights were not 
applied because no continuity exists in the weight variables for separate study 
waves and countries.  
The outcome variable in the analysis is incumbent support, measured as vote 
intention in the subsequent respective national election (for more information 
on operationalising the dependent variable, see section 3.4). Respondents in the 
EES voter study were shown a list of parties and asked who they would vote for 
if the general election were held the following day. The answers were recoded 
as 1 if the respondent intended to vote for the incumbent PM party and as 0 in 
the case of any other vote intention. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who 
stated that they would not vote, would spoil their vote or vote blank, and miss-
ing answers were excluded. In the pooled dataset of five survey years and 10 
countries, 21.3% of respondents indicated their support for the incumbent PM 
party, 49.5% for some other party, and 29.2% expressed no clear party prefer-
ence. Typically for economic voting studies, the economy was operationalised 
through subjective retrospective evaluations as previous findings show that 
when evaluating incumbent performance, citizens are more influenced by retro-
spective than prospective considerations (Key 1966; Fiorina 1978); for more 
information on operationalising the independent variables, see section 3.5). 
Survey respondents were asked to assess whether they thought compared to 12 
months previous, that the general economic situation in their country had gotten 
better, stayed the same or gotten worse. In a combined data pool of 50 country-
years, 43% of individuals negatively evaluated national economic develop-
ments, 25.8% positively and 29.1% stated that they felt that no change had 
occurred over the course of a year. The attitudes of 2.1% were not revealed.    
The control variables added in the models are age (in full years), gender 
(1=male, 2=female), education (age when stopped full-time education, 0=still 
studying, 1=up to 15 years, 2=16-19 years, 3=20 years or more), attendance of 
religious services (1=several times a week, 2=once a week, 3=few times a year, 
4=once a year or less, 5=never) and subjective placement into social class 
(1=working class, 2=middle class, 3=higher class). To account for potential 
effects of the electoral cycle, cabinet time in office in months is included. In 
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single-level models, country and year dummies are used to account for un-
observed heterogeneity across nations and time. Left-right self-placement, class 
affiliation and religiosity are adjusted to account for government ideology: the 
scores remain unaltered (0=left, 10=right) when the government is right from 
the centre, and are reversed (0=right, 10=left) when the government is left-
wing. For electoral cycle, log transformation is used because I expect its effect 
on incumbent support to be non-linear (for more information on these decisions, 
see section 3.5).  
Finally, in order to carry out robustness checks for economic effects, a num-
ber of additional variables are utilised. Past vote choice is used to capture indi-
cators potentially missing from the model specification and in order to chal-
lenge economic effects with conservative over-controlling. The variable is 
coded as 1 if in the preceding national elections the respondent voted for the 
PM party in office during the conducting of the survey fieldwork and as 0 for 
any other party. The same variable is later used in endogeneity tests. The 
macro-level model of incumbent support is estimated using an annual national 
average of three macroeconomic indicators: GDP growth, change in inflation 
and change in unemployment. Macroeconomic data are obtained from the Euro-
stat and the OECD online databases. For the sake of within-model comparison, 
all predictors are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. Descriptive statistics of all 
variables used in this chapter, as well as question wording, are shown in 
Appendix 2.  
Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use logistic 
regression analysis to estimate the effect of economic perceptions on voter 
political preferences (for more information on the choice of analytical tech-
nique, see section 3.6). The function is specified as follows: 
 
 ݈݊ ൭ pˆ
ଵି pˆ
൱ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܥଵ+. . . +ߚ௞ܥ௞ (2) 
 
where pˆ is the probability of voting for the incumbent, ߚ଴ is the intercept, 
ߚଵ − ߚ௞ are regression coefficients, ଵܺ is economic perceptions, and ܥଵ − ܥ௞ 
are control variables.  
The results are presented as average marginal effects, which indicate discrete 
changes in predicted probabilities of incumbent support when independent vari-
ables change from their minimum to their maximum value. 
In addition to single-level logistic regression, multilevel regression analysis 
will be employed to test the robustness of the results. Multilevel analysis is 
typically used for analysing data with a focus on nested sources of variability. 
Ignoring any sources of variability may lead incorrect conclusions being drawn 
(Snijders and Bosker 2011; see also section 3.6).  
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4.3. Empirical results  
4.3.1. Descriptive overview 
To illustrate the basic features of the data, this section first describes the main 
variables used in the analysis. All estimates represent the total sample of 50 
surveys, pooled into one dataset (N= 55,731). Taking a look at the frequency 
distribution of the dependent variable, we see that on average 21.4% of all 
respondents intended to vote for the governing PM party and 49.8% for some 
other party. The vote intention of 28.8% of respondents remains unknown. Sup-
port for incumbents varies considerably across countries, ranging from roughly 
16% in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to 25.6% in Denmark, 26.3% 
in Germany and 27.2% in Spain (see Figure 9). The proportion of people with 
no clear political preference across all survey years combined is lowest in Den-
mark (14.7%) and highest in Portugal (42.2%).  
 
 
Figure 9. Vote intention by country. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
 
 
The primary explanatory variable, retrospective economic evaluations, was 
recoded from the original 5-point scale to a 3-point scale with 1 referring to 
‘worse’, 2 to ‘same’ and 3 to ‘better’. On average, 25.7% of all respondents 
indicated that the general economic situation in their country was better and 
43.2% said it was worse than 12 months previous. According to 29%, the state 
of the economy had remained the same. Answers from 2.1% of respondents are 
missing. Economic evaluations, too, show great geographic variation. The low-
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est assessments of the state of the national economy over all five survey years 
appear in Greece, Italy and France (only 15%-16% consider economic perfor-
mance to be better than a year previous), whereas the most optimistic evalua-
tions are given by respondents in Denmark and Ireland (roughly 37% share the 
opinion that conditions are better) (see Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10. Economic evaluations by country. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014; author’s own calculations. 
 
 
The correlation between incumbent support and economic evaluations is r=0.18, 
which indicates a weak but positive relationship between the two variables. The 
ANOVA test points to a statistically significant difference in political support 
across economic evaluation groups. As confirmed by Figure 11 below, support 
for the governing party increases as economic assessments improve: average 
support for the incumbent PM party is 32.1% among people who say that the 
economy has improved over the year, 14.7% among those who think it has got-
ten worse and 22.2% among people who think economic conditions have 
remained the same. By the same token, support levels for non-incumbent parties 
are higher among respondents who rate economic conditions as being poor. The 
initial descriptive statistics of the survey data, then, accurately match the 
underlying expectation of economic voting theory according to which political 
leaders gain support when the economy is healthy and suffer when it is weak.   
43.2
34.2 33.8 40.3
54.8 56.1
41.1
58.0
36.2
46.0
37.5
29.0
35.2
26.1
37.1
28.8 27.1
20.9
23.4
28.1
29.7
31.2
25.7 28.9
37.1
20.9 15.0 14.5
37.1
16.3
33.5
21.2 29.3
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Total DE DK ES FR GR IE IT NL PT UK
Worse Same Better Missing
71 
Figure 11. Vote intention by economic evaluations. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
 
 
4.3.2. Economic voting models 
To statistically test the relationship between the economy and incumbent sup-
port, I next estimate a bivariate regression model, where the only explanatory 
variable is retrospective economic perceptions. The bivariate model is the sim-
plest form of regression models, and is helpful for describing a plain association 
between two variables. The economic predictor is defined as categorical 
(1=worse, 2=same, 3=better), which allows us to observe the effects for all three 
groups of economic evaluations separately. In order to account for the possi-
bility that responses are nested within countries and time points, robust clus-
tered standard errors are used throughout. The Wald chi-square of 67.17 with a 
p-value of 0.0000 indicates that the fit of the bivariate model is significantly 
better than that of an empty model with no predictors. The overall effect of 
economic perceptions on incumbent support is significantly different from zero 
(p<0.01), suggesting that there are valid reasons for moving on with the analysis.  
Model 1 in Table 5 shows that compared to people who say that the economy 
has not changed over the past year, the probability of an incumbent vote is 10 
percentage points lower for those who say that the situation is now worse, and 9 
percentage points higher for those who believe it has improved. Translated into 
predicted probabilities (not shown in the table), the likelihood of voting for the 
incumbent PM party is 22% for people who think the economy has deteriorated, 
32% for people who think it has stayed the same and 41% for those who say the 
economy has improved over the year. These results point to strong economic effects 
in the dataset, which covers a heterogeneous geographical range and includes, 
among others, the period of the severe global crisis. Furthermore, the operation-
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alization of the economic variable, contrasting the categories “worse” and “better”, 
allows assessing whether there is an asymmetry in economic voting as suggested by 
previous works (see Mueller 1973; Kernell 1977; Kiewiet 1983; Anderson 1995). 
The results here suggest that the effect appears relatively symmetric, in that poor 
economic opinions reduce the likelihood of an incumbent vote to a similar 
magnitude as good evaluations increase voter support for incumbent.   
 
 
Table 5. Effects of economic evaluations on incumbent support. 
 (1) Bivariate 
model 
(2) Basic    
model 
(3) Past vote 
control 
(4) Multilevel 
model 
Economic evaluations: 
same 
ref. category ref. category ref. category ref. category 
Economic evaluations: 
worse 
-0.10*** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
Economic evaluations: 
better 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Left-right placement - 0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.71*** 
(0.02) 
Class - 0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
Religiosity - -0.07*** 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Age  - 0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.16*** 
(0.01) 
Gender  - 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Education  - -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Cabinet time in office 
logged 
- -0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Past vote choice - - 0.33*** 
(0.01) 
- 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.03 0.19 0.61 - 
Log likelihood - - - -15315.64 
N 39.071 30.980 27.246 30.980 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Entries are average marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote 
intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who 
said they would vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-
right placement, class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are 
recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. Country and year dummies in Models 2 and 3 are not shown. Standard errors 
clustered by survey (each country in each year). In Model 4, random effects not shown.  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
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Next, controls for economic effects are added to the model. Model 2 in Table 5 
thus constitutes the baseline model of economic voting in this study. In order to 
cvontrol for unobserved heterogeneity due to omitted variables, country and 
year fixed effects in the form of dummy variables are also added. Comparing 
the pseudo R-squared of the multivariate model (0.19) to the one with only one 
explanatory variable (0.03), we see decent improvement in model fit, suggesting 
that the control variables considerably help explain variation in political sup-
port. In line with previous findings, the basic model indicates that respondents’ 
ideological views have a strong influence on electoral preference: citizens are 
more likely to vote for the incumbent PM party if the party’s ideological views 
are close to their own. Higher social class and more frequent church attendance 
increase vote for an incumbent when it is positioned right from the centre. In 
addition, older people and women are more willing to vote for the governing 
party. More importantly, however, we see that the effect of economic percep-
tions does not change substantially when the carefully selected set of control 
variables is added: retrospective economic evaluations continue to be a power-
ful predictor of incumbent support in the basic model.  
Pseudo R-squared in logistic regression models cannot be interpreted the 
same way as in linear models, but it could still be argued that the relatively low 
fit of Model 2 may imply that there are important predictors missing from the 
specification. Such indicators, for example important issues for voters at the 
elections, are most likely captured in citizens’ previous political preference 
(Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013), which is now added to the model. 
Past vote choice may help to pick up variables that are missing from the 
empirical specification, and, moreover, it is also likely to be very strongly 
correlated with current vote intention (in this dataset, Pearson’s r=0.81) and as 
such may overpower the impact of other explanatory variables, including those 
of economic perceptions (Ibid.). Therefore, including past recalled vote as a 
proxy for possible omitted variables seriously challenges economic effects (for 
a similar approach, see Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). The past vote 
variable is coded as 1 if the respondent’s vote in the preceeding national 
election was given to the PM party in office during the period of the study 
fieldwork (26%) and as 0 if the vote was cast for any other party (44.6%). Don’t 
knows, refusals, respondents who were not eligible to vote, voted blank, spoiled 
the vote or did not vote were excluded from the analysis (29.4%). The results 
show that adding past vote to the model increases the pseudo R-squared to 0.61, 
considerably improving the prediction fit (see Model 3 in Table 5). We are now 
able to explain a large part of the variation in incumbent support, but what 
happens to the economic variable? The economic coefficient is indeed 
somewhat smaller in this model than before, referring to potential shortages in 
the previous specification. Nevertheless, the statistical significance test 
indicates that economic considerations remain an important predictor of vote 
intention despite conservative over-controlling. The omitted variable bias does 
not seem to considerably inflate economic effects.    
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Models 2 and 3 in Table 5 include country and year dummies (not shown in 
the table), which enable us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across 
time and space and thereby estimate a purer effect of economic perceptions. 
Each dummy helps to absorb the effects particular to a country or a survey year. 
The problem remains, however, that by doing so we assume that the relation-
ship between the economy and the vote is similar in different countries and 
points in time. Put differently, we capture the difference in intercepts but not the 
difference in slopes. In reality, respondents are nested in countries and points in 
time, both with extremely diverse political and economic conditions, which may 
shape the individual-level accountability mechanism. Consequently, economic 
voting may be more intense in some elections and less pronounced in others. It 
is therefore legitimate to improve the model by using a multilevel design and 
allow the economic effect vary randomly across countries and survey years. To 
do so, I estimate a 3-level model where respondents are nested in country-years 
at level 2 (50 unique values), and country-years are nested in countries at level 3 
(10 values) (for a similar approach in fitting multilevel models to comparative 
longitudinal survey data, see Fairbrother 2013). The slope of the economic 
coefficient is allowed to vary randomly across all three levels in order to 
account for the variation in economic effects. Multilevel modelling is in this 
analysis primarily used for the purpose of the robustness check; therefore, to 
maintain comparability with other models, raw uncentred variables are used.  
The intraclass correlation of 0.08 on level 2 and 0.004 on level 3 in a null-
model (not shown) indicates a weak average correlation of respondents within 
countries, but a larger correlation within country-years, supporting the idea of 
using the multilevel approach. Moving on, a full set of control variables are 
added to the model next. Multilevel analysis enables us to detect both fixed and 
random components of the coefficient. The random effects part, not reported 
here, implies that economic effects differ significantly across countries 
(σ2=0.04) and especially across countries in different time points (σ2=0.35). 
This aspect will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. For now, let us 
focus on what happens to the economic fixed effect in the improved model. We 
observe that the economic coefficients in Model 4 in Table 5 are very similar to 
those in previous models and almost identical to those in Model 2, a single-level 
logistic regression with the same subsample and an analogous set of explanatory 
variables. Taking into account the hierarchical structure of the data, economic 
effects remain firm and stable: improvement in economic assessments from 
category ‘worse’ to ‘same’ or ‘better’ yields a significant increase in the likeli-
hood of an incumbent vote.  
Although the analysis above lends strong support to individual-level eco-
nomic accountability, critics might still question the relevance of using subjec-
tive economic measures to link the economic situation with vote choice (see van 
der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007; van der Eijk and Franklin 2009). 
Unless we are able to detect a systematic link between subjective economic 
perceptions and the aggregate level of behavior, the results rest on shaky ground 
(Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). Moreover, Dassonneville and 
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Lewis-Beck (2014) talk in their recent work about micrological fallacy, which, 
contrarily to ecological fallacy, makes the mistake of inferring an aggregate 
economic–election connection from individual patterns of economic voting. The 
authors argue that the collective vote of the national electorate might not 
respond to national economic conditions, despite a seemingly supportive micro 
foundation. A common solution to these concerns is to substitute voter eco-
nomic considerations in statistical models with objective macroeconomic 
measures, which I will do next. Indicators that have been found to correlate with 
incumbent support the most are GDP growth, the unemployment rate and the 
rate of inflation (see section 2.2.1). To observe economic effects at the aggre-
gate level, I therefore estimate a logistic regression model using macro-eco-
nomic predictors, which I obtained from the OECD and the Eurostat databases, 
in combination with individual-level survey data. In order to as closely as pos-
sible resemble their subjective counterparts, which look at change in economic 
evaluations over the past 12 months, all three macro-level indicators are meas-
ured as annual percentage change. For similar reasons, no lag structure was 
used for operationalizing the objective economic indicators, but instead the rate 
of change for the year of the EES Voter study fieldwork was used. For all three 
economic variables, logarithmic transformation was employed so as to allow the 
relationship between these variables and incumbent support to be non-linear. 
Thus we avoid the assumption that the same level of economic growth, change 
in unemployment and in inflation always result in similar changes in political 
support (see e.g. Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995). Models are estimated for 
the three economic predictors separately in order to avoid multicollinearity. The 
results in Table 6 indicate that GDP growth rate has a firmly significant effect 
on vote intention at the highest significance level (0.01), demonstrating that 
voters are substantially more willing to support the government when the econ-
omy grows. In a similar manner, incumbent popularity is higher when change in 
unemployment compared to the year previous has been positive, i.e. the 
unemployment rate has decreased, with a significant effect at the 0.5 level. The 
inflation growth rate shows no statistically significant association with political 
preferences. Model fits appear similar to this in Model 2 in Table 5. These out-
comes confirm the findings presented above and indicate that the economy has 
an important impact on incumbent vote, regardless of whether it is observed via 
subjective or objective measures. This allows us to conclude that ‘micro- and 
macro- processes mirror each other’ (Lewis-Beck, Stubager, and Nadeau 2013, 
p. 500) and tell a similar story of economic voting.   
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Table 6. Effects of macroeconomic indicators on incumbent support. 
 (1)  
GDP 
(2)  
Inflation 
(3) 
Unemployment 
GDP growth logged 0.40*** 
(0.13) 
- - 
Inflation growth logged - 0.09 
(0.10) 
- 
Unemployment change logged - - 0.19** 
(0.07) 
Left-right placement 0.72*** 
(0.04) 
0.72*** 
(0.04) 
0.71*** 
(0.04) 
Class 0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Religiosity -0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Age  0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
Gender  0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Education  -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Cabinet time in office logged -0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.17 0.17 0.17 
N 31.350 31.350 31.350 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; Eurostat and 
OECD; author’s own calculations. 
Notes: Entries are average marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote 
intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who 
said they would vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-
right placement, class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are 
recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. Country and year dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by survey (each 
country in each year).  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
 
 
4.3.3. Addressing the endogeneity problem  
One of the major limitations of economic voting studies is the problem of 
potential endogeneity (see section 2.2.3). Critics claim that contrary to the logic 
of economic voting, the causal relationship between economic assessments and 
political support may be actually reverse in direction. Citizens’ economic per-
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ceptions may be biased by their party attachment: incumbent government sup-
porters may view the economy in a more favourable light and be selective in 
attributing responsibility, whereas opposition loyalists tend to evaluate the eco-
nomic situation and government performance more negatively. In other words, 
people can ignore objective economic conditions and adjust their evaluations in 
line with their partisanship, or adjust who they think is responsible for economic 
conditions according to whether these conditions are good or bad, based on their 
partisanship (Tilley and Hobolt 2011). Consequently, the estimated impact of 
economic perceptions on vote choice may be spurious and economic effects in 
previous academic studies may be overstated (see Wlezien, Franklin, and 
Twiggs 1997; Evans and Andersen 2006; Anderson 2007).  
The stability and robustness of economic effects demonstrated in the analy-
sis thus far suggests that the economy is a valid predictor of incumbent support. 
However, in order to properly address the endogeneity concerns, additional tests 
are necessary. Unfortunately, it is difficult to tackle the endogeneity issue with 
regression analysis based on individual-level cross-sectional data because 
causal relationships cannot truly be estimated with data from a single timepoint. 
For ܺ to cause ܻ, ܺ must occur prior to ܻ in time, but surveys measure variables 
at the same moment (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008). To disentangle the 
complex temporal relations between economic perceptions and political sup-
port, a number of works utilise longitudinal panel data, which enable research-
ers to measure partisanship at an earlier point in time (see Anderson, Mendes, 
and Tverdova 2004; Evans and Andersen 2006; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 
2008; Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014), or, occasionally, experimental survey data, 
which allows us to make proper causal inferences (see Wilcox and Wlezien 
1993; Tilley and Hobolt 2011). Another way to address the endogeneity prob-
lem is to exogenise the economic predictor using instrumental variables (see 
Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013; 
Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014). The latter are constructed using variables from 
outside the explanatory equation, which are not caused by vote preference and 
are not correlated with error terms in the model, a frequent concern with panel 
data. However, since none of these approaches is without its own problems, the 
debate on endogeneity remains inconclusive. Studies provide support for both 
proponent and revisionist arguments of economic voting, meaning that the jury 
is still out on whether economic evaluations shape partisan support or vice 
versa.  
They also suggest the need to examine the temporal interconnections 
between partisanship and economic perceptions, something that is simply not 
possible without extensive longitudinal data. 
The use of cross-sectional survey data in the present study limits the ability 
to fully assess the causal direction between subjective economic perceptions 
and party support. That said, one way to see whether responsibility attribution is 
influenced by party attachment is to investigate whether economic effects also 
hold among voters who do not identify with the governing party (for a similar 
approach, see Bélanger and Nadeau 2012). Economic opinions of the latter are 
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not coloured by being incumbent partisan and should thus provide us with un-
biased results. To do so, I replicate the previous analysis in three separate sub-
samples, indicating voter attachment to the incumbent PM party. If the results 
are robust, we should witness significant economic effects on vote intention in 
all three groups. Party loyalty can be measured in various ways, for instance 
with party identification (asking respondents which party they feel close to), or 
with previous vote choice (asking which party they voted for in preceding gen-
eral elections). Regrettably, data on party identification are missing in the EES 
Voter study for 1994, leaving us with the second approach. I define PM-parti-
sans as respondents who in the preceding national election voted for the party of 
the Prime Minister in office during the conducting of the survey fieldwork 
(26%), and non-PM-partisans as those who voted for any other party (44.6%). 
29.4% of the respondents fall into the category for whom details of their past 
vote choice is missing.  
Table 7 below displays the predictions of incumbent vote depending on 
subjective economic perceptions, holding all other variables at their means. We 
witness that results are indeed partly influenced by party loyalty. Average mar-
ginal effects for PM-partisans (Model 1) indicate that compared to people who 
believed that the economy had not changed over the preceding year, the proba-
bility of an incumbent vote is 8 percentage points lower for those who thought 
the condition of the economy had worsened and 4 percentage points higher for 
those who said that it had improved. For non-partisans (Model 2), the results are 
-1 percentage point and 1 percentage point respectively, indicating that eco-
nomic effects are less pronounced among these respondents. Nonetheless, the 
overall vote distribution is similar in both groups, telling us that the economy 
has a firmly significant impact on vote choice in the non-partisan subsample as 
well. Evaluations that rate economic conditions more positively lead to higher 
probability of voting for incumbent PM party, even if the vote in previous elec-
tions was given to some other party. Moreover, the economic coefficient is 
statistically significant also among citizens whose response to the past vote 
question was missing: those who did not cast a vote, voted blank, refused to 
answer the question, etc. (Model 3). Even in this subsample, positive economic 
evaluations considerably increase and negative evaluations decrease the likeli-
hood of an incumbent vote. These results suggest that although partisan atti-
tudes seem to play a role in shaping economic perceptions, there is still solid 
evidence for the presence of retrospective economic voting in all voter groups.     
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Table 7. Effects of economic evaluations on incumbent support by party attachment. 
 (1)  
PM-partisans 
(2) Non-         
PM-partisans 
(3) Party 
attachment not 
known 
Economic evaluations: same ref. category ref. category ref. category 
Economic evaluations: worse -0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
Economic evaluations: better 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
Left-right placement 0.26*** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.48*** 
(0.05) 
Class 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Religiosity 0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
Age  0.18*** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Gender  0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Education  -0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
Cabinet time in office logged -0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.12 0.12 0.12 
N 10,231 17,015 3,734 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Entries are average marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote 
intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who 
said they would vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-
right placement, class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are 
recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. Country and year dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by survey (each 
country in each year).  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
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4.3.4. Supplementary tests 
Finally, I will perform a number of additional tests in order to address some 
common methodological concerns in the economic voting literature. More spe-
cifically, I will discuss different approaches in operationalising the dependent 
variable as these vary considerably across studies and often lead to discrepan-
cies in conclusions about the performance of economic effects. The tests will 
provide a robustness check to the main findings presented in this empirical 
chapter.  
The analysis thus far is carried out with the dependent variable defined as 
support for the incumbent PM party. However, critics may argue that the more 
obvious choice would be to observe economic effects on the support for any 
party in the coalition government. For many reasons, focusing on PM party 
support is well-justified for the purpose of this study (see section 3.4). None-
theless, in order to address these concerns, I will replicate the analysis using all 
government parties to construct the outcome variable. I expect economic effects 
to be less pronounced in this model compared to the results for the PM party 
only, because the sanctioning of multiple parties by voters can be mitigated due 
to lower clarity of responsibility (see Lewis-Beck 1986; Powell and Whitten 
1993; Fisher and Hobolt 2010). The new dependent variable is coded as 1 for 
vote intention for a government party at the time of the conducting of the field-
work and as 0 for any other party. In the pooled dataset, 27.5% of all respond-
ents indicated their support for a government party and 43.6% for some other 
party. The vote intention of 28.8% remains unclear. The correlation between 
two dependent variables, support for PM party and for government, is r=0.83.     
I will run a logistic regression analysis, using the exact same set of inde-
pendent variables as earlier. Results in Model 1 in Table 8 below indicate that 
the impact of economic evaluations is similarly strong on government popu-
larity as it is on PM party popularity. Economic effects for all government par-
ties are almost identical to those for the PM party only, shown in Model 2 in 
Table 5 above. Negative economic evaluations reduce the probability of voting 
for government by 9 percentage points and positive ones increase the proba-
bility by 10 percentage points compared to people who think that the economy 
has not changed over the preceding year. Recall that the corresponding figures 
for PM party are 8 and 9 percentage points (see Model 2 in Table 5 above). 
Thus, using an alternative measurement of party choice lends support to the 
findings presented earlier and confirms strong economic effects on voter politi-
cal preferences.      
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Table 8. Economic voting models using alternative measurement of the dependent 
variable. 
 (1) Support for 
all government 
parties in 
national elections
(2) PM party 
support at EP 
elections 
(3) Non-voters 
included 
Economic evaluations: same ref. category ref. category ref. category 
Economic evaluations: worse -0.09*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Economic evaluations: better 0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
Left-right placement 0.75*** 
(0.05) 
0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.04) 
Class 0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
Religiosity -0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
Age  0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
Gender  0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
Education  -0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Cabinet time in office logged -0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.20 0.18 0.18 
N 30,980 21,321 32,918 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Entries are average marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses. Left-right placement, class and 
religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. 
Country and year dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by survey (each country in each year).  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
 
 
Another potential limitation of the current measurement of the dependent vari-
able is using vote intention instead of vote choice. This decision stems from the 
intent to explore voting behaviour at national and not European-level elections. 
Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this means having to choose the vote 
intention question instead of that for vote choice (for more information, see 
section 3.4 above). Such an approach can be problematic for two reasons. 
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Firstly, it is not in congruence with the traditional interest in electoral studies in 
making vote choice the key outcome variable. Secondly, the EES Voter study is 
carried out as a post-election survey and the fact that respondents have recently 
voted may affect the findings. It could be argued that the survey data used do 
not properly express economic voting because voters have engaged in punishing 
or rewarding shortly before the survey. One way to deal with these issues is to 
see whether economic evaluations are also associated with vote choice in Euro-
pean elections. For this reason, I next repeat the analysis with the dependent 
variable, where 1 stands for vote choice for the incumbent PM party in an EP 
election and 0 for any other party. The analysis is only carried out for four sur-
vey years out of five as data for 1989 were collected via a pre-election study 
and do not contain information on vote choice at EP elections. Due to blurred 
responsibility attribution in the complex European multilevel system (see 
Tilley, Garry, and Bold 2008; Bartkowska and Tiemann 2015), we are likely to 
witness weaker economic effects in this model than at the national level.  
Altogether, 16.3% of respondents voted for the incumbent PM party in EP 
election held prior to the survey. 42.6% voted for some other party, and a large 
proportion, 41%, fall into the ‘missing’ category due to not having voted, 
refusing to answer the question, etc. The first thing that we see, then, is that 
changing the dependent variable from vote intention to vote choice considerably 
reduces the number of units in the analysis. The correlation between vote choice 
in European elections and vote intention in national elections is r=0.83. The 
regression results in Model 2 in Table 8 reveal very similar patterns of vote 
determinants to what we have seen in this analysis up until now. As expected, 
marginal effects of economic evaluations are somewhat smaller here than in 
Model 2 in Table 5, indicating weaker sanctioning and rewarding in European 
elections, but their impact on vote remains solid and significant. Negative per-
ceptions clearly reduce and positive ones increase incumbent support in EP 
elections as well. Again, the findings comfortably withstand the test of alterna-
tive measurement of the outcome variable.   
Most economic voting studies look at party preference as a dependent vari-
able. Less attention, however, has been paid to another mechanism through 
which citizens are able to express their attitudes, namely whether they decide to 
turn out at the polling station in the first place. Various authors have criticized 
the economic voting literature for ignoring the relationship between economic 
conditions and voter turnout, and have demonstrated that miserable economic 
conditions can lead people to abstain from voting, for example when the incum-
bent party is performing poorly and no other available option is more agreeable 
to a voter (see Taylor 2000; Stevens 2007; Tillman 2007; Weschle 2014). Using 
the choice between incumbents and opposition as the dependent variable limits 
the ability of this study to observe the non-voter category. Therefore, to account 
for the possibility that citizens may utilise non-voting as a form of electoral 
punishment, I include abstention from elections in the economic voting model. 
The new dependent variable is coded as 1 for vote intention for the incumbent 
PM party (21.4%), whereas 0 combines both vote for other parties as well as 
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non-voting (55.5%). The latter group includes respondents who said they would 
vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote at all if general election 
were held the following day.12 Don’t knows, refusals to answer the question and 
missing answers are excluded from the analysis because substantively these 
responses do not express sanctioning of incumbents (23.1%).  
The results presented in Model 3 in Table 8 above demonstrate once again 
that changes in the outcome variable do not affect the stability of findings. Dif-
ferences in economic effects compared to those in previous models are almost 
non-existent, with positive economic perceptions endorsing incumbent support 
and negative ones increasing the likelihood of the voter casting their vote for 
another party or abstaining from voting entirely. The findings on economic 
effects remain solid even if we take into account different forms of economic 
voting.   
 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
I began the empirical part of the dissertation by exploring the general patterns of 
economic accountability in Western Europe. Decades of scholarly work on 
political behaviour have provided strong support to the expectation that voters 
punish incumbents for poor economic conditions and reward them when the 
economy is performing well. Despite the accumulated empirical evidence, how-
ever, there is an ongoing academic debate as to whether economic effects are 
overestimated and how universal the phenomenon of economic voting actually 
is. Not only is the research field characterised by large temporal and geograph-
ical variation in the magnitude of economic accountability, but the results also 
lack stability when different authors investigate similar datasets and use similar 
methods of analysis. The instability is often attributed to differences in statisti-
cal modelling: there is no common practice in model specification, or even 
consensus on which survey instruments to use and how to operationalise the key 
variables. Additionally, concerns over endogeneity of the causal process are 
frequently raised.    
This chapter applied a number of conceptual, methodological and statistical 
tools in order to scrutinise the robustness of the economic vote. The set-up 
relies on previous similar large-scale comparative studies, but pays careful 
attention to methodological issues outlined in former works. Importantly, it 
extends and further diversifies the dataset with survey waves from during and 
after the worst of the global financial and economic crisis, which provides a 
vigorous test to the robustness of traditional findings. In the empirical analysis, 
I first estimate a basic model of economic voting for 10 Western European 
countries measured over the course of a 25-year period and demonstrate that 
political support is strongly linked to voter economic evaluations. I then intro-
                                                                          
12  For 1989, only respondents who stated they would vote blank were added in category 0. 
Respondents who stated they would not vote at all or would spoil their vote could not be 
identified in the dataset for that year.  
84 
duce a number of demanding methodological challenges to these findings, but 
continue to find firm confirmation of performance-based voting. The economy 
matters to voters in developed Western democracies, in that more positive eco-
nomic evaluations lead to higher probability of incumbent support. These 
results stand solid against the ambitious dataset, experimentation with different 
coding and operationalisation decisions, model specifications, conservative 
over-controlling, various robustness checks and statistical approaches.   
Having demonstrated that there is strong empirical evidence for economic 
effects, it must be acknowledged that we still lack information on what condi-
tions its occurrence. Because the purpose of this dissertation is to make infer-
ences about overall trends in the relationship between the economy and political 
support, the analysis did not focus on potential heterogeneity in the effects, even 
though previous studies have shown that economic voting can be stronger in 
some countries, or population groups within countries. For instance, the eco-
nomic vote has been found to be more pronounced in Southern Europe (Lewis-
Beck and Nadeau 2012), among more vulnerable citizens (Singer 2011; 2013), 
and more politically knowledgeable voters (Godbout and Bélanger 2007). The 
country-specific scenarios of the economic crisis and of its consequences have 
accentuated the variability of voter behaviour patterns even more. Political 
results following the period of severe economic instability were far from uni-
form, raising questions over whether the mechanism of economic accountability 
may have changed over the course of recent turbulent number of years. This 
topic will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter, Chapter 5.  
85 
5. DID THE CRISIS MATTER?  
In recent decades, a significant amount of scholarly attention has been paid to 
conditions of individual voting behaviour. Rapid changes in the socio-economic 
environment suggest that the context in which parties and voters operate is 
growing more and more sophisticated, calling for further scrutiny of democratic 
accountability to see how it has responded to developments in the global envi-
ronment. The economic and financial crisis in particular has emphasized the 
need to revisit the responsibility attribution process. Political reactions to and 
the electoral consequences of the severe economic shock appear to vary signifi-
cantly across affected countries. During 2008–2009, most European countries 
faced a considerable slowdown in economic growth and an increase in unem-
ployment levels. Theoretically, this would lead us to expect strong economic 
effects on incumbent support. However, recent academic work suggests that 
diminishing clarity of responsibility makes it increasingly difficult for voters to 
attribute blame for economic outcomes, consequently making punitive voting 
less likely. Can we then state that the sanctioning-rewarding mechanism has 
changed over time? Was economic voting more or less pronounced during the 
crisis than it was prior to the economic downturn? I address this issue next by 
exploring the performance of economic voting in Western Europe in the wake 
of the economic recession.  
This chapter, which focuses on the stability of economic effects amid the cri-
sis, has been structured into four sections. The first section reviews previous 
findings and proposes theoretical expectations. The second section introduces 
the data, measurement and methods used in the study. The third section presents 
the empirical results of the multivariate analysis, and the fourth and final section 
summarises the main conclusions. 
 
 
5.1. Economic voting in (the) crisis? 
In recent years, the economy has emerged as the most salient issue on the public 
agenda and can easily be expected to play a key role in voter considerations. Since 
the beginning of the crisis in 2007–2008, the vast majority of countries in the 
Western world have experienced its worst recession since World War II. By mid-
2009, European countries faced significant slowdown in GDP growth and 
increasing levels of unemployment (see Figure 12). According to classic economic 
voting theories, such enormous economic instability should have resulted in major 
political consequences for the ruling parties. Moreover, previous evidence shows 
that economic voting can be asymmetric: it may be more prevalent during uncertain 
economic times and less pronounced when the economy is performing well. 
Namely, negative information has found to play a greater role in voting behavior, 
resulting in the tendency for voters to penalize incumbents for negative economic 
trends rather than reward them for positive ones (see Mueller 1973; Kernell 1977; 
Kiewiet 1983; Anderson 1995). Studies in psychology have shown that because 
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people are risk averse, they may be more responsive to negative messages. This 
‘negativity effect’ means that greater weight is given to negative information (Lau 
1985). Studies in political communication indicate that similar trends are evident in 
mass media content, which enhances the asymmetry in public responsiveness 
(Soroka 2006). Furthermore, in times of economic hardship the saliency of the 
economy increases, resulting in voters perceiving stronger impact of the economy 
on their personal situation and consequently giving greater weight to economic 
issues (Singer 2011b). Given the magnitude of the negative macroeconomic 
changes that occurred around the year 2009, we would therefore expect that 
economic voting in crisis-time Europe was stronger than in ordinary times. We 
should witness that individual vote decision has been first and foremost motivated 
by national economic performance. 
 
 
Figure 12. Macroeconomic changes in the Euro area from 1996 to 2014. 
 
Source: Eurostat. Change in GDP per capita over preceding year (%), unemployment as an annual average 
(%), and rate of inflation as an annual average rate of change (%).   
 
 
On the other hand, there are also reasons to hypothesise that economic effects 
on political support have weakened with the crisis. Voters are more eager to 
punish incumbents when the clarity of responsibility for economic conditions is 
high (Powell and Whitten 1993), but recent developments are sending signals to 
citizens that government economic performance is externally constrained. 
Globalisation, growing economic integration, openness and interdependence 
have left voters confused regarding the assigning of responsibility for national 
economic outcomes, and have consequently weakened the link between the 
economy and the vote (Katzenstein 1985; Hellwig 2001; Fernández-Albertos 
2006; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Kayser 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2010). 
Economic voting is also depressed in systems of multilevel governance where the 
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EU is held responsible for national economic conditions (Costa Lobo and Lewis-
Beck 2012). Economic globalization could be expected to have become especially 
salient to voters during the recession, which carries a strong global character. 
Citizens may blame other actors such as banks or international financial institutions 
for the bleak economic conditions, and assign less responsibility to local political 
leaders. In the EU and the Eurozone, national response to the economic earthquake 
was strongly coordinated, constraining the ability of governments to steer 
macroeconomic conditions. To the extent that voters are aware of such limitations, 
we could expect their propensity to hold incumbent authorities responsible for 
economic outcomes to diminish during the worldwide recession. Uncertain 
responsibility attribution amidst the transnational and complex crisis would 
therefore suggest that economic voting has become less pronounced.  
Studies on the impact of the crisis on economic voting have hitherto arrived 
at mixed conclusions. Analysing the German parliamentary election of 2009, 
Anderson and Hecht (2012) found no evidence of retrospective economic vot-
ing, whereas Rattinger and Steinbrecher (2011) argued that the economy was an 
important factor for German voters in making party choices that year. Tillman 
(2011) demonstrated that in the 2010 British general election blame attribution 
was exercised only by more knowledgeable voters. More explicit retrospective 
voting has been detected in countries that were hit harder by the crisis: Cyprus, 
Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Kanol and Pirishis 2016; 
Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012; Indridason 2014; Nezi 2012; Bellucci 2012; Fraile 
and Lewis-Beck 2012; Freire and Santana-Pereira 2012). Torcal’s (2014) results 
confirmed that incumbents were also punished in Spain in 2011, but punishment 
was mediated by deep ideological divisions among the electorate. Bellucci 
(2014) found some evidence of retrospective economic voting in the 2013 Ital-
ian election, but concluded that the effect was conditioned by the extent to 
which the EU was blamed for the crisis. Several single-country studies demon-
strate that while there is clear evidence of the punishing mechanism, the first 
post-crisis elections were relatively ‘normal’: the economic shock did not result 
in a substantially change in the political landscape (Marsh and Mikhaylov 2014; 
Indridason 2014; Magalhães 2014b). 
This chapter aims to advance our understanding of the impact of the global 
crisis on voting behaviour. Single-country and regional studies provide valuable 
insights into the influence of the crisis on economic voting in local contexts, but 
the lack of extensive comparative studies in the literature limits our ability to 
make generalisations. In an effort to reveal larger patterns of crisis-time voting, 
this study employs a comparative analytical framework. The use of survey data 
from 50 cross-sections enables us to cover a large variety of economic and 
political conditions and to provide a robust systematic test of the stability of 
economic effects both over time and across countries. Especially in the rapidly 
changing socioeconomic environment, research findings can easily be affected 
by country-specific idiosyncrasies and only tell us half the story. In order to 
identify the universal structure of economic voting before, during and after the 
crisis, a comparative approach is needed.  
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5.2. Data, methods and model specification  
The analysis presented in this chapter relies on individual-level survey data 
from the EES Voter study (for more information on the study, see section 3.3). 
Similarly to the previous chapter, I include in the analysis a total of 50 surveys: 
10 Western European countries from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014, with a 
final data pool of N=55,731 respondents (for more information on case selec-
tion, see sections 3.3 and 4.2). The dependent variable is incumbent support, 
coded as 1 for the PM party (21.4% of respondents) and 0 for any other party 
(49.8%). Non-voters and missing answers were dropped from the analysis 
(28.8%; for operationalisation, see section 3.4). The primary explanatory vari-
able is perceptions of the national economic situation compared to 12 months 
previous, measured on a 3-point scale where 1=worse (43.2%), 2=stayed the 
same (29%) and 3=better (25.7%). The standard set of control variables is 
added in the models (for more information, see sections 3.5 and 4.2). Descrip-
tive statistics of all variables used in the analysis presented in this chapter, 
together with question wording, appear in Appendix 2.  
The dependent variable is dichotomous, which implies that the relationship 
between variables is nonlinear. Therefore, to estimate the effect of economic 
evaluations on the incumbent vote, I employ logistic regression analysis (for 
more information on methods, see sections 3.6 and 4.2). The results are pre-
sented as average marginal effects, which express the population average effect 
of independent variables on the probability of an incumbent vote. However, the 
focus in the analysis is not only on how economic assessments influence 
incumbent support, but rather on how this effect varies over time. For this rea-
son, dummies for each five survey years are added in the model and are then 
interacted with economic perceptions. This allows us to observe whether retro-
spective voting varies over time. Interaction effects are a concept in statistics 
that refers to a situation where the impact of one variable on the outcome 
depends on the value of another, a moderator variable (Jaccard and Turrisi 
2003). Here, I test the possibility that economic effects on vote intention depend 
on a point in time: based on theoretical expectations, sanctioning and rewarding 
could be either stronger or weaker in 2009 than in the other four survey years. 
To do so, I add a multiplicative term, an interaction term between two inde-
pendent variables, to the regression model. The simple additive logistic regres-
sion equation used in previous models is therefore revised as follows:    
 
 ݈݊ ൭ pˆ
ଵି pˆ
൱ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ + ߚଷ ଵܺ ∗ ܺଶ +  ߚସܥଵ+. . . +ߚ௞ܥ௞  (3) 
 
where pˆ is the probability of voting for the incumbent, ߚ଴ is the intercept, 
ߚଵ − ߚ௞ are regression coefficients, ଵܺ is economic perceptions, ܺଶ is survey 
years, ଵܺ ∗ ܺଶ is the interaction term between economic perceptions and survey 
year, and ܥଵ − ܥ௞ are control variables.  
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Because year alone may not be enough to capture the drastic economic 
changes that took place in 2008–2009, I conduct an additional test by running a 
separate model using an alternative measure of the crisis. More specifically, 
survey year is replaced with a numerical value that represents changes in actual 
macroeconomic conditions: annual GDP change rate for each country at each 
of the five time points. Interacting these 50 figures with economic assessments 
enables us to examine how retrospective voting varies at different levels of the 
crisis, thus providing a robustness check to previous findings. Macroeconomic 
data are obtained from the OECD online database. 
 
 
5.3. Empirical Results  
5.3.1. Descriptive overview 
By 2009, the worst of the worldwide crisis, macroeconomic conditions had 
worsened significantly. Many European countries were experiencing severe 
economic decline, rising unemployment and worrying levels of public debt and 
deficit. Now let us explore how voter assessments of the state of the economy 
have evolved over time. Overall, 29% of respondents in the total sample (50 
surveys combined) said that the general economic situation in their country had 
improved compared to 12 previous ago and 43.2% stated that they felt it had 
deteriorated. These assessments, however, vary greatly over time. In 1989, only 
32% of respondents stated that the economy had worsened compared to the year 
previous. By 2009, the proportion of people sharing this opinion had more than 
doubled (up to 76.8%), before stabilising again by 2014 (34.7%) (see Figure 8 
in Chapter 4). Both survey data and factual macroeconomic trends, then, indi-
cate a severe economic downturn in 2009.  
Surprisingly, despite the sharp economic decline, there is no major differ-
ence in levels of incumbent support before versus after the crisis. In the data 
pool of 50 surveys, an average of 21.4% of respondents supported the party of 
the incumbent Prime Minister, and the numbers for 2009 did not differ much, 
with 20.7% of respondents willing to vote for the incumbent (see Figure 8 in 
Chapter 4). Interestingly, the proportion of people with no clear vote intention 
did not increase during the worst year of the crisis either. Compared to the aver-
age of 28.8%, in 2009 the percentage of respondents whose vote preference 
remained unknown was 29.7% (incl. don’t know, refusals, would vote blank, 
would spoil the vote, would not vote or no answer provided; not shown on the 
figure). Unfortunately, differences in coding do not allow us to engage in a 
more detailed temporal comparison of non-voter and no-answer categories. 
Data from the post-crisis period in 2014, indicate a slight decline in incumbent 
support (at 17.7%) and a modest increase in the proportion of respondents 
whose vote preference is unknown (at 33.5%). 
In line with the key expectation of economic voting, incumbent support is on 
average highest among respondents who consider national economic conditions 
to be healthy (32.1%) and notably lower among those who believe it has deteri-
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orated (14.7%; see Figure 13). But does this tendency differ over the years? 
Figure 13 below implies that there is relative stability. Like in other survey 
years, support for the governing PM party is highest in 2009 among citizens 
with positive economic assessments, and reduces as the economic evaluations 
become more negative. Analogous tendencies appear in the post-crisis survey in 
2014, although overall incumbent support is somewhat lower that year com-
pared to other points in time. All in all, the proportion of respondents voting for 
the incumbent among different economic evaluation groups does not fluctuate 
drastically over the years. The first glance at the data, then, suggests compara-
tively stable incumbency support patterns despite the severe economic shock.  
 
 
Figure 13. Vote intention by economic evaluations per year. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
 
 
5.3.2. Impact of the crisis 
To statistically analyse variation in economic effects over time, I employ 
logistic regression analysis. For the sake of clarity, I first present the basic 
model of economic voting (see Model 1 in Table 9). The coefficients differ 
slightly from the ones shown in the baseline model in the previous chapter (see 
section 4.3.2.) because here year dummies are not yet added, but the overall 
results are very similar. Compared to Europeans who think that the economy in 
their country had not changed over the preceding year, negative economic 
assessments lower the likelihood of an incumbent vote by 8 percentage points 
and positive assessments increase this likelihood by 9 percentage points. Addi-
tionally, respondents’ ideological leaning, social class, religiosity, age, gender 
and education significantly influence governing party support levels.  
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Table 9. Year effects on incumbent support. 
 (1) Basic model (2) Year dummies 
Economic evaluations: same ref. category ref. category 
Economic evaluations: worse -0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Economic evaluations: better 0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Left-right placement 0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.68*** 
(0.04) 
Class 0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
Religiosity -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
Age  0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Gender  0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
Education  -0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Cabinet time in office logged -0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
1989  - 0.06* 
(0.03) 
1994 - 0.02 
(0.03) 
2004 - -0.03 
(0.03) 
2014 - -0.06* 
(0.03) 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.18 0.19 
N 30,980 30,980 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Entries are average marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote 
intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who said they 
would vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-right placement, 
class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. 
Country dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by survey (each country in each year).  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
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A similar basic model can now be estimated for each survey year. The results in 
Table 10 below show that the coefficients in separate models are similar overall, 
suggesting that there is no remarkable variation in economic effects over time. 
Negative performance evaluations seem to reduce and positive ones raise 
incumbent approval in a similar manner across years. Comparing separate models 
across years has an essential limitation, however: it does not enable us to properly 
estimate the effect of time because in each of those models time is constant (see van 
der Eijk et al. 2006; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2012). For this reason, I use a pooled 
dataset and include dummy variables for each survey year in order to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity over time. The main time point of interest, 2009, is 
defined as the reference category. In such a model, the economic main effect can be 
interpreted as the average effect of the economy on incumbent support across all 
years and can be measured against that in the baseline model. The comparison 
indicates that there is practically no difference in the coefficient for economic 
perceptions: even when the temporal variation is taken into account, retrospective 
assessments continue to have a strong impact on political support (see Model 2 in 
Table 9). The only year dummies showing a weak significant effect are 1989, when 
the support for PM party appears somewhat higher than during the crisis peak in 
2009, and 2014, when it is a little lower.  
 
 
Table 10. Effects of economic evaluations on incumbent support by year. 
  1989 1994 2004 2009 2014 
Economic evaluations: 
same 
ref.  
category 
ref.  
category 
ref. 
category 
ref. 
category 
ref. 
category 
Economic evaluations: 
worse 
-0.10** 
(0.04) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Economic evaluations: 
better 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.17 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.25 
N 5,272 4,793 7,519 6,528 6,868 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Entries are average marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote 
intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who said they 
would vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-right placement, 
class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. 
Control variables and country dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by country.  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1   
 
 
Moving on to the variation in retrospective voting over time, economic evaluations 
are next interacted with year. The results as average marginal effects are presented 
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in Figure 14, which for space considerations only focuses on the economic 
predictor of vote intention. Additionally, regression coefficients in the form of 
logged odds are shown in Appendix 3. The graph first tells us that in each year, 
people are significantly less inclined to vote for incumbents if their economic 
perceptions are poor, and more willing to do so if their evaluations are good. In 
other words, the sanctioning and rewarding mechanism performs as expected in all 
five years. Turning to the temporal dynamics in economic effects, we observe that 
change in economic perceptions from ‘same’ to ‘worse’ decreases the probability of 
an incumbent vote by 11 percentage points in 1989, by 7 percentage points in 1994, 
by 11 percentage points in 2004, and by 5 percentage points in 2009 and in 2014. 
The differences between the years remain within 6 percentage points. The outcome 
is even more stable for the category ‘better’, where economic evaluations changing 
from ‘same’ to ‘better’ increases the probability of incumbent vote by 8–9 
percentage points in all five years. We see, then, that economic effects are 
somewhat weaker in 2009 and in 2014 compared to the pre-crisis years, with 
especially the effect of negative perceptions being slightly lower than before. This 
could mean that incumbents are held accountable for economic conditions to a 
lesser extent after the period of recession. However, respective interaction terms in 
Appendix 3 do not appear statistically significant, indicating that the null 
hypothesis, which states that the difference in effects is zero, cannot be rejected. 
Hence, data do not support the claim that economic voting varies over time, 
suggesting that neither punishing nor rewarding of incumbents was substantially 
different during periods of economic decline compared to ordinary times.  
 
 
Figure 14. Effects of economic evaluations on incumbent support by year. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 countries; author’s own calculations.  
Notes: Average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals; ref. category ‘same’.  
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In a yearly comparison, it is in fact 2004 that stands out (see Figure 14). Eco-
nomic effects on political support appear somewhat more pronounced in 2004 
than in other years, and attitudes towards the incumbent PM party are more 
pessimistic. Since the focus in this work is on the crisis period, explaining the 
divergent results for 2004 is a task for another analysis. With macroeconomic 
conditions being relatively stable that year (recall Figure 12 above), we can only 
speculate that the strong anti-government inclination may have been due to 
rising Euroscepticism in Western Europe following the EU enlargement.13 One 
way to minimise the weight of the atypical 2004 is to recode year into a crisis 
variable, defined as 1 for 2009 and 0 for all other years. However, neither this 
nor excluding 2004 from the analysis altogether provide support for the expec-
tation that economic effects vary significantly over time.14    
 
 
5.3.3. The restricted variance problem  
Despite the data not demonstrating any temporal variation in economic effects, 
the results do not allow us to argue that the recent economic turbulence did not 
alter economic voting in any way. From statistical point of view, a failure alone 
to find evidence of influence of the crisis is not a confirmation that there is none 
(Rainey 2014). Instead, the analysis enables us to say that there is no evidence 
in favour of the opposite. One reason why we are not able to detect significant 
crisis-time changes in economic effects could be the restricted variance prob-
lem. It can be difficult to methodologically obtain evidence of the link between 
the economy and the vote when variance in economic opinions in crisis years is 
limited. When all scores on the independent variable are similar, this variable 
cannot explain variation in the outcome (Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014; Lewis-
Beck and Costa Lobo 2016). Indeed, only 8.8% of respondents evaluated the 
economy positively in 2009 compared to an average of 25.7% in the pooled 
EES Voter study dataset (see Figure 8 in Chapter 4). In other words, there is 
little variance in economic assessments between individuals during the crisis as 
most people agree that things are going downhill. This does not mean that 
incumbents are not punished at elections for poor economic performance, but it 
does reveal difficulties in assessing the magnitude of economic voting using 
cross-sectional survey data (Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014).  
One way to address the restricted variance problem is to use, for the pooled 
data, an aggregate measure of the economy that is independent of voter percep-
tions. Although there is little variance in economic opinions between individu-
                                                                          
13  The EU enlargement in May 2004 was the fifth and the largest ever expansion of the EU, 
with the accession of 10 new member states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The public reaction 
to the Eastern enlargement in the old member states was strongly divided and loaded 
with fears. On the eve of enlargement, 42% of the EU15 citizens were for and 39% 
against the expansion (Eurobarometer, Spring 2004).    
14  Results available from the author upon request.  
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als in the crisis year of 2009, there is considerable variance between all surveys 
(Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo 2016). For this reason, I next replace individual-
level economic evaluations in the model with an aggregated economic variable, 
as suggested by Fraile and Lewis-Beck (2012; 2014). This variable reflects the 
percentage of respondents in each survey who said that the national economic 
situation was good or very good. As before, the model is estimated for the data 
pool of 50 surveys; all control variables remain the same. The results in Model 
1 in Appendix 4 demonstrate that although regression estimates are now much 
smaller than in previous models due to scale differences (the values of the new 
economic variable range from 0 to 100), there is a firmly significant positive 
aggregate-level impact of the economy on incumbent support. The confidence 
intervals for 2009 are rather large, indicating that variation in positive economic 
perceptions is still relatively low between countries in the crisis year (see Figure 
15). Nevertheless, we see that exogenising the economy does not provide con-
firmation that there is a significant difference in economic effects between 2009 
and other survey years. The above test does not provide sufficient empirical 
evidence to support the claim that the crisis has brought about a change in eco-
nomic voting.    
 
 
Figure 15. Effects of the exogenised economy on incumbent support by year. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 countries; author’s own calculations.  
Notes: Average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.  
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5.3.4. Introducing the real economy 
To ascertain the robustness of the results, let us experiment with another meas-
ure of the crisis. It is necessary to consider that survey year may not fully cap-
ture the contextual changes that took place during the timeframe in question. 
Temporal differences in economic effects only become apparent when one takes 
into account the severity of the economic downturn in 2008–2009. This can be 
done by assigning each survey year a numerical value based on actual macro-
economic conditions. The most widely used measure of the state of the econ-
omy is change in GDP growth rate. A steep decline in GDP was clearly appar-
ent by 2009. According to the OECD data, average annual GDP growth rate in 
the 10 countries in question was 4.4% in 1989, 3.1% in 1994 and 2.7% in 2004. 
It then dropped to a remarkable -4.4% in 2009 and stabilised again to 1.4% in 
2014. Recalling Figure 12 above, change in two other macroeconomic indica-
tors commonly used in economic voting studies – rates of inflation and unem-
ployment – did not occur nearly as sharply or as fast.  
Based on the latter, the survey year variable could be replaced with an 
annual average GDP growth rate that marks the actual magnitude of the eco-
nomic decline. However, this approach, too, has its limitations: using annual 
average figures does not enable us to take into account possible country-level 
differences. By including country dummies in the models we control for unob-
served heterogeneity across countries due to omitted variables, for instance the 
specifics of a political system, but do not consider national variation in the 
punishing mechanism itself. Recent macroeconomic changes in Western de-
mocracies vary quite remarkably. Even though all 10 countries under discussion 
faced a notable deterioration in economic conditions by 2009, some were hit 
harder by the crisis (see Table 11). Consequently, one would also expect the 
public reaction to the economic hardship to vary. Indeed, previous studies indi-
cate disparities in the economic vote between countries and regions. Stronger 
evidence of electoral punishment has been found in Ireland, Iceland and South-
ern Europe, which suffered a great deal from the crisis (see Marsh and 
Mikhaylov 2012; Indridason 2014; Nezi 2012; Bellucci 2012; Fraile and Lewis-
Beck 2012; Freire and Santana-Pereira 2012).  
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Table 11. GDP growth per country per year (annual %). 
 1989 1994 2004 2009 2014 
Denmark -0.1 5.5 2.6 -5.1 1.0 
France 4.7 2.3 2.8 -2.9 0.4 
Germany 3.7 2.5 1.2 -5.6 1.6 
Greece 4.3 2.0 5.0 -4.4 0.8 
Ireland 5.2 5.8 4.6 -6.4 4.8 
Italy 4.2 2.2 1.6 -5.5 -0.4 
Netherlands 3.4 3.0 1.9 -3.3 0.8 
Portugal 7.5 1.0 1.8 -3.0 0.9 
Spain 5.1 2.4 3.2 -3.6 1.4 
United Kingdom 5.9 4.0 2.5 -4.3 2.6 
Average 4.4 3.1 2.7 -4.4 1.0 
Source: OECD.  
 
 
The EES Voter study data also demonstrate variation in economic effects across 
nations. The results of the multilevel model presented in Table 5 in Chapter 4 
indicated that economic effects differ significantly across countries (σ2=0.04) 
and especially across countries in different time points (σ2=0.35). Previous 
research shows that stronger tendency to punish incumbents for poor perfor-
mance characterises especially the southern part of Europe. Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau (2012) demonstrate that the electorate in Southern Europe holds their 
governments accountable for managing the economy to a larger degree than 
their northern counterparts. The authors attribute this to poor overall economic 
performance and to low complexity of government coalitions in the Southern 
countries, arguing that these factors make accountability attribution easier for 
voters. Within Southern Europe, Greece is in many ways a special case. It was 
more adversely affected by the crisis than perhaps any other country in Europe. 
Following the turmoil of the Great Recession, Greece was the first EU member 
state to enter the European debt crisis in late 2009. Structural economic weak-
nesses, the inability to refinance the largest-ever government debt and sharp 
loss of international confidence led the country to the verge of exit from the 
Eurozone. In political terms, Greece witnessed a dramatic decline in the popu-
larity of the governing PASOK amid continuously rising unemployment, 
unpopular austerity measures and painful negotiations with international insti-
tutions over financial bailout deals. Interestingly, the decline of PASOK was not 
translated into gains for the major opposition party New Democracy – instead, it 
contributed to the rise of smaller parties like SYRIZA on the left and Golden 
Dawn on the extreme right. 
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Running a baseline incumbent support model with the EES Voter study data 
for Greece separately (not shown here) provides evidence of strong economic 
voting, with average marginal effects of -0.16 for the economic evaluations’ 
category “worse” and 0.14 for the category “better”. These figures are notably 
larger than average marginal effects for the entire data pool combined (-0.8 and 
0.9 respectively: see Model 1 in Table 9). Although systematic analysis on eco-
nomic voting in Greece is only emerging, studies do confirm a strong relation-
ship between economics and electoral outcomes. Freire and Costa Lobo (2005) 
look at individual-level data from 1985 to 1999 and identify ideological leaning 
as the most important predictor of voting behaviour in Greece, but also detect 
strong economic effects, especially relative to social class. Nezi (2012) com-
pared the national election in 2004 to the European Parliament election in 2009, 
in which economic issues, especially high inflation and high levels of unem-
ployment, were the focal topic. Despite strong partisan and ideological voting, 
Nezi found solid economic effects in both elections, whereas sociodemo-
graphics had virtually no influence on incumbent support. The 2012 national 
election was characterised by extreme economic pessimism and resulted in a 
dramatic defeat for the incumbent PASOK. Teperoglou and Tsatsanis (2014) 
discussed these elections and the political consequences of the economic crisis. 
They argued that both the election in 2009 and that 2012 appear to have been 
classic cases of economic voting, but the crisis had even deeper system-level 
effects than just short-term electoral loss for the government. Sudden decline in 
party identification and severe political distrust, especially among younger gen-
erations, have given rise to strong anti-establishment attitudes and have led to 
hostility towards the political leaders, subsequently leading to a collapse of a stable 
two-party system. Empirical evidence, then, lends weight to the presence of strong 
economic voting in Greece, but in the absence of comparative studies we are not 
able to assess whether economic effects in Greece are more pronounced in contrast 
with other European countries, as suggested by the EES Voter study data.   
Returning to the focus of the dissertation, this analysis is first and foremost 
interested in universal patterns in economic voting, not specific national dis-
crepancies. Nevertheless, the contextual variation should be taken into account 
when modelling incumbent support. We need to keep in mind that voters from 
each country vote, above all, based on their own national economic situation 
and not the overall economic well-being in Europe. Therefore, survey year is 
next replaced with a new variable, defined as annual GDP growth rate, giving a 
separate value to every country-year. This enables us to capture the variation in 
economic fluctuations not only over time but also across countries. These 50 
figures are interacted with subjective economic evaluations in order to estimate 
whether retrospective voting varies depending on the macroeconomic context. 
Using aggregated economic indicators provides a ‘reality check’ to the previous 
findings, which indicate relative temporal stability in the economic vote. It also 
helps to address the restricted variance problem in economic opinions as GDP 
growth is an exogenous variable which is independent from the calculations of 
the individual voter. Furthermore, the macro-model enables us to address the 
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issue of the year 2004 potentially being an outlier because on the macroeco-
nomic level it does not appear substantially different from other pre-crisis years. 
The results visualised in Figure 16 illustrate the magnitude of economic 
effects for three macroeconomic scenarios: severe negative change in GDP 
growth (-4%), no change in GDP growth (0%) and solid positive change in 
GDP growth (4%). Negative economic growth, marked with a dotted line, rep-
resents a country in economic crisis. If economic effects vary depending on 
national macroeconomic performance, we should witness significant differences 
between the steepness of the three lines. For example, if the punishing mecha-
nism is less pronounced when the economy is performing poorly, the prediction 
line for economic recession should be flatter than the other lines. This would 
imply that during the economic downturn the difference in incumbent support 
between people with negative and positive economic evaluations is less than in 
non-crisis times, i.e. retrospective voting is less intense. However, the inter-
action does not appear to be statistically significant in the model (see Appendix 5). 
The lines in Figure 16 below are similar to each other and confidence intervals 
overlap, confirming that the differences in effects are not significant. 
Improvement in economic evaluations increases the probability of an incumbent 
vote to a similar extent regardless of real national macroeconomic conditions. In 
other words, voter economic perceptions by and large influence incumbent 
support levels by a similar magnitude both in weak and healthy economic times. 
Thus, using alternative ways to measure the recession does not lend support for 
the expectation that economic voting changed during the recent crisis.  
 
 
Figure 16. Predicted mean incumbent support by economic evaluations for GDP 
growth levels. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; OECD; author’s 
own calculations. 
Notes: Adjusted predictions with 95% confidence intervals. 
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5.4. Conclusions  
This chapter sought to clarify how the latest financial and economic crisis has 
shaped economic voting. In line with the severe economic troubles being expe-
rienced by European countries by mid-2009, the EES Voter study indicates 
great dissatisfaction with the state of the economy in 10 Western democracies 
with as much as 76.8% of respondents expressing pessimistic views towards 
national economic performance. At the same time, no evident drop occurred in 
incumbent support during the years of the crisis: similarly to previous survey 
years, roughly every 5th respondent was still willing to vote for the PM party in 
2009. These patterns contradict the basic logic of economic voting, according to 
which incumbent popularity is positively correlated with perceptions of eco-
nomic performance.   
Recent academic work therefore proposes that as a consequence of the 
worldwide crisis, the mechanisms of economic accountability may have 
changed. The hypothesis according to which economic voting is asymmetric 
and can be more pronounced during difficult times suggests that crises should 
lead to substantial electoral punishment of incumbents. On the other hand, 
arguments emphasising the ambiguity of responsibility propose that globalisa-
tion and economic integration have resulted in governments having less control 
over national economic outcomes. With reduced ability of voters to assign eco-
nomic responsibility, economic effects may weaken. This study, which analyzes 
large-scale data from diverse political and economic contexts, finds support for 
neither proposition. In Western Europe, retrospective voting did not change 
significantly between 1989 and 2014. Rather, the mechanism of economic vot-
ing appears to be relatively immune to external shocks. This is not to argue that 
the economic crisis had no impact on voter considerations. The dramatic deteri-
oration of voters’ economic opinions by 2009 clearly implies that citizens were 
aware of and unhappy with the state of the economy. However, our data do not 
allow concluding that the sanctioning mechanism changed accordingly. Instead, 
the magnitude of economic effects seems to have remained remarkably stable 
over time. The findings hold strong across various robustness tests using alter-
native methodological approaches, variable operationalisation, and coding deci-
sions.   
While data provide no empirical evidence of economic voting being less or 
more intense during the crisis, part of the puzzle remains. If the statistical rela-
tionship between the economy and voting stayed the same, the Great Recession 
should have led to a significant decline in incumbent support. Neither survey 
data nor post-crisis election results in Europe, however, demonstrate that this 
was necessarily the case. This raises critical questions about the performance of 
the accountability mechanism. If economic voting has not changed, why did 
high levels of economic discontent not lead to heavy electoral sanctioning? One 
reason for the failure to identify these patterns could be endogeneity. Critics 
claim that contrarily to classic economic voting theory, the causal relationship 
between economic assessments and political support may actually be reverse in 
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direction: citizens’ economic perceptions could be biased by their party affilia-
tion (Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997; Evans and Andersen 2006; 
Anderson 2007). Furthermore, recent findings suggest that the impact of 
partisanship varies over time, with economic perceptions being less biased dur-
ing the recession (Parker-Stephen 2013; Bisgaard 2015). This cyclical asym-
metry could mean that the relationship between economic opinions and incum-
bent support in the context of crisis is actually more pronounced than the cur-
rent analysis reveals. Regrettably, cross-sectional survey data do not enable us 
to properly address the concerns of endogeneity, therefore highlighting the need 
for longitudinal or experimental data in order for us to make proper causal 
inferences. Finally, given that two contrasting hypotheses were tested in the 
analysis, it cannot be excluded that both mechanisms – negative asymmetry and 
increased awareness of globalization – are at work, but mutually counterbalance 
each other. For this to happen, both phenomena would have to move simultane-
ously in an opposite direction, but unfortunately variables used in this study do 
not allow to directly assess how voter attribution of economic responsibility 
changes.   
From a substantive point of view, additional factors may have played a cru-
cial role in defining political preferences in hard times. Upon closer inspection, 
the global crisis was about more than merely plummeting macroeconomic fig-
ures. Governments in Europe were placed in the challenging position of having 
to choose an adequate policy response, while confronted with alarmingly high 
unemployment levels, the need to use public finances to bail out private banks, 
as well as international stabilisation requirements. Different policy approaches 
led to generous stimulus packages in some countries and belt-tightening auster-
ity measures in others, often causing political distrust and wide-scale public 
unrest. Recent literature has suggested that it is precisely these varied develop-
ments that may have played an important moderating effect in electoral sanc-
tioning (see Magalhães 2014a). Large variation in government national policy 
response across states may indicate that punishment of incumbents was not 
executed identically everywhere either. Recent years have seen macroeconomic 
indicators speak of recovery, but the aftermath of the recession is ongoing as 
governments continue to struggle to balance public finances. Turbulent times 
have brought economic management under greater public scrutiny, enabling 
citizens to observe and assess national economic policy choices. The next 
chapter of the dissertation will observe more closely how these perceptions 
frame political preferences.   
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6. ECONOMIC POLICY VOTING:  
a new dimension of economic voting 
The harsh economic realities associated with the economic and financial crisis 
led to governments being voted out of office in many countries, but not always 
and not everywhere. Significant variation in the electoral results for incumbents 
in countries affected by the crisis have raised doubts amongst academics about 
the performance of the traditional punishing and rewarding mechanism in vot-
ing behaviour. In search of an explanation, a large branch of literature has 
emerged which discusses the contextual constraints of blame attribution. Expo-
sure to the global economy and international integration have resulted in gov-
ernments having less control over national economic outcomes. This together 
with the ambiguous origin and the complexity of the global crisis diminishes 
voter ability to attribute responsibility for economic performance.  
Voters typically form their opinion regarding government competence based 
on macroeconomic indicators. However, during crises, when a majority of 
countries are negatively affected and the responsibility for the poor economic 
conditions is difficult to assign, additional considerations may play a role in 
evaluating the economic competence of incumbents. In situations such as this, 
the way governments react to economic turmoil gains importance. This chapter 
seeks to shed light on the political impacts of the global crisis by exploring 
voter reactions to government economic policies. It introduces an innovative 
examination of economic policy voting, which may emerge when the conven-
tional economic voting calculus – according to which voters lend support to or 
withhold support from incumbents based on macroeconomic outcomes – is 
distorted or disrupted. From the rational point of view, fiscal retrenchment is 
likely to be publicly unpopular, but this work considers the possibility that pol-
icy effects on incumbent support vary over the course of the economic cycle: 
voters may deem strict austerity programs unavoidable and justified when faced 
with rapid economic decline and growing public deficits.  
The chapter is divided in five sections. The next section introduces the theo-
retical framework and formulates the theory’s assumptions. The second section 
then offers an overview of data, measures and methods used to test these 
expectations. The fourth section presents the results of the empirical analysis 
and, finally, the fifth discusses the conclusions.      
  
 
6.1. Economic voting in turbulent times  
Recent years have seen a shift in focus of economic voting studies towards 
electoral consequences of the international financial and economic crisis. The 
economic turbulence, which accompanied the U.S. financial market crisis in 
2007–2008, severely shook the advanced industrial world. Economic recovery 
from the subsequent Great Recession has been remarkably slow and uneven, 
and in several countries is still under way almost a decade later. In Europe, a 
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painful aftershock emerged in the form of the Eurozone debt crisis in late 2009, 
accompanied by increased differentiation of countries within the euro area. 
Countries with larger public debts and underlying weaknesses in their national 
economy as evidenced by economic indicators found it difficult to access the 
financial markets and needed to be rescued by sovereign bailout programs 
(Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo 2016). The worldwide crisis, thus, incorporates 
several waves. Even though economic growth has, for the most part, begun to 
recover, the falling government revenue, increased expenditure and record high 
borrowing have left European countries struggling to deal with distressing lev-
els of public debt and deficit (see Figure 17). The average national budget defi-
cit in the EU dropped under 3 percent of GDP only in 2014 (EU28 average in 
2014 2.9% of GDP), a criteria set for the European countries in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The average government debt in the EU still substantially exceeds 
60 percent of GDP (EU28 average in 2014 86.8% of GDP), a requirement set 
out in the same Treaty.15   
 
 
Figure 17. Macroeconomic changes in the EU from 2004 to 2014. 
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s own calculations.  
Notes: Government debt and deficit between 2004--2008 are calculated for 27 EU member states. All other 
data are calculated for 28 member states.  
 
 
Following the logic of traditional economic voting theories, such a severe eco-
nomic shock should lead to public protest in the form of electoral punishment. 
Yet, empirical evidence from Europe appears far more mixed with governments 
facing dramatic losses in some countries and getting re-elected in others. 
Among all EU member countries, incumbent party was re-elected in Austria in 
2013, in Cyprus in 2011, in Estonia in 2011, in Germany in 2009 and in 2013, 
in Hungary in 2014, in Latvia in 2011 and in 2014, in Luxembourg in 2009, in 
                                                                          
15  For Maastricht criteria, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/escb/html/ 
convergence-criteria.en.html.  
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the Netherlands in 2012, in Poland in 2011, in Portugal in 2009, and in Sweden 
in 2010. Furthermore, on several occasions governing parties even increased 
their vote share compared to previous elections (e.g. in Cyprus in 2011, in Esto-
nia in 2011, in Germany in 2013, in Luxembourg in 2009, and in the Nether-
lands in 2012). Earlier chapters of this dissertation clearly demonstrated that no 
remarkable drop appeared in incumbent popularity in survey data either. The 
proportion of respondents in the EES Voter study who negatively evaluated the 
national economy almost doubled between 2004 and 2009, but differences in 
incumbent support are nearly non-existent (see Figure 8 in Chapter 4). The 
proportion of respondents with no clear political preference rose slightly, but 
the overall dynamics of incumbent support remained surprisingly stable in 
comparison with the changes in economic opinions. This leads us to question 
whether the sanctioning mechanism has become more complex amid the crisis 
than anticipated by the traditional literature. 
According to the theory of economic voting, voters are expected to form 
their electoral preferences based on incumbents’ past record of economic per-
formance as this is the optimal way to judge the competency of economic man-
agers. Voters gather information about incumbent competence by observing 
macroeconomic outcomes (Duch and Stevenson 2008). During economic crises, 
however, this mechanism is interrupted because the economy is performing 
poorly everywhere. Indeed, 20.8% of respondents positively evaluated the 
economy in the EES Voter study in 2004 and 27.4% did so in 2014, but this 
figure was only 7.2% in 2009. In other words, there is little variation in eco-
nomic assessments between the individuals during the crisis, as most people 
believe that economic conditions are worsening. Analytically, it is difficult to 
estimate the link between the economy and voting when variation in economic 
opinions is limited (Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014; Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo 
2016). In addition, the global and complex nature of the crisis blurs voter under-
standing of economic management. Hellwig and Coffey (2011) showed that in 
Britain only a quarter of citizens held the national government responsible for 
the economic crisis, while nearly two-thirds blamed banks and investment com-
panies. Data from the EES Voter study in 2014 indicate that Europeans placed 
the blame for their respective country’s economic situation on national govern-
ments (mean score 8.7 on a scale, where 0=no responsibility and 10=full 
responsibility), but banks (8.0) and the EU (7.6) followed closely behind. Alto-
gether, when the attribution of responsibility for economic outcomes is unclear 
and, moreover, everyone agrees that the economy is performing poorly, citizens 
are forced to base their judgments on other sources of information than macro-
economic indicators. In such situations, voters are likely to turn to economic 
policies. Even when the electorate is united in their attitude towards economic 
conditions, they may be divided in their opinion on government policy actions.   
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6.2. The electoral consequences of austerity 
European nations provide considerable variation in policy response to the most 
recent economic crisis. When confronted with major economic shocks, govern-
ments can choose different stabilisation and adjustment strategies depending, 
for instance, on the size and openness of the economy, the amount of debt, or 
domestic constraints such as the electoral cycle or the political strength of labor 
movements (Haggard and Kaufman 1989). Even though the overall response to 
the most recent crisis is argued to be more uniform than in previous crises – due 
to higher levels of international commitments and constraints (Pontusson and 
Raess 2012) – cabinets in Europe still chose very diverse strategies of coping 
with economic hardship. Economic policy has many dimensions, most notably 
fiscal and monetary, and within each dimension a number of positions can be 
taken (Gourevitch and Gourevitch 1986). In the Eurozone, monetary policy is 
largely coordinated by the European Central Bank (ECB), thus the crisis-time 
variability across countries can predominantly be attributed to fiscal policy 
measures, that is, primarily changes in taxes and spending. By and large, the 
Great Recession led to one of two alternative policy responses in Europe: fiscal 
austerity or stimulus. Sometimes the two appeared mixed, or were implemented 
one after another (Pontusson and Raess 2012). The liberal approach of fiscal 
expansion is defined as increase in public spending and/or reduction in taxes in 
order to encourage growth and to revive the economy. The idea follows the 
economic theory by John Maynard Keynes (1936), who advocated government 
policy intervention to stimulate demand and pull the global economy out of the 
Great Depression in the 1930s. Keynes and his followers believed that instead 
of waiting for wages and prices to adjust, expansionary policy offers a quick 
way out of the recession. Fiscal austerity, on the other hand, refers to conserva-
tive measures taken to reduce government budget deficits, most often by 
implementing tax increase and/or reducing public spending. This contractionary 
approach relies on the business cycle theory of the classic anti-interventionist 
view of fiscal policy, or the so-called Austrian economics, which states that 
government intervention to stimulate the demand is unnecessary and creates 
more problems than it solves. For example, credit expansion during an eco-
nomic downturn is ineffective as it merely postpones the sustainable boom 
(Tempelman 2010).  
Governments are typically expected to pursue economic policies according 
to their party-political orientation: right-of-the-centre free market ideology is 
traditionally associated with advocating austerity, and leftist views with finan-
cial expansion. During crises, however, policy preferences of political actors are 
often more complex than the economic positions would suggest (Kahler and 
Lake 2013). Investigating social policy, Starke, Kaasch and Hooren (2013) 
demonstrate that in the welfare states of Continental and Northern Europe cut-
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backs were pursued by left-wing and right-wing governments alike.16 Similarly 
in fiscal policy, radical retrenchment was introduced for example by the Con-
servatives in the United Kingdom and centre-right leaders in Eastern Europe, 
but also by leftist governments in Southern Europe. Policy choices in Italy in 
2011–2013 cannot be attributed to incumbent ideology at all as fiscal adjust-
ments were imposed by a technocratic non-partisan government. Policy deci-
sions taken during the crisis were strongly determined by the institutional set-
ting. Economic policy was not simply a domestic issue but was heavily influ-
enced by foreign actors such as creditors and financial institutions, and often 
motivated by bailout agreements or the wish to remain in the Eurozone and in 
the EU (Haggard 2013). In the aftermath of the Great Recession, many Euro-
pean countries were forced to implement severe austerity programs in an 
attempt to halt and reverse the soaring levels of budget deficit. These circum-
stances placed governments in Europe in a difficult position, caught between 
meeting the external requirements and dealing with an electorate suffering 
because of the distressing fiscal reforms. 
Rationally speaking, rigorous fiscal adjustments should be publicly unpopu-
lar as they are followed by an increase in inequality (Ball et al. 2013; Woo et al. 
2013) and are strongly related to social unrest (Ponticelli and Voth 2011). How-
ever, a bulk of evidence indicates that voters may actually tolerate such deci-
sions, and public response to financial cutbacks may not always be negative. 
For example, if taxes are rising everywhere, even a large tax increase may be 
politically acceptable (Besley and Case 1995). In a similar manner, voters may 
react positively to austerity and be willing to make short-term sacrifices if they 
believe that the reforms are justified and will not last long (Stokes 1996). In 
their analysis of nineteen OECD countries between 1975 and 2008, Alesina, 
Carloni and Lecce (2012) found that even large fiscal adjustments do not neces-
sarily lead to governments being systematically voted out of office. The authors 
argued that strong and popular governments can implement reductions without 
facing electoral defeat. Likewise, Kalbhenn and Stracca (2015) showed that 
contrary to conventional wisdom, fiscal austerity is not associated with dimen-
sions of public opinion such as life satisfaction, confidence, trust in national 
institutions, and trust in Europe and European institutions. Giger and Nelson 
(2011) suggested that electoral consequences of social policy cuts differ by 
party family, and retrenchment might not be as unpopular as previously pre-
sumed. Focusing on the 2010 Greek election, Karyotis and Rüdig (2015) 
detected considerable public doubt about government policy positions, but con-
cluded that austerity had no impact on electoral behaviour – mainly due to 
political rhetoric portraying cuts as the only possible solution, and the lack of a 
plausible alternative in voters’ minds. Various works have shown that govern-
ments may employ ‘blame avoidance’ techniques to escape electoral failure, for 
                                                                          
16  Starke et al (2013) have argued that this is because much of the fiscal stabilisation is 
carried out through automatic stabilisers, features such as income taxes and welfare 
spending, which offset economic fluctuations without government intervention. 
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example insisting that fiscal consolidation is crucial, unavoidable and externally 
imposed (Weaver 1986; Hering 2008; ’t Hart and Tindall 2009). Thus, even 
though contractionary policies that decrease public services and benefits tend to 
generally be unpopular, incumbents who introduce painful cuts may avoid 
electoral sanctioning. Building on the latter, I test the hypothesis that, overall, 
voters react more negatively to fiscal austerity than to stimulus, but consider the 
possibility that in times of crisis belt-tightening measures may find public 
approval. 
In non-crisis times, citizens may be argued to possess little knowledge on 
and have little interest in government policies. During the crisis, however, eco-
nomic hardship brought government choices and actions under greater public 
scrutiny, enabling citizens to form opinions on and assess policy decisions. It is 
feasible to assume that these decisions frame voter perceptions of incumbent 
economic competence. This analysis explores, therefore, how national eco-
nomic policies influence incumbent support. The chapter offers an innovative 
examination of economic policy voting, which may occur when the usual path 
of economic voting via subjective economic opinions is disrupted. The argu-
ment fits into a larger theoretical framework, in that it offers a second dimen-
sion to voter economic calculus. In addition to the usual retrospective national 
economic evaluation – i.e., the traditional valence view of economic voting – 
there is another dimension, positional economic voting. In the latter, the econ-
omy, rather than being perceived as a valence issue, can be seen as a positional 
issue, with the voter holding different ideological stances on important aspects 
of economic policy. According to this theory, voters will select the party closest 
to their own policy position (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck, 
Nadeau, and Foucault 2013). The idea of a voter being policy-oriented is not 
new (see Stokes 1963; Kiewiet 1983). However, this dissertation differs from 
previous works, in that it focuses on government fiscal policy choices rather 
than on parties’ (or voters’) overall ideological standpoints. Previous work typi-
cally operationalises economic policies via government ideology or program-
matic positions, but, as discussed above, crisis politics do not necessarily corre-
spond to party ideology. For these reasons, political rhetoric alone hardly pro-
vides a full picture. Rational voters develop their perceptions of incumbent 
economic competence based on past performance rather than on campaign 
promises or ideological views. This study employs measures of government 
policy stance that are novel in the political science literature, despite being 
commonly used in economics. The key indicator used is government structural 
balance, which identifies the national fiscal position while taking into account 
the country’s position in the economic cycle. This provides a more accurate 
measure of economic policies.  
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6.3. Data, methods and model specification  
In order to empirically test voter reactions to government economic policies, the 
study utilises both micro and macro-level data. Individual-level data are obtained 
from the EES Voter study. The analysis in this chapter relies on survey waves from 
2004, 2009 and 2014, thereby covering the peak year of the global crisis as well as 
the periods before and after. With a total sample of 77,531 respondents, I include 
data from 24 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. A larger geographical coverage than in 
previous chapters of the dissertation is possible here because the analysis only 
focuses on three latest survey waves. Three survey waves and 24 countries 
constitute 72 cross-sections altogether, which have been pooled into one dataset. 
For contextual indicators, the study uses macroeconomic data published by the 
IMF. All macro-level variables were merged with the EES Voter study data into a 
combined, hierarchically structured database. For more information on data and 
case selection, see section 3.3 of the dissertation.  
The dependent variable is incumbent support, coded as 1 if vote intention in 
the subsequent election was for the incumbent PM party (18.8%) and 0 for any 
other party (50%; for variable operationalisation, see section 3.4). To quantify 
economic policy, the study employs a macro-level indicator of general govern-
ment structural balance.17 Structural balance reflects the difference between 
government revenues and expenditure, and is in economics commonly used to 
assess the stance of government fiscal policy (Chouraqui, Hagemann, and 
Sartor 1990; IMF 1995; Hagemann 1999; Chalk 2002). It aims to capture struc-
tural trends in order to estimate whether the fiscal policy of a country in a given 
period is expansionary, neutral or restrictive (OECD 2015). A positive balance 
refers to a government budget surplus and a negative balance to a budget defi-
cit. Balance deficit suggests an expansionary fiscal stance, where government 
spending exceeds revenue, which primarily comes from taxes. Conversely, 
financial surplus suggests reduced spending and increased revenue due to con-
tractionary policy (IMF 1995; OECD 2015). Because fiscal balance is directly 
related to government spending, it also captures the usage of public resources 
for bailout of financial institutions – a measure widely executed by Western 
governments after the crisis broke. Importantly, the indicator of structural bal-
ance is cyclically adjusted, that is, is purged off the impact of macroeconomic 
developments as well as the influence of one-off events on the budget. It takes 
into account the fact that over the course of the business cycle, revenues are 
likely to be lower and expenditure higher during the slump. Government reve-
nues and expenditures are highly sensitive to economic developments, and thus 
changes in fiscal balance cannot always be attributed to adjustments in the fiscal 
                                                                          
17  Regrettably, the EES Voter study data do not enable us to observe attitudes towards 
government economic policies at the individual level as no comparative survey 
instrument measuring such attitudes exists. 
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stance, but may simply reflect that the economy is moving through the cycle. 
These cyclical deviations are corrected for in the structural balance indicator, 
which enables us to identify the underlying trends in fiscal policies (IMF 1995; 
OECD 2015). Changes in non-cyclical balance are therefore indicative of 
medium-term orientation of government fiscal policy (Hagemann 1999).   
In order to ascertain the robustness of the analytical results, I conduct sup-
plementary tests with two additional macroeconomic indicators – general gov-
ernment total expenditure and total tax revenue. Neither is adjusted for the eco-
nomic cycle, but as secondary variables in the analysis they can still help assess 
the reliability of the results. Total expenditure refers to the money a government 
spends to deliver public goods and services and to provide social protection 
(OECD 2011a). Tax revenue is the total income a government gains from taxes 
and social contributions (Eurostat 2008). In post-crisis fiscal consolidation, 
governments in Europe primarily addressed precisely these two areas. Spending 
reduction mainly concerned public sector jobs and wages, and revenue 
enhancement was implemented through VAT and other consumption taxes 
(OECD 2011b). However, the final policy mix chosen varied significantly 
across countries, depending, for instance, on the severity of the crisis, national 
political and institutional conditions as well as external constraints. Addition-
ally, welfare and pensions were targeted by governments in response to the 
recession, but unfortunately consistent data on social expenditure for recent 
years are not available at the time of writing.  
All three proxies for economic policy positions are originally measured in 
units of national currency. In order to make the figures comparable, percentage 
change from the preceding year is calculated for the analysis.18 This aggregate-
level variable, indicating change in economic policy stance, is generated for 
each country and year, altogether for 72 cross-sections. Table 12 below pro-
vides an overview of how negative and positive change in each indicator can be 
interpreted in terms of government policy direction.  
The models include a standard set of control variables (for more information, 
see sections 3.5 and 4.2). Subjective economic evaluations are also added as the 
results presented so far have underlined their importance as a predictor of 
incumbent support. In the sample used in this chapter, 49% of respondents con-
sider the economy to be worse, 27.8% unchanged and 18.8% better than it was 
in a year previous. Additionally, to account for monetary policy, I include a 
dummy variable for Eurozone membership. As discussed earlier, monetary 
policy in the Eurozone is relatively homogenous and the majority of variation 
between countries in terms of economic decisions comes from fiscal policy, 
which in this study is captured by the structural balance indicator. However, in 
order to reduce the confounding effect of expansionary and contractionary 
tendencies in money supply, monetary policy is also controlled for.  
                                                                          
18  Alternatively, fiscal balance as a percent of GDP could be used. However, this parameter 
is not a suitable proxy for government policies as it is highly sensitive to changes in GDP 
growth. Fluctuations in balance measured as a percent of GDP may occur independent 
from government actions and may therefore not reflect calculated policy choices.  
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Table 12. Measurement of government fiscal policy position. 
Indicator Measure used in the study Policy position 
General government struc-
tural balance  
Percentage change from 
preceding year 
Positive change refers to 
increase in balance deficit 
(i.e. spending exceeds 
revenue), which indicates 
movement towards fiscal 
stimulus  
General government total 
expenditure  
Percentage change from 
preceding year 
Positive change refers to 
increase in spending, which 
indicates movement 
towards fiscal stimulus 
Total tax revenue  Percentage change from 
preceding year 
Positive change refers to 
increase in tax revenue (i.e. 
higher tax levels), which 
indicates movement 
towards austerity 
 
 
To explore the influence of individual-level and contextual factors on political 
support, I use multilevel logistic regression analysis. In addition to statistical 
reasons stemming from hierarchical data structure (for more information, see 
section 3.6), there is a motivation to use multilevel modelling where necessary – 
as is commonly the case in political science research – in order to combine in a 
single model predictors from multiple levels of analysis (Steenbergen and Jones 
2002). This necessity stems from the substantive interest in the effects of group-
level predictors on individual outcomes. Here, a multilevel approach is appro-
priate both due to clustered data and an interest in contextual factors in 
explaining political support. Alternative fixed effects models account for higher 
levels of heterogeneity, but do not provide substantive explanation for this het-
erogeneity.19 Multilevel models effectively combine substance with assump-
tions about group-level heterogeneity (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).   
I estimate a three-level model, where respondents are nested in country-years 
at level 2 (68 unique values20), and country-years are nested in countries at level 
3 (24 values) (for a similar approach in fitting multilevel models to comparative 
longitudinal survey data, see Fairbrother 2012).21 Based on previous results 
                                                                          
19  The inclusion of country and year dummies in fixed effects models leaves no variance to 
be explained by additional variables at the country and year level (see e.g. Allison 2009; 
Bell and Jones 2015). This is particularly critical here as the substantive interest lies in 
the effects of a higher-level variable. 
20  From the original 72 country-years, four are dropped due to a lack of data either on vote 
intention or government structural balance.  
21  Admittedly, the application of multilevel models requires caution when the number of 
higher-level units is small (see e.g. Stegmueller 2013). However, in three-level models, 
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demonstrating large variation in economic voting (see Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
2000; Dorussen and Taylor 2003), the individual-level effect of economic 
perceptions on incumbent support is allowed to vary across all three levels. The 
random-slope multilevel logistic regression model is specified as follows: 
 
݈݊ ቌ
pˆ ௜௝௞
1 − pˆ ௜௝௞
ቍ = ߛ଴଴଴ + ߛ଴ଵ଴ ௜ܺ௝௞ + ߛ଴଴ଵ ௝ܼ + ߛ଴ଶ଴ܥ௜௝௞ + ⋯+ ߛ଴௛଴ܥ௛௜௝௞ 
+	ݒ௞ + ݑ௝௞ + ௝݁௞ ௜ܺ௝௞	 (4)	
	
where ݌̂ is the probability of voting for the incumbent, ݅ is individuals, ݆ is 
country-years, ݇ is countries, ߛ଴଴଴ is the intercept, ߛ଴ଵ଴ − ߛ଴௛଴ are regression 
coefficients of the individual-level predictors, ߛ଴଴ଵ is the regression coefficient 
of the country-year-level predictor, ܺ is individual-level economic perceptions, 
ܼ is country-year-level economic policies, ܥ − ܥ௛ are control variables, ݒ௞ is 
the variance of the intercept across countries, ݑ௝௞ is the variance of intercept 
across country-years, and ௝݁௞ ௜ܺ௝௞ is the variance of individual-level economic 
effects. To observe whether the effect of economic policies on political support 
varies over time, interactions with year are introduced later on.  
Although in multilevel analysis it is typically advised to center the scores of 
interval individual-level predictors (see Snijders and Bosker 2011; Tabachnik 
and Fidell 2012), here raw variables are used in order to maintain comparability 
with previous models. For the sake of within-model comparison, all predictors 
are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in 
this chapter, and the wording of the questions, are shown in Appendix 6. 
 
 
6.4. Empirical Results  
6.4.1. Descriptive overview 
This section first presents a description of the main variables in the analysis. All 
estimates represent the total sample of 72 surveys, pooled into one dataset 
(N=77,531). Overall, 18.8% of all respondents in the dataset expressed support 
for the governing PM party, 50% for some other party, and 31.3% indicated no 
preference. Data demonstrate considerable variation in the dependent variable 
across the European countries under study, with the highest PM support levels 
to be found in Luxembourg (34.6%) and the lowest in the Czech Republic 
(8.6%). The key explanatory variable, government economic policies, is meas-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the sample size that matters the most is the one at which the effect is measured (see e.g. 
Snijders 2005). As this analysis tests the effect of a variable measured at the country-year 
level, the number of country-years is of main importance. With 62 country-years 
included, the sample size should not lead to major concern here. Nevertheless, the 
potential limitations of the multilevel setup must be kept in mind when interpreting the 
findings. 
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ured as percentage change from the preceding year. Average change in struc-
tural balance in the pooled dataset is 33.6%, indicating an overall movement in 
recent years towards larger budget deficit, i.e. towards fiscal expansion.   
While incumbent support in Europe has not gone through considerable fluc-
tuation in the decade between 2004 and 2014, the same cannot be said about 
government structural balance. Average balance estimates across 24 countries 
witnessed a substantial shift towards larger budget deficit in 2009, suggesting that 
governments first reacted to the plummeting economy with expansionary measures 
(see Figure 18). Indeed, although the individual policy mix varied across nations, 
the share of government spending generally increased immediately after the start of 
the crisis. Part of this reflects declining GDP, but the other part points to increased 
government expenditure, which attempted to ensure the stability of the financial 
system and to stimulate the economy in response to the crisis (OECD 2011a). 
However, by 2014 fiscal balance had taken a sharp turn towards surplus, signaling 
that initial measures taken to stimulate the economy had been replaced, and 
governments were now trying to shrink the record high levels of deficit with 
contractionary measures such as budget cuts and tax increases.  
 
 
Figure 18. Incumbent support and government structural balance between 2004 and 
2014. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 24 European countries; IMF; author’s own calculations. 
Notes: Incumbent as percentage of all respondents. Missing answers not shown.   
 
 
6.4.2. Voter response to economic policies 
To first explore the overall popularity of alternative policy approaches, I estimate a 
model of incumbent support for the data pool of 72 surveys. The multilevel model 
contains the same basic set of individual-level predictors as the models presented in 
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previous chapters. The analysis thus far has demonstrated the importance of economic 
perceptions in explaining the variation in incumbent popularity, therefore subjective 
assessments of the national economy are also added. The random effects part of the 
model, not reported here, implies that economic effects differ significantly across 
countries (σ2=0.10) and especially across country-years (σ2=0.60), underlining the 
necessity to use the multilevel design. Fixed effects in Model 1 in Table 13 show 
below that economic opinions play a substantial role in incumbent support levels in 
the sample used in this chapter. Even when the case selection is extended beyond 
Western Europe, poor economic evaluations continue to significantly diminish and 
good ones to consolidate incumbent popularity. Comparing the estimates to those in 
the earlier multilevel model (see Model 4 in Table 5 in Chapter 4), we witness that 
average marginal effects of economic perceptions on the incumbent vote are nearly 
identical. Bad economic conditions decrease PM party support by approximately 8 
percentage points and good ones increase it by 9 percentage points. Due to different 
sample compositions, the coefficients in two models are not directly comparable, but 
the results still signal considerable similarities. In addition, the same set of individual-
level variables influence incumbent popularity as shown above, with signs in a similar 
direction.  
Our main interest in this chapter, however, lies in the impact of government 
policy approach on vote intention. Three models in Table 13 incorporate differ-
ent measures of economic policy, introduced separately in order to avoid multi-
collinearity. Model 1 includes government structural balance as a proxy for 
economic policy, with a positive estimate pointing to expansionary and a nega-
tive one to contractionary measures. The coefficient appears positive in the 
model, as if to propose that change in government economic policies towards 
fiscal stimulus is rewarded by an increase in party support levels, but the effect 
is not statistically significant. The findings for a combined dataset of 72 surveys 
provide no evidence that developments in government fiscal balance are associ-
ated with incumbent support. Let us investigate the results using alternative 
measures for economic policy position, focusing on government spending and 
tax revenue. The results displayed in Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 13 demon-
strate that public expenditure exhibits a statistically significant relationship with 
voter political preferences. The effect is positive in direction, suggesting that 
change towards higher government spending enhances PM party support. The 
results in Model 3 indicate in a similar manner that fiscal austerity has a nega-
tive influence on incumbent vote. All three models, then, point to the same logic 
in findings: government decision to stimulate the economy tends to boost and 
fiscal cutbacks to lessen political support for incumbents.22 However, in a com-
bined dataset, which includes 24 European countries at three different points in 
time, only two of the three macroeconomic indicators – public spending and tax 
revenue – show a statistically significant association with party preferences.       
                                                                          
22  Similar findings indicating that austerity leads to electoral punishment also appear in models 
where the dependent variable is operationalised as vote intention for all government parties or 
as vote choice for the incumbent PM party in the preceding EP election (see also robustness 
tests in section 4.3.4). Results available from the author upon request. 
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Table 13. Effects of government economic policy on incumbent support. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Economic evaluations: same ref. category ref. category ref. category 
Economic evaluations: worse -0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Economic evaluations: better 0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Government structural balance 0.11 
(0.08) 
- - 
Government expenditure - 0.21*** 
(0.06) 
- 
Tax revenue - - -0.09* 
(0.05) 
Left-right self-placement 0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
Social class 0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
Religiosity -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Age 0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
Gender 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Education  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Cabinet time in office logged 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Eurozone membership 0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
 
Log likelihood -18802.65 -19774.42 -19778.33 
Number of countries 23 24 24 
Number of country-years 63 68 68 
Number of individuals 39,894 42,363 42,363 
Source: EES Voter study from 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 24 European countries; Eurostat and IMF; author’s 
own calculations.  
Notes: Entries are average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. Random effects not shown. 
The dependent variable is 1 if vote intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t 
knows, refusals, respondents who said they would vote blank, spoil vote or would not vote, and missing 
answers are excluded. Left-right placement, class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All 
control variables are recoded on a 0 to 1 scale.  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
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6.4.3. Variation in policy reactions over time 
Preliminary findings provide some support for the understanding that austerity 
measures are generally less popular among voters, whereas expansionary 
measures tend to elicit stronger public approval. Indeed, common logic suggests 
that purely self-interested citizens would react painfully to tax increase, job 
cuts, reduction in public goods and services and in welfare state functions, all of 
which would negatively affect their standard of living and economic wellbeing. 
Nonetheless, the severe magnitude of the economic turbulence of recent years 
poses the question of whether these attitudinal patterns differed during the cri-
sis, when the salience of government economic policies drastically increased. 
Citizens may well accept that ‘desperate times call for desperate measures’, as 
the saying goes, and be willing to endure the temporary cutbacks. Therefore, I 
next examine variation in public reactions to government policies over time. To 
do this, I estimate a similar three-level model of incumbent support as before, 
but introduce an interaction term between economic policy stance and survey 
year. This enables us to observe whether the effect of policy decisions on 
incumbent vote varies between different points in time.  
Figure 19 shows the fixed effects of three different policy indicators by year, 
holding other variables in the models constant. 95% confidence intervals are 
included. Additionally, regression coefficients from multilevel models in the 
form of logged odds are shown in Appendix 7. Firstly, the upper plot illustrating 
the interaction effect between government structural balance and time shows 
that there is virtually no difference between 2004 and 2009 in the extent to 
which policy choices affect incumbent support. In both years, the policy effect 
on party preference remains insignificant. The results for 2014, however, are 
quite contrasting. In the post-crisis period, a positive change in government 
structural balance, that is, fiscal stimulus, considerably enhances governing 
party’s support, and, vice versa, the incumbent is sanctioned for austerity 
measures. On the original scale23, the average marginal effect for 2014 is 
0.0012, indicating that an increase in balance deficit of approximately 8 per-
centage points raises the likelihood of an incumbent vote by 1 percentage point. 
Substantively, the effect size may seem low, but if we take into consideration 
that change in structural balance in 2014 was, for instance, approximately 140 
percentage points in Italy, -91 percentage points in the Netherlands, 52 percent-
age points in Hungary, 42 percentage points in Sweden, and 38 percentage 
points in Germany, no doubt remains that shifts in economic policy stance may 
have considerable consequences for government popularity. These results 
imply, firstly, that policy considerations have gained importance after the crisis. 
Turbulent times have resulted in citizens observing government economic pol-
icy decisions more closely and using this information to form their judgments of 
leaders’ economic competence. Secondly, we observe that after years of auster-
ity, the expansionary fiscal approach, in particular, has greater appeal for the 
                                                                          
23  Recall that all tables and figures reflect variables that have been recoded on a scale from 
0 to 1. 
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public in the post-crisis era. Similar findings emerge on the middle plot in 
Figure 20 below, which measures national economic policy direction via gov-
ernment expenditure. The effect remains around zero in 2004 and 2009, but is 
significantly different for 2014, when higher public spending considerably 
increases incumbent popularity. The lower plot in Figure 20, which uses tax 
revenue to measure economic policies and where a positive figure refers to 
austerity, points to a similar outcome – in 2014, contractionary policies harmed 
government support. However, the overlapping of confidence intervals and the 
results in Appendix 7 indicate that the difference in the effect between years is 
not statistically significant. 
We see, then, that policy considerations affect political support much more 
strongly in the post-crisis period. Where does this fit in with the overall vote 
prediction equation? What is the relative importance of policy effects compared 
to more traditional determinants of vote choice? To properly assess this, we 
need to bring all independent variables to a comparable metric. Currently, the 
variables have been rescaled on a similar metric from 0 to 1, enabling us to 
observe their effect on the outcome variable when they change from their 
minimum to their maximum value. However, variables are measured on a very 
different scale using different units, and have different normal distributions, 
which limits our ability to properly compare the effect sizes. For this reason, I 
will next use z-standardisation, where the scales of all variables are converted to 
z-scores, measuring how many standard deviations above or below the sample 
mean a raw score is. A standardised score tells us where each value is situated 
compared to the sample mean (the score of 0 means that the observation is at 
the sample’s mean level, and a score of 1 points to an observation one standard 
deviation above the mean). Because the standardised scores do not express the 
original unit of measurement, the effect sizes within models can now be more 
easily compared (see e.g. Rubin 2012: 86–93). Appendix 8 presents separate 
models for each of the three economic policy measures by year. The results for 
all three policy proxies indicate that government economic policy actions have 
gained importance over time as a predictor of vote preference. Compared to 
earlier years, government policy decisions are strongly correlated with the like-
lihood of voting for the PM party in office. Furthermore, in 2014 government 
policies are the strongest predictor of vote intention after political ideology (see 
Models 3, 6 and 9 in Appendix 8). In two other survey years, incumbent vote is, 
as traditional voting theories suggest, primarily determined by respondent 
ideological leaning, subjective economic perceptions, and social cleavages (see 
Models 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 in Appendix 8). In other words, even though an indi-
vidual’s vote decision is still strongly determined by traditional long-term and 
short-term factors, a new dimension has been added to the conventional voting 
mechanism that cannot be ignored. Citizens have become more responsive to 
government actions in the field of economic policy, and the decision of gov-
erning parties to pursue fiscal austerity may have significant consequences on 
incumbent support levels after the crisis. 
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Figure 19. Effects of economic policies on incumbent support by year. 
 
Source: EES Voter study from 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 24 European countries; Eurostat and IMF; author’s 
own calculations.  
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6.5. Conclusions 
During the worldwide economic and financial crisis, economic policies may 
emerge as an important determinant of vote choice next to economic percep-
tions. The traditional responsibility attribution is blurred between various actors 
and levels of governance, and citizens may search for other indicators than the 
state of the national economy to evaluate incumbent performance. When the 
economy is performing poorly everywhere, it is feasible to assume that the way 
governments react to the crisis gains voters’ attention. This chapter offered a 
novel exploration of economic policy voting in the face of a crisis when virtu-
ally everyone agrees that the economy is performing poorly and the usual 
mechanism of economic voting is clogged. It first explored the influence of 
national policy positions to political support in general, and then tested the hy-
pothesis that citizens’ policy reactions vary simultaneously with economic 
fluctuations. The analysis utilised an operationalisation of government policy 
approach that is new in the political science literature, but is commonly used in 
economics. The key indicator used was government structural balance, which 
reveals a government’s underlying fiscal position while taking into account a 
country’s current position in the economic cycle. The work also contributes to 
the literature by providing large-scale empirical evidence on the electoral con-
sequences of the crisis, while previous academic knowledge on the subject 
matter is often limited to single elections or nations.    
The results of a multilevel analysis of 24 nations measured before, during 
and after the crisis demonstrate that for elections held in years when govern-
ment expenditure increased in relation to the year previous, the probability of 
voting for the incumbent increased. On the other hand, in elections held in years 
when total tax revenue increased the probability of voting for the incumbent 
deteriorated. However, when examined by year, increases in government 
expenditure and loosening of fiscal policy only boost the likelihood of the 
incumbent vote after the crisis, suggesting that economic policy voting is a post-
crisis phenomenon. European citizens react to government policy decisions 
more strongly in the post-crisis period, and economic policy choices have 
emerged as one of the key predictors of political preference next to traditional 
indicators. In 2014, five years after the worst of the global collapse, voters 
expressed particularly strong disapproval of fiscal retrenchment: budgetary cuts 
and tax increase clearly led to lower incumbent support levels. The political 
rhetoric of ‘no pain, no gain’ has not earned long-term success; instead, citizens 
in Europe have grown tired of large-scale cuts, especially if these failed to bring 
with them the promised results (see also Clarke et al. 2013). The continuing rise 
in public debt and deficit as well as persistently high unemployment levels have 
done little to boost voter confidence in incumbents as capable economic manag-
ers. Meanwhile, there is no empirical evidence that stringent reduction measures 
found overwhelming public endorsement during the worst years of the crisis 
due to belief that cutbacks are justified, temporary, and no better alternatives are 
available. Citizens are not willing to accept desperate measures in desparate 
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times if they require sacrifice on their part. But reductions were not associated 
with great electoral losses either – in fact, in 2009 economic policies exhibited 
no considerable impact on political support at all. These tendencies suggest that 
voters in the midst of the crisis primarily reacted to economic conditions. Policy 
considerations had little impact on vote choice in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis; instead, citizens in many countries focused on incumbents’ perfor-
mance and simply punished them for hard economic times (see also Bartels 
2012; Magalhães 2014b; Bellucci 2014; Marsh and Mikhaylov 2014; Okolikj 
and Quinlan 2016). In the early years of the crisis, stronger consensus existed 
between political actors on the causes of the economic troubles and on neces-
sary measures, and voters did not associate parties with alternative policy posi-
tions. It is likely that for similar reasons no significant policy effects occured in 
2004. However, over time voter considerations have become more multidimen-
sional and citizens have grown more policy-oriented. With government strug-
gles to balance public finances placed under the media’s magnifying glass, 
voters are able to observe and assess actions taken in the economic field, and so 
the likelihood for electoral repercussions increases (see also Armingeon and 
Giger 2008). Thus, we are increasingly witnessing a phenomenon that Lewis-
Beck et al. (2013) call the ‘compleat economic vote’: the vote is influenced by 
various economic dimensions. Citizens punish and reward incumbents on the 
basis of economic performance, but they also rely on other aspects of the econ-
omy when making their choices. They assess central aspects of economic pol-
icy, and the positions they take also shape their political preference (Lewis-
Beck, Nadeau, and Foucault 2013).24 Considering the multiple dimensions of 
the economic voting model helps us to better understand how economic voting 
performs overall and also under extraordinary circumstances.   
That said, there are also certain data limitations that may inhibit the identifi-
cation of the effects of austerity during the crisis years. Macroeconomic 
dynamics reveal that governments in Europe first responded to the economic 
collapse with attempts to revitalise the economy, whereas fiscal reductions 
intended to shrink the rapidly growing deficits were only introduced later. For 
this reason, it is possible that by measuring government policy position in 2009 
and 2014 we do not capture the harshest crisis-time fiscal adjustments as in 
many countries these were only implemented in the period in between these two 
years. For example, in Greece and Portugal the first austerity packages were 
enacted in 2010, in Italy in 2011, and in Cyprus only in 2012. In other words, 
using data from only certain points in time in this analysis – a decision dictated 
by the availability of survey data – may limit our ability to capture voters’ 
immediate reaction to rigorous austerity programs. Still, even if fiscal retrench-
ment was met with a degree of sympathy and understanding at first, it is safe to 
say that the optimism wore off quickly.  
                                                                          
24  The authors also introduce a third dimension, patrimony, or voter wealth portfolio, which 
is not discussed in this dissertation.  
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The findings presented in this chapter provide confirmation that national 
economic policies help explain political support. Future research will have to 
reveal whether this was a one-off effect or whether it will remain an important 
dimension of economic voting. The fact that national economic policies had no 
remarkable influence on political support before the crisis, in 2004, does not 
allow us to exclude the former possibility. Either way, voter policy reactions 
must be placed within the larger context of rules and institutions in which 
policymaking essentially takes place. Countries in Europe operate in a complex 
system of multilevel governance, where room for fiscal manoeuvre by govern-
ments is externally limited. Intergovernmental organisations and supranational 
institutions constrain national fiscal policy responses through the provision of 
financial assistance to states in difficulties, but also by the introduction of 
stronger fiscal rules, reinforcement of financial supervision and broadening of 
surveillance in order to secure financial stability. Altogether, eight Eurozone 
countries were forced to seek a bailout, receiving financial support from the EU, 
the IMF or the World Bank. These disbursements were strongly conditional on 
policy achievements in fiscal consolidation, forcing countries to implement 
stringent austerity measures and structural reforms in order to restore financial 
stability and to return to sustainable growth. Consequently, countries that 
received a bailout were even more constrained in their execution of national 
economic policies as they were subject to much higher scrutiny from external 
institutions (Okolikj and Quinlan 2016). Additional pressure to control national 
budgets followed from international bond markets. However, voters are gener-
ally aware of the limitations that economic internationalisation imposes on 
policymaking (Fernández-Albertos 2006), and if policies are externally 
imposed, then the former may be less willing to hold national governments 
accountable for policy decisions. Especially in the early years of the Great 
Recession, international pressures on states with regard to fiscal adjustments 
may have affected public perceptions of national-level crisis management and 
muddied the waters of responsibility attribution. In other words, in a system 
where a government’s ability to steer the national economy is curbed and policy 
responsibility is divided between various levels of governance, voters could be 
less inclined to hold governments accountable for unpopular economic policy 
measures. Moreover, the electoral consequences of austerity may vary depend-
ing on the ideological leaning of the governing parties. The costs of fiscal con-
solidation for left-wing parties may differ from these for the parties on the right 
flank of the political spectrum. Further research is needed in order to shed more 
light on how these contextual factors interact with individual-level voting 
behaviour.    
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7. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
7.1. Summary of main findings 
There is a widely acknowledged robust relationship between the economy and 
electoral results: voters are prone to holding political leaders responsible for 
economic outcomes, and sanction or reward them based on the government 
economic record. Incumbent support typically suffers when the economic 
climate worsens and increases when the economy booms. Previous work shows 
that voters form their political preferences based on national rather than per-
sonal economic circumstances, and give more weight to the incumbent’s past 
rather than future economic performance. But not all elections are determined 
by national economic conditions. The course of history has witnessed presi-
dents, governments and incumbent parties being voted out of office during peri-
ods of prosperity and economic growth, and getting re-elected amidst deep 
recessions. Academic work on the topic, too, suffers from the lack of con-
sistency in research results. Students of voting behaviour often find empirical 
evidence of economic effects on political support, but not always and not 
everywhere, and it remains unclear why that is. The fact that previous studies on 
economic voting have produced contradictory, puzzling and inconclusive find-
ings was a major motivating factor for the present author in writing this 
dissertation.  
A strand of recent work attributes the inconsistency in empirical outcomes in 
academic studies to methodological issues (see Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; 
van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007). It is argued that discrepancies in 
variable operationalisation, model specification, methodological approach and 
other similar research decisions have led to contradictory conclusions not only 
across elections but also in works using similar datasets. The first task of this 
dissertation was to address namely these concerns. In the first stage of the anal-
ysis, I compiled a highly heterogeneous dataset with regard to political and 
economic contexts, including time periods from before, during and after the 
global economic crisis. Giving careful consideration to variable selection, 
measurement issues and model specification, I then tested in Chapter 4 the sta-
bility of economic voting in ten established Western European democracies, 
using data for five survey years between 1989–2014 and a total sample of more 
than 55,000 respondents. The analysis provides solid evidence that economic 
considerations have a strong effect on incumbent support (see Table 14). Citi-
zens clearly withdraw support from governments during economic decline and 
rally behind incumbents when the economy flourishes. As demonstrated later on 
in Chapter 6, these tendencies extend well beyond Western Europe. Next, I 
challenged the results by applying a number of statistical and methodological 
robustness checks and demonstrated that economic effects remain stable against 
these tests. These outcomes provide me with enough confidence to be able to 
conclude that the economy matters to voters in developed democracies, in that 
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citizens regularly observe national economic outcomes and shape their electoral 
decisions accordingly.  
The global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 has underlined the 
concerns about the instability dilemma in economic voting. During the crisis, a 
large part of the Western world was hit by severe economic hardship and a 
sharp increase in unemployment. Considering that economic effects are gener-
ally more pronounced during weak economic times than during strong, such a 
harsh recession was widely regarded as being bad news for incumbent govern-
ments as voters were expected to use elections as a means to give voice to their 
discontent and punish political leaders (see Mueller 1973; Anderson 1995). On 
the other hand, there are reasons to believe that economic effects have weak-
ened over time. A growing body of academic literature suggests that low clarity 
in the attribution of responsibility for economic developments diminishes eco-
nomic voting (see Katzenstein 1985; Powell and Whitten 1993; Hellwig 2001; 
Fernández-Albertos 2006; Kayser 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2010). Multilevel 
governance, increasing economic interdependence and the complex global 
nature of the crisis have left voters confused about responsibility for national 
economic outcomes, consequently blurring patterns of blame attribution and 
weakening the link between the economy and the vote. Following the above, the 
second task of this dissertation was to test two competing theoretical expecta-
tions. According to the first, economic voting in times of crisis should increase 
over that seen in non-crisis times due to negative asymmetry. According to the 
rival account, the effects of the economy on voting should lessen due to the lack 
of clarity in the attribution of economic responsibility. In order to draw gener-
alised conclusions on voting behaviour patterns and avoid the influence of elec-
tion-specific characteristics, I again employed large-scale cross-sectional time-
series data with a sample of more than 55,000 respondents. The findings in 
Chapter 5 demonstrate that there is very little abrupt change in economic voting 
over time: economic effects were neither less nor more pronounced during the 
worldwide crisis compared to the other years under study. The statistical rela-
tionship between the economy and voting remained remarkably constant and 
was not subject to short-term fluctuations, even after the most dramatic eco-
nomic recession in our lifetime (see Table 14). The stability of economic voting 
is particularly noteworthy considering that levels of voter dissatisfaction with 
national economic performance soared in 2009.      
These results pose a serious challenge to the theory of economic voting. If 
the magnitude of economic effects has remained more or less constant, then 
drastic economic changes should have led to a reshaping of national political 
landscapes as a consequence of the Great Recession. However, mid-crisis and 
post-crisis elections in many European countries demonstrate that this was not 
necessarily the case. Incumbent governments were voted out of office in many 
countries, but consolidated their popularity and were re-elected in several oth-
ers. Survey data, too, indicate that even though respondent economic assess-
ments worsened sharply by 2009, incumbent support levels reflected a surpris-
ingly steady pattern. Does this mean that there are other dimensions to eco-
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nomic considerations that explain voter political behaviour? In this dissertation 
I argued that part of the variation in incumbent vote can be attributed to national 
economic policies. Voters typically observe macroeconomic outcomes in order 
to evaluate government performance, but when the clarity of economic respon-
sibility is poor and, furthermore, when the economy is in recession everywhere, 
citizens may need additional sources of information in order to form a reasoned 
opinion. It is feasible to assume that government policy response to the crisis is 
one such source: citizens observe and assess government policy actions and use 
this information to judge the economic competence of incumbents. Using com-
parative survey data, which in Chapter 6 is extended to 24 European countries 
and more than 77,000 respondents, and utilising macroeconomic indicators 
novel to political science research, I showed that in addition to traditional retro-
spective economic evaluations, the policy context helps explain electoral out-
comes. In fact, economic policies have emerged as one of the key predictors of 
individual vote choice next to more conventional determinants, revealing the 
new and multidimensional face of economic voting (see also Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Foucault 2013). The results indicate 
that citizens in Europe react more painfully to contractionary fiscal measures 
than to fiscal expansion. Contrary to theoretical expectations, I found no evi-
dence that austerity measures were overwhelmingly endorsed by voters in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis due to being perceived as inevitable in order 
to restore public finances (see Besley and Case 1995; Stokes 1996). However, it 
is clear that five years on citizens in many countries have grown weary of tax 
increases and radical cuts to welfare state functions, public services and bene-
fits. In the post-crisis era, government decision to pursue fiscal austerity signifi-
cantly lowers incumbent support (see Table 14).  
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Summing up, this work has three major conclusions. First, it provides solid 
evidence that there is a strong and robust positive statistical relationship 
between the economy and political support, as first suggested by foundational 
theories of voting behaviour and later confirmed by numerous studies observing 
the electoral decision-making process of democratic citizens in Europe and 
elsewhere. Concerns over the instability of the relationship between the econ-
omy and voting should beyond doubt be taken seriously. Outliers do exist, and 
sometimes appear more frequent than the advocates of traditional economic 
voting theory would like to admit. Nevertheless, while addressing these worries 
by advancing the study of political support mechanisms, we should keep in 
mind that the broader goal of the scientific method is to create systematic 
knowledge by identifying patterns and regularities. Unique cases are fascinating 
and provide nuanced understanding of the subject matter, but the underlying 
target is to generate universal knowledge. 
Secondly, we can conclude that despite the major contextual fluctuations that 
have occurred over the past decade, economic voting has proved to be quite 
consistent over time. This is certainly not to argue that the worldwide crisis had 
no influence on voter attitudes: subjective economic evaluations deteriorated 
sharply with the vast majority of people expressing deep discontent with eco-
nomic performance. The restricted variance in these evaluations may make it 
methodologically complex to detect temporal changes in economic effects, but 
additional tests carried out to address these difficulties did not lend any support 
to the view that economic voting has become either more or less intense in 
response to the crisis. In substantive terms, the patterns of retrospective voting 
identified in this analysis are fairly consistent. However, this work revealed the 
emergence of a novel dimension to the formation of political support, economic 
policy voting, which has arisen in the voter calculus as a consequence of the 
economic slump. The study demonstrated that citizens pay more attention to 
national fiscal policies than before, and hold incumbents responsible for painful 
austerity programs. The policy dimension does not replace the traditional mech-
anism of economic voting, but holds, at least in the post-crisis context, an influ-
ential position at its side as an accompanying vote determinant.   
 
 
7.2. Limitations of the study 
This dissertation helps us to understand the role of the economy in citizens’ 
electoral behaviour. It reported robust economic effects that hold steady across 
different geographical locations, against the macroeconomic turmoil during the 
global economic crisis, and against commonly stressed methodological chal-
lenges in economic voting research. The analysis reminds us of the importance 
of the individual-level cross-sectional time-series approach in studies of voting 
behaviour in order to draw generalisable conclusions on the basic mechanisms 
of the responsibility attribution. However, this work has shortcomings that need 
to be highlighted and, where possible, to be taken into account in future studies. 
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First and foremost, the analysis presented here does not eliminate the much-
debated problem of inconsistency in retrospective economic effects. It does not 
look at the contextual factors that characterise the countries under study, for 
instance the institutional setting, which may condition the magnitude of elec-
toral sanctioning or rewarding and help explain cross-national diversity in the 
economic vote. Instead, it focuses on temporal dynamics. We are able to say 
based on the findings presented in this work that the overall statistical relation-
ship between the economy and the vote is strong, even in the context of severe 
macroeconomic turbulence. However, a large part of the variation in political 
support remains unexplained: clearly, additional drivers exist that determine 
individual decision to cast a vote for or against governing parties, which are not 
identified here. I propose in the dissertation that national economic policies are 
one such covariate, and I believe that this emerging dimension of voter eco-
nomic considerations needs greater attention. Government policy reactions to 
external impulses are a relevant feature not only in the context of the crisis, but 
increasingly define national economic outcomes in the current environment of 
growing economic interdependence and multilevel governance. It is fair to 
expect that citizens pay attention to and assess government policy performance, 
and use this information when they form their political attitudes. Furthermore, 
future work should consider the possibility that the relationship between eco-
nomic policies and incumbent support is mediated by the clarity of responsi-
bility for policy choices. If economic policies are externally constrained, then 
voters may be less willing to hold national governments accountable for unpop-
ular measures. Therefore, the effect can be expected to depend on the extent to 
which national governments share responsibility for economic policies with 
supranational and intergovernmental institutions. Of course, voter willingness to 
punish incumbents for unpopular policies may also be moderated by domestic 
factors, such as the ideological leaning of the government. It is possible that 
governing parties on the right flank of the political spectrum, which are tradi-
tionally associated with conservative fiscal policies, find more support and 
understanding from voters when they introduce cuts to public goods and ser-
vices than they would from their left-wing counterparts, who typically advocate 
larger government and higher spending. These are only some of the condition-
ing mechanisms that may help reveal to what extent and in which direction 
incumbent popularity is affected by the policies they pursue.  
Common challenges of individual-level studies on economic voting, which 
this work inevitably suffers from as well, are the endogeneity issue and the 
restricted variance problem. Both remind us to avoid drawing overly reaching 
conclusions based on our research findings, and call for caution when making 
causal inferences. In the presence of either of the two phenomena, it may be 
complicated to assess the substantive connection between the economy and 
voting in survey-based research, which may as a result lead to incorrect estima-
tions of economic effects. Throughout this analysis, special methodological 
measures were taken in order to account for potential endogeneity of and 
restricted variance in economic perceptions. Nevertheless, these are fundamen-
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tal problems in the broad field of empirical studies of political science, which 
cannot be fully addressed with observational data. Perhaps in the future new 
methodological possibilities such as experimental designs could be utilised in 
studies on crisis consequences, in order to deal with such issues and to properly 
assess causal relationships between variables.    
Critics may also express concern over measurement, modelling, and meth-
odological decisions used in this study – these are topics often discussed in 
economic voting research. While I attempted to pay careful attention to each of 
these matters and undertake robustness tests where possible, disagreements 
between researchers over such decisions are ultimately unavoidable. For 
example, it could be argued that data from 2009 is not suitable for measuring 
the influence of the economic crisis. The survey fieldwork of the EES Voter 
study in 2009 was carried out in the middle of the year, and it is possible that 
the severity of the economic downfall was not yet reflected in respondents’ 
answers given in June. Moreover, using data on government policies from 2009 
may be problematic because in many instances fiscal consolidation measures 
were only implemented later in the year. One may also claim that it is a mis-
judgement to consider 2014 as a post-crisis year because some countries were 
still experiencing serious financial difficulties, and many were surely still strug-
gling with balancing the public finances. Unfortunately, however, the hands of a 
researcher are tied with regard to these decisions, as choices are dictated by data 
availability, especially in the matter of high-quality survey data that enable 
cross-sectional time-series comparisons. While the search continues for 
improved ways and better data for studying voter behaviour, these caveats must 
be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this research.  
   
 
7.3. Theoretical and practical implications  
By addressing concerns about the instability of economic voting from various 
aspects, this work contributes to the existing knowledge by providing empiri-
cally and methodologically sound confirmation of the presence of retrospective 
voting in general, and during the financial and economic crisis in particular. 
Although the literature on the political impact of crises on electoral behaviour is 
growing, we still know little about the wider political consequences of the Great 
Recession. Existing research by political scientists remains incomplete, often 
only focusing on single elections, countries and regions, making it difficult to 
draw broader conclusions. This dissertation aspired to fill some of these gaps in 
the knowledge. While exploring context-specific conditions is undoubtedly 
necessary, a fuller understanding of the core mechanisms of voting behaviour 
from more systematic analyses is essential as it constitutes a foundation for 
further studies in the field and helps build comprehensive theory. Responding to 
academic concerns over the lack of consistency in economic effects, the robust 
and extensive analysis carried out in this dissertation provides systematic and 
reliable evidence of strong economic vote as well as its temporal stability. The 
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economy is a powerful predictor of electoral support in Europe, and the strength 
of the punishing-rewarding mechanism seems to be largely immune to external 
shocks.  
The dissertation also contributes to the literature from a theoretical point of 
view, in that it introduces government economic policies as a determinant of 
incumbent support. Up until now, policy-based voting has received little atten-
tion in the academic literature, but I argue that especially in times of crises the 
way national governments react to global economic fluctuations gains signifi-
cance in the public agenda and, subsequently, affects voter attitudes and their 
electoral decisions. Voter calculus has become more complex amid the eco-
nomic turmoil. It contains various economic dimensions, and only by taking 
into account all of these dimensions can we fully understand an economic voter 
and assess the performance of the mechanism of economic voting, both under 
ordinary and extraordinary socioeconomic circumstances (see also Lewis-Beck 
and Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Foucault 2013). Recently, a grow-
ing number of studies have noted the significance of national crisis-time poli-
cies, discussing the economy from a positional perspective (see Clarke et al. 
2013; Magalhães 2014a; Nezi and Katsanidou 2014; Karyotis and Rüdig 2015; 
Kavanagh 2015; Whiteley et al. 2015). Still, we know very little about how 
government economic policy decisions shape political support patterns, and I 
believe that next to the traditional reward-punishment approach, the policy 
dimension requires greater awareness in future work. Importantly, I also draw 
attention to the shortcomings of how economic policies are measured in pre-
vious works. In this study, I introduce a novel measure of government policy 
stance by using macroeconomic indicators that are commonly employed in 
economics, but have thus far found little use in political science. Utilisation of 
these variables enables us to more precisely assess economic policy voting.  
Past decades have seen a decline in traditional social cleavages in predicting 
electoral choice, and the shift to performance-based voting has increased the 
evaluative content of elections. Parties are increasingly judged by the policies 
they advocate, which suggests greater democratic responsiveness (Dalton 1996: 
340). With regard to wider implications, the conclusions presented in this 
dissertation provide support for the judgement that there exists healthy demo-
cratic accountability in Europe. Of course, economic voting is only one of the 
many ways in which citizens give feedback to political leaders, but if voters 
maintain a capacity to monitor national policymaking and to react accordingly, 
then parties seeking electoral success are forced to take into account public 
interest and to act with the public benefit in mind when establishing and pursu-
ing economic policies. This assures that governmental business remains public 
business. For citizens, maintaining their right to demand accountability for how 
public policies are being executed – and being aware that such a possibility 
exists – empowers them to fulfil their role as democratic actors and to actively 
participate in the process of decision-making. This democratic mechanism, 
ultimately, helps determine national policy. 
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That said, recommendations for policymakers based on these findings are 
less straightforward than advising them to blindly follow public demands. In 
many ways, democratic accountability can be imperfect. Previous scholarship 
suggests that political behavior of the great majority of the citizens is driven by 
how they feel about the economy and by political loyalties typically acquired in 
childhood, rather than the facts of political life and government policy (Achen 
and Bartels 2016). To expect ordinary people to possess thorough expertise in 
political and economic matters would be naïve. In fact, citizens may exhibit 
contradictory opinions when it comes to economic issues: for example, voters 
have been found to expect more benefits for the same or lower level of taxes 
(see Steinmo 1996). The public may also resist certain policy measures, even 
necessary ones, when these are pursued ‘in their backyard’ and threaten their 
own wellbeing. Furthermore, citizens may not be able to correctly put into per-
spective long-term and short-term gains, short-sightedly opting for the latter. 
Even when voting is based on public approval or disapproval of the past per-
formance of the political leaders – which requires less elaborate and informed 
policy views – ordinary citizens may lack sensible judgements about credit or 
blame. Retrospective voters can be blind, i.e. hold incumbents accountable for 
events that they do not control, and myopic, i.e. focus only on short periods of 
time (Achen and Bartels 2016). These tendencies make it hard for elected offi-
cials to respond to public preferences. On the other hand, overall economic 
knowledge has grown over time and society has become more demanding, 
expecting effective economic management from political leaders. Incumbents 
unable to effectively respond to economic challenges face the threat of being 
voted out of office. This applies particularly strongly in periods of crisis, when 
the salience of economic issues is greater and political parties compete in their 
ability to manage national policy reactions to external shocks. Governments 
seeking re-election must find a viable balance in this complex situation between 
what is rational and necessary for the country and what is supported by the 
electorate.    
There is no doubt that the economy matters for voters. The sequence of 
banking and sovereign debt crises that unfolded in 2007, and a very slow recov-
ery from the steep crash, had powerful consequences, resulting not only in 
short-term electoral losses but led to, in several countries, substantial restruc-
turing of the political landscape. Popular discontent has evoked an anti-estab-
lishment wave, as demonstrated by unforeseen support levels of Donald Trump 
in the United States and by the emergence of left and right populism all across 
Europe. In the United Kingdom, the willingness of citizens to punish the 
incumbents took a particularly dramatic turn when the country voted to leave 
the EU at public referendum in June 2016. Economic considerations played an 
essential role in determining where people stood on the referendum decision. 
Voters who wished to remain in the EU feared the great risks that leaving the 
EU would bring along to the country’s economy, prices and jobs, whereas the 
‘leave’ voters saw more threats than opportunities to their living standard from 
the way the economy and society are changing, for example as a result of immi-
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gration and the free movement of people (Lord Ashcroft 2016). Moreover, 
many supporters of the British exit from the EU, known colloquially as ‘Brexit’, 
saw the referendum as an opportunity to express their deep dissatisfaction with 
long-time economic malaise and several years of Tory-led austerity policies. 
However, economic issues were not the only ones that drove the ‘leave’ vote in 
Britain. The protest sentiment was also strongly motivated by psychological and 
emotional aspects related to security, culture and national identity, and by the 
overall resentment towards the ruling elite, both within the country and in 
Brussels.  
The British case illustrates vividly that while the economy plays a major – 
and a very consistent – role in how citizens evaluate the work of political lead-
ers, the final vote choice is a complex combination of various aspects, some of 
which are rational and many of which are not. A major lesson from the British 
shock vote is that it is a risky decision to trust the populist rhetoric over rational 
arguments in political campaigns and media framing in a situation where so 
much is at stake. A dissatisfied citizenry demanding change is one thing, but 
when populist ideas catch fire, it has the potential to swing the results in a 
direction that irreversibly changes the course of history, not only for the state in 
question but possibly for much of the interdependent and globalised inter-
national community. The danger is real, given the emerging anti-establishment 
sentiment in many parts of the advanced industrial world.  
Finally, the experience from the Great Recession has taught us that govern-
ments can also survive the crises. Sometimes miserable economic conditions are 
not directly associated with government actions; sometimes the situation, albeit 
poor, is still perceived as being preferable to that of another place or another 
moment in time, and sometimes other issues than the economic ones receive 
primary focus in the minds of the electorate. This knowledge is particularly 
comforting for political parties seeking to be elected or re-elected in today’s 
world, where both political and economic instability are growing. The contin-
ued aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, the ongoing immigration 
crisis, and the as-yet-unpredictable consequences of Brexit provide clear signals 
that countries operate in a context full of uncertainty, external threats, and sud-
den transformations, which require quick and adequate reactions. This new 
reality, where what constitutes as a ‘non-crisis’ time remains ambiguous, 
changes the rules of the political game and makes political calculation more 
challenging. Nevertheless, this work provides evidence that one way for incum-
bents to increase their prospects for survival is to ensure as much as possible 
that their actions benefit the country’s current and future economic wellbeing. 
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics for Chapters 4 and 5. 
If there was a general election tomorrow, 
which party would you vote for? 
21.41% ‘Current PM party’ 
49.76% ‘Other party’  
28.83% Missing (incl. refused, don’t 
know, would vote blank, would spoil the 
vote, would not vote) 
What do you think about the economy? 
Compared to 12 months ago, do you think 
that the general economic situation in 
[country] is… 
43.23% ‘Worse’ 
29.03% ‘Same’ 
25.69% ‘Better’ 
2.05% Missing 
In political matters people talk of “the 
left” and “the right”. What is your 
position? Please indicate your views using 
any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means “left” and 10 means “right”. 
Which number best describes your 
position? 
Mean 5.37 
Std. deviation 2.31 
12.07% Missing 
If you were asked to choose one of these 
names for your social class, which would 
you say you belong to? 
29.76% ‘Working class’ 
63.55% ‘Middle class’ 
1.69% ‘Upper class’ 
5% Missing 
Apart from special occasions such as 
weddings and funerals, how often do you 
attend religious services nowadays? 
 3.98% ‘Several times a week’ 
17.77% ‘Once a week’ 
32.86% ‘Few times a year’ 
12.08% ‘Once a year or less’ 
21.09% ‘Never’ 
12.21% Missing (incl. not applicable in 
1989, 1994) 
What year were you born?  
Recoded into age in full years.  
Mean 47.46 
Std. deviation 17.39 
0.49% Missing 
Are you … 47.71% ‘Male’ 
52.17% ‘Female’ 
0.12% Missing 
How old were you when you stopped full‐
time education? 
6.04% ‘Still studying’ 
26.29% ‘Up to 15’ 
35.04% ’16–19’ 
30.55 ’20 or more’ 
2.08% Missing 
Cabinet time in office (months) Mean 20.73 
Std. deviation 13.99 
0% Missing 
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Which party did you vote for at the 
General Election of [year]?  
26.03% ‘Current PM party’ 
44.59% ‘Other party’  
29.38% Missing (incl. refused, don’t 
know, was not eligible, voted blank, 
spoiled vote, did not vote) 
GDP growth, change on previous year (%) Mean 1.48 
Std. deviation 3.20 
0% Missing 
Inflation, annual average rate of  
change (%) 
Mean 2.13 
Std. deviation 2.78 
0% Missing 
Unemployment, annual average rate of 
change (%) 
Mean -0.25 
Std. deviation 1.54 
0% Missing 
If there was a general election tomorrow, 
which party would you vote for? 
27.54% ‘Government party’ 
43.63% ‘Other party’  
28.83% Missing (incl. refused, don’t 
know, would vote blank, would spoil the 
vote, would not vote) 
Which party did you vote for in the 
European Parliament elections? 
1989 not included. 
16.32% ‘PM party’ 
42.64% ‘Other party’  
41.04% Missing (incl. refused, don’t 
know, was not eligible, voted blank, 
spoiled vote, did not vote) 
If there was a general election tomorrow, 
which party would you vote for? 
21.41% ‘PM party’ 
55.49% ‘Other party, or would vote blank, 
spoil vote or not vote’  
23.1% Missing (incl. refused, don’t know) 
Aggregated positive economic  
evaluations (%) 
Mean 25.69 
Std. deviation 15.97 
0% Missing 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 countries; Eurostat and OECD; 
author’s own calculations. 
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Appendix 3. Interaction effects of economic evaluations and year on incumbent 
support.  
Economic evaluations: same ref. category 
Economic evaluations: worse -0.33* 
(0.17) 
Economic evaluations: better 0.46*** 
(0.10) 
Left-right placement 4.06*** 
(0.28) 
Class 0.45*** 
(0.16) 
Religiosity -0.45** 
(0.16) 
Age  0.93*** 
(0.13) 
Gender  0.09** 
(0.04) 
Education  -0.05 
(0.07) 
Cabinet time in office logged -0.49 
(0.31) 
1989  0.51*** 
(0.19) 
1994 0.23 
(0.21) 
2004 0.01 
(0.24) 
2014 -0.26 
(0.19) 
Worse X 1989 -0.24 
(0.27) 
Worse X 1994 -0.06 
(0.20) 
Worse X 2004 -0.41* 
(0.24) 
Worse X 2014 -0.05 
(0.24) 
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Better X 1989 -0.02 
(0.13) 
Better X 1994 -0.07 
(0.14) 
Better X 2004 0.08 
(0.18) 
Better X 2014 0.00 
(0.18) 
 
McFadden’s R2  
N 
0.19 
30,980 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote 
intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who 
said they would vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-
right placement, class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are 
recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. Country dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by survey (each country 
in each year).  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
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Appendix 4. Effects of the exogenised economy on incumbent support. 
 (1) Basic model (2) Interactions 
Good economic evaluations 0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Left-right placement 4.22*** 
(0.28) 
4.25*** 
(0.29) 
Class 0.50*** 
(0.16) 
0.55*** 
(0.17) 
Religiosity -0.45*** 
(0.15) 
-0.44*** 
(0.15) 
Age  0.86*** 
(0.13) 
0.91*** 
(0.12) 
Gender  0.04 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Education  -0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.00 
(0.07) 
Cabinet time in office 
logged 
-0.47* 
(0.31) 
-0.49* 
(0.27) 
1989  0.37 
(0.28) 
-1.13** 
(0.57) 
1994 0.16 
(0.22) 
-0.07 
(0.56) 
2004 -0.04 
(0.22) 
-0.61 
(0.50) 
2014 -0.32 
(0.28) 
-0.10 
(0.53) 
Good economic evaluations 
X 1989 
 0.07 
(0.04) 
Good economic evaluations 
X 1994 
 0.03 
(0.04) 
Good economic evaluations 
X 2004 
 0.04 
(0.04) 
Good economic evaluations 
X 2014 
 0.02 
(0.04) 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.17 0.18 
N 31,350 31,350 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; author’s own 
calculations. 
Notes: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote intention 
is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who said they would 
vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-right placement, class 
and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. Country 
and year dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by survey (each country in each year).  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
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Appendix 5. Interaction effects of economic evaluations and GDP growth on 
incumbent support. 
Economic evaluations: same ref. category 
Economic evaluations: worse -0.42*** 
(0.08) 
Economic evaluations: better 0.45*** 
(0.08) 
GDP growth  0.13** 
(0.05) 
Economic evaluations: worse X GDP growth  -0.02 
(0.02) 
Economic evaluations: better X GDP growth  -0.01 
(0.02) 
Left-right placement 4.10*** 
(0.28) 
Class 0.47*** 
(0.15) 
Religiosity -0.44*** 
(0.15) 
Age  0.91*** 
(0.13) 
Gender  0.09** 
(0.04) 
Education  -0.05 
(0.06) 
Cabinet time in office logged -0.49 
(0.30) 
 
McFadden’s R2  0.19 
N 30,980 
Source: EES Voter study from 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 10 European countries; OECD; author’s 
own calculations. 
Notes: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if vote 
intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, refusals, respondents who 
said they would vote blank, would spoil their vote or would not vote, and missing answers are excluded. Left-
right placement, class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control variables are 
recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. Country and year dummies are not shown. Standard errors clustered by survey (each 
country in each year).  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1  
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Appendix 6. Descriptive statistics for Chapter 6. 
If there was a general election tomorrow, 
which party would you vote for? 
18.78% ‘PM party’ 
49.96% ‘Other party’  
31.25% Missing (incl. refused, don’t 
know, would vote blank, spoil vote or not 
vote) 
What do you think about the economy? 
Compared to 12 months ago, do you think 
that the general economic situation in 
[country] is… 
49.00% ‘Worse’ 
27.80% ‘Stayed the same’ 
18.82% ‘Better’ 
4.39% Missing 
Change in government structural  
balance (%) 
Mean 33.56 
Std. deviation 117.57 
6.75% Missing 
Change in government total  
expenditure (%) 
Mean 3.99 
Std. deviation 5.03 
0.00% Missing 
Change in government total tax  
revenue (%) 
Mean 1.69 
Std. deviation 6.89 
0.00% Missing 
In political matters people talk of  
“the left” and “the right”. What is your 
position? Please indicate your views using 
any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means “left” and 10 means “right”. 
Which number best describes your 
position? 
Mean 5.26 
Std. deviation 2.54 
15.33% Missing  
If you were asked to choose one of these 
names for your social class, which would 
you say you belong to? 
29.10% ‘Working class’ 
62.29% ‘Middle class’ 
2.04% ‘Upper class’ 
6.56% Missing 
Apart from special occasions such as 
weddings and funerals, how often do you 
attend religious services nowadays? 
3.12% ‘Several times a week’ 
13.29% ‘Once a week’ 
30.85% ‘Few times a year’ 
18.00% ‘Once a year or less’ 
28.63% ‘Never’ 
6.10% Missing  
What year were you born?  
Recoded into age in full years. 
Mean 49.70  
Std. deviation 17.35 
3.56% Missing 
Are you… 45.29% ‘Male’ 
53.38% ‘Female’ 
1.34% Missing 
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How old were you when you stopped full‐
time education? 
5.37% ‘Still studying’ 
15.30% ’15 or younger’ 
38.50% ’16-19’ 
36.24% ’20 or older’ 
4.58% Missing 
Cabinet time in office (months) Mean 21.38 
Std. deviation 15.31  
0.00% Missing 
Eurozone membership 59.47% ‘Yes’  
40.53% ‘No’  
0.00% Missing 
Source: EES Voter study from 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 24 European countries; Eurostat and OECD; author’s 
own calculations.  
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Appendix 7. Interaction effects of government economic policy and year on incumbent 
support. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Economic evaluations: same ref. category ref. category ref. category 
Economic evaluations: worse -0.51*** 
(0.16) 
-0.47*** 
(0.15) 
-0.47*** 
(0.16) 
Economic evaluations: better 0.51*** 
(0.16) 
0.51*** 
(0.15) 
0.51*** 
(0.16) 
Government structural 
balance 
-0.39 
(1.19) 
- - 
Government expenditure - 0.14 
(0.64) 
- 
0.88 
Tax revenue - - (0.81) 
2004 -0.39 
(0.55) 
-0.71 
(0.69) 
0.98 
(1.04) 
2014 -3.02*** 
(1.02) 
-3.01*** 
(0.68) 
1.05 
(1.33) 
2004 X Government 
structural balance 
0.48 
(1.33) 
- - 
2014 X Government 
structural balance 
7.83*** 
(2.83) 
- - 
2004 X Government 
expenditure 
- 0.68 
(1.05) 
- 
2014 X Government 
expenditure 
- 5.12*** 
(1.18) 
- 
2004 X Tax revenue - - -2.01 
(1.53) 
2014 X Tax revenue - - -2.18 
(1.99) 
Left-right self-placement 4.11*** 
(0.06) 
4.12*** 
(0.06) 
4.12*** 
(0.06) 
Social class 0.60*** 
(0.06) 
0.57*** 
(0.05) 
0.57*** 
(0.05) 
Religiosity -0.31*** 
(0.05) 
-0.30*** 
(0.05) 
-0.29*** 
(0.05) 
Age 0.79*** 
(0.06) 
0.72*** 
(0.06) 
0.72*** 
(0.06) 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Gender 0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
Education  -0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Cabinet time in office logged 0.49* 
(0.29) 
0.53** 
(0.26) 
0.19 
(0.27) 
Eurozone membership 0.37*** 
(0.14) 
0.55*** 
(0.13) 
0.39*** 
(0.15) 
 
Log likelihood -18796.34 -19761.76 -19787.37 
Number of countries 23 24 24 
Number of country-years 63 68 68 
Number of individuals 39,894 42,363 42,363 
Source: EES Voter study from 2004, 2009 and 2014 for 24 European countries; Eurostat and IMF; author’s 
own calculations.  
Notes: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Random effects not shown. The 
dependent variable is 1 if vote intention is for the incumbent PM party and 0 for any other party. Don’t knows, 
refusals, respondents who said they would vote blank, spoil vote or would not vote, and missing answers are 
excluded. Left-right placement, class and religiosity are adjusted for the PM party’s ideology. All control 
variables are recoded from 0 to 1.  
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Akadeemiline kirjandus pakub ulatuslikku tõestust sellest, et majanduslike 
tingimuste ja valimistulemuste vahel on tugev positiivse suunaga seos. Valijad 
peavad võimulolijaid riigi majanduse eest vastutavaks: valitsusparteide toetus 
kasvab, kui majandus kosub, ning kannatab, kui majandusel läheb kehvasti. 
Paraku ei ole aga kõikide valimiste tulemused üheselt majandusest tingitud. 
Ajalugu on olnud tunnistajaks nii riigijuhtidele, kes kindlustavad oma popu-
laarsust sügavas majanduslanguses, kui ka nendele, kes on kaotanud oma koha 
majandusedust hoolimata. Ka akadeemiline töö antud valdkonnas pakub eba-
ühtlaseid tulemusi. Majanduslik hääletamine leiab empiirilist tõestust sageli, 
kuid mitte alati ega igal pool, ja pole päris selge, miks see nii on.  
Hiljutine finants- ja majanduskriis on küsimuse majandusliku hääletamise 
ebastabiilsusest taas teravalt päevakorda kergitanud. Kriisi ajal koges valdav 
enamik läänemaailma riikidest sügavaimat majanduslangust alates 1930ndatest, 
asetades valitsused silmitsi kahanevate riigituludega, kasvavate kulutustega ja 
rekordkõrge võlatasemega, sundides mitmeid riike ellu viima karme kärpe-
meetmeid. Lähtudes klassikalisest majandusliku hääletamise teooriast peaks 
niivõrd tähelepanuväärne majanduslik ebastabiilsus viima tõsiste poliitiliste 
tagajärgedeni. Tõepoolest, mitmed Euroopa valitsusparteid said valimistel 
armutult lüüa, ent mitmetes teistes õnnestus võimulolijatel oma positsioon säili-
tada või seda isegi tugevdada. Need arengud on tõstatanud vajaduse majandus-
tingimuste ja hääletamise omavahelist seost paremini mõista.    
Majandusliku hääletamise ebastabiilsus oligi selle väitekirja kirjutamise 
peamiseks ajendiks. Kui seost majanduse ja valimiste vahel ei eksisteeri, siis on 
piiratud ka valijate võime võimulolijaid majandustulemuste eest vastutavaks 
pidada, mis omakorda jätab viimastele vabad käed ellu viia neile sobivaid 
poliitikaid, isegi kui need ei ole kooskõlas avaliku huviga. Väitekiri käsitles 
majandusliku hääletamise ebastabiilsuse küsimust kolmest aspektist, millest 
igaühele oli pühendatud eraldi empiiriline peatükk. Esmalt uuris töö majanduse 
ja poliitilise toetuse vahelise seose üldist tugevust. Pöörates erilist tähelepanu 
metodoloogilistele küsimustele, vaatles töö majandusliku hääletamise stabiilsust 
kümnes Lääne-Euroopa demokraatias, kasutades indiviidi-tasandi 
küsitlusandmeid ajavahemikust 1989-2014 ja hõlmates enam kui 55 000 
vastajat. Tulemused kinnitavad, et majanduslikel kaalutlustel on tugev mõju 
poliitilistele eelistustele. Valijate toetus võimulolijatele kasvab, kui majandus 
õitseb, ja kahaneb, kui majandus on languses. Loomulikult esineb erandeid, 
kuid üldjoontes on riigi majanduse käekäik kodanike jaoks arenenud riikides 
oluline – seda jälgitakse ja võetakse oma poliitiliste eelistuste kujundamisel 
arvesse.   
Teiseks uuris töö, mil moel mõjutas majanduslikku hääletamist Euroopas 
finants- ja majanduskriis. Selle osa eesmärgiks oli võrrelda valijakäitumist n.ö 
harilikul ja ebaharilikul ajal, ning kaardistada 2007-2009. aasta sügava kriisi 
poliitilised tagajärjed. Teoreetiliselt oleksime pidanud tunnistajaks olema tuge-
vale valitsusparteide karistamisele valimistel, kuivõrd majandustingimuste mõju 
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hääletamisele on tavapäraselt tugevam siis, kui majandusel läheb kehvasti. 
Teisest küljest aga võib majanduslik hääletamine olukorras, kus riigid üha enam 
teineteisest sõltuvad ja vastutuse omistamine majandustulemuste eest on eba-
määrane, olla hoopis nõrgem. Analüüsitulemused aga kinnitasid, et majanduslik 
hääletamine ei ole aja jooksul üldse erilisel määral muutunud. Statistiline seos 
majanduse ja hääletamise vahel jäi sarnasele tasemele, isegi ajal, mil Euroopat 
raputas viimaste aastakümnete tugevaim majanduslangus. See viitab asjaolule, 
et majandusliku hääletamise mehhanism on välistele šokkidele võrdlemisi 
immuunne.  
Kolmas ja viimane empiiriline peatükk tõi välja uudse dimensiooni majan-
duslikus hääletamises, suunates fookuse majanduspoliitikale. Analüüs kesken-
dus väitele, et olukorras, kus vastutus majandustulemuste eest on hägune ja kus 
majandus on igal pool ühtlaselt languses, vajavad valijad mõnd muud info-
allikad peale majandusnäitajate, et adekvaatselt hinnata riigijuhtide majandus-
likku kompetentsust. Kasutades võrdlevaid küsitlusandmeid, mis selles peatükis 
olid laiendatud 24 Euroopa riigile ja enam kui 77 000 vastajale, ning rakendades 
makromajanduslikke mõõdikuid, mis on politoloogia-alases kirjanduses uudsed, 
näitasin, et lisaks traditsioonilistele retrospektiivsetele majandushinnangutele 
aitab valimistulemusi seletada see, milline on riikide majanduspoliitiline kurss. 
Kriisi järel pööravad kodanikud fiskaalpoliitikatele enam tähelepanu kui varem, 
ja valitsejaid karistatakse karmide kärpemeetmete eest. Veelgi enam, majandus-
poliitikad on tavapäraste tegurite kõrval kerkinud üheks keskseimaks determi-
nandiks, mis indiviidi valimisotsust määravad, viidates asjaolule, et majan-
dusliku hääletamise fenomen on muutunud mitmetahulisemaks.    
Väitekirja panus akadeemilisse teadmisse seisneb ühelt poolt selles, et see 
annab metodoloogiliselt ja empiiriliselt tugevat tõestust asjaolust, et majandus-
tingimuste ja valimiste vahel on oluline seos – seda nii üldiselt kui ka kriiside 
ajal. Teoreetilisest aspektist pakub töö välja uudse käsitluse majanduspolii-
tilisest hääletamisest, mis on kriisi tulemusena esile kerkinud. Töös esitatud 
järeldused annavad tunnustust, et demokraatlik vastutus Euroopas on heal järjel. 
Loomulikult on majanduslik hääletamine kõigest üks mehhanism, mille kaudu 
kodanikud riigijuhtidele tagasisidet annavad, kuid kui valijad säilitavad võima-
luse jälgida riiklikke poliitikaid ja neile adekvaatselt reageerida, tuleb era-
kondadel, kes valimisedu nimel tegutsevad, võtta poliitikakujundamisel arvesse 
avalikku huvi. Kodanikud, kellel säilib võimalus nõuda vastutust poliitikate 
loomise ja elluviimise eest – ja kes on teadlikud sellest, et neil selline võimalus 
on – saavad efektiivsemalt täita oma rolli demokraatlike tegutsejatena ning osa-
leda otsustusprotsessides. Selline demokraatlik mehhanism aitab lõpptule-
musena kaasa sellele, milliseks riigi poliitikad kujunevad.   
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